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Peace Forum

GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF PEACE STUDIES, KYUNG HEE UNIVERSITY

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Peace Message

It is my great honor to have the opportunity of writing the Foreword to the 25th anniversary issue of Peace Forum. The journal symbolizes the GIP students’ commitment to peace and peace education. It is a proud achievement of their cherished tradition of autonomous activities. As the head of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, I commend their efforts to collect the excellent papers and publish it in time for the 25th anniversary.

The Graduate Institute of Peace Studies was founded in 1984 by the internationally renowned educator and peace activist, Dr. Young Seek Choue. It has been rewarded with the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education in 1993. The school envisions a new global society of spiritual beauty, material affluence, and human reward. Its educational goal is to nurture and train peace-oriented international leaders for a better future of mankind. The students of this graduate institute of noble cause and high spirit have come from all over the world; our graduates of more than 400 are working in all walks of life to promote peace and to cultivate a peaceful environment.

As the theme of this year’s Peace Forum indicates, peace and peace education tend to reflect the contemporary international and social issues and conditions of a given time. At times, peace means the prevention of the world from suffering another total war of global scale. In others, it comprises the efforts to provide security and stability for conflict-ridden countries and regions. In another, it involves providing material welfare and sustainable existence for the poor and the weak in the Third World countries. Nowadays, the global society has come to the point of embracing all the past concerns and adding new ones like protection of the environment and sustainable development, hence coming to have a global consensus, the Global Agenda 21.

It has been accepted in 1992 at the Rio conference as an ambitious but achievable goal if all countries are truly committed to it. As of today, however, the specific targets set for an immediate relief of pain and suffering of the less fortunate people are getting remoter to achieve as the world economy runs amok and world politics lacks leadership. Hence, it has become all the more important and crucial for the global civil society to take in charge of mobilizing the support for and of actively participating in implementing the Agenda 21 both at the local and the global level.

In this regard, I truly hope the 25th anniversary issue of Peace Forum provides an occasion for the global citizens to take notice of the urgency of action and becomes a catalyst for getting the peace messages of the 21st century across.

December 2009

Gibung Kwon, Ph.D.
Acting Rector
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Editorial Foreword

For 25 years Peace Forum has engaged in timely debates in Peace Studies, a field that has undergone fundamental changes since the foundation of this journal and its sponsoring institution, the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies (GIP). The striking progress in (re-) defining Peace Studies in the past quarter of a century prompted us to review the trends in this field – not from an academic “ivory tower” but in cooperation with scholars from five continents who are currently researching in various associated disciplines and fields.

The transformations in the field of Peace Studies are illustrated by the proliferation of issues that are and can be discussed. To a large extent this is a result of external dynamics such as the end of the Cold War, the changing character of war and armed conflict – whether due to new technologies or “diminished democracy” – and the emergence of global terrorism. On the other hand, self-reflection is a sign of a mature field, and Peace Studies has questioned its own domain by, for example, engaging constructively with novel conceptualizations of war, peace, and security that to a certain extent have also re-defined the field itself. On the occasion of its 25th Anniversary, the GIP dedicates this Special Edition to questions arising from changes in peace theory and practice with a particular focus on the East Asian context. In addition, we wish to draw attention to approaching these issues from both macro (e.g. the international community) and micro (e.g. grassroots movements) perspectives.

We begin with two views on Peace Studies from a constructivist international relations theory angle. In his contribution, Hannes Peltonen analyzes the concepts of international “systems,” “societies” and “communities” and he refers to the lack of a common Northeast Asian identity beyond sovereignty. If the actors succeeded in constructing a common history and thereby possibly also a common future, the author argues, it is plausible that the region could overcome the hostility and divisions which characterize the contemporary international relations in Northeast Asia. Maria Rost Rublee’s article is dedicated to contentious nonproliferation issues in East Asia. Her study shows that states’ compliance with the nonproliferation regime can be explained neither solely by realist nor by idealist presumptions, but that such explanations involve constructivist and socio-psychological considerations. She concludes that the normative strength of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has helped streamlining state behavior. This plea for rule-based global governance has many practical policy implications, particularly for East Asia.

Next, we turn to interdisciplinary efforts that have flourished in the recent years. Patricia Friedrich introduces the concept of Peace Linguistics. Her main argument is that the importance of languages for peace studies has yet to be fully realized. The short article offers plenty of points of reference concerning the intersection of languages and peace. She also introduces networks that further the understanding of the dynamics between language and peace. Another contribution that looks at the wider picture has been provided by Joel Rookwood. As an example for Sports and Conflict Resolution, the author introduces the case study of a peace building program called “Football [soccer] for Peace” in Israel. The chosen project exemplifies how NGOs can contribute to promoting, building and sustaining peaceful societal co-existence in communities that have experienced war.

Being associated with an institute that aims to promote the development of peace-oriented leaders, we are especially looking for the latest developments in peace education in the East Asian region. We found that encouraging developments have taken place in Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China – countries that to this point have not had a high profile of involve-
ment in Peace Studies. Theresa Der‐lan Yeh reviews the upsurge of peace education in Taiwan in the last decade. She analyzes the improvements on different educational levels and in civil society. Alan Hunter and Liu Cheng describe initiatives for peace studies that have been implemented at Nanjing University in China in cooperation with Coventry University, UK. The authors make a case for expanding peace studies within the Middle Kingdom which would be in its national interest as well as in the interest of the world. We believe that the independent but simultaneous efforts in both mainland China and Taiwan are not just a coincidence and hope for a political environment that allows peace educators on both sides to bridge the Taiwan Strait for fruitful cooperation in this area. Constructing regional consciousness that transcends borders, as we learned earlier in Peltonen’s article, is a crucial task in order to overcome the national divisions on this subcontinent.

Peace museums play a crucial role in raising awareness for and educating the public towards peace. Peter van den Dungen revisits the success story of the global peace museum movement in the last 25 years. He emphasizes that the proliferation of peace studies has sparked the worldwide establishment of peace museums which have become increasingly popular. The peace activist Kazuyo Yamane outlines the differences between war and peace museums in Japan, the home of peace museums. Additionally she explains what conditions institutions should meet in order to classify as peace museums.

The theme of this journal is being summarized by Helena Meyer‐Knapp who draws an analogy from the past “siege war” between East and West on the one hand and the continuing military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, on the other. An expert on Cold War history and peacemaking, she demonstrates that the contenders in the Cold War were never really at peace with each other. Similarly, a closer look at the two Koreas now reveals that the unfinished war between North and South deeply affects the daily lives of people on both sides, and thus can be characterized as “siege war” as well. With this thought‐provoking analysis of the contemporary condition on the Korean peninsula ends the theme‐based section of this journal edition.

The 25th anniversary of the GIP is also an excellent occasion to acknowledge the academic achievements of its students. We have agreed to publish one article based on a distinguished Master’s thesis written at this school. Starting from this 34th edition, the readers of Peace Forum will regularly find the academic work of one honored GIP student. The first such article in this category has been written by Huseyn Aliyev who graduated from this institute in June 2009. His Master’s thesis, which is printed in this journal edition, systematically explains the decline of the civil sector in the Russian Federation.

Peace Forum is entirely compiled and edited by the GIP Student Editorial Board. For the graduate students involved, the process of creating this anniversary edition has been an exciting and refining experience. Yet, without the generous support and advice of the faculty and staff at this exceptional school this issue would not have been possible. We would like to thank especially to Helena Meyer‐Knapp for her continuous and enthusiastic support during the creative process of envisioning this Peace Forum edition and beyond. We are also grateful for Hannes Peltonen’s constructive criticism and helpful comments in the recent months and weeks. Last but not least, we would like to extend our gratitude to the authors who have so generously shared their latest research on Interdisciplinary and Regional Peace Studies with the readers of Peace Forum.

December 2009

Robert Schwarz
Editor‐in‐Chief
Of Systems, Societies, and Communities: Some Thoughts for Northeast Asian Peace Studies

HANNES PELTONEN

The “international community” gains ever wider use among practitioners and scholars of international relations, yet it is unclear whether its contemporary use is synonymous with the older “international society” familiar from the English School. This article provides a conceptual analysis of the differences between international systems, societies, and communities while simultaneously suggesting why Northeast Asian peace studies should pay attention to the differences. As becomes evident in the analysis, international communities are “imagined.” They are distinguishable by their common identity, projects, and “direction” that call a focus upon a common history and projections about the future. Thus, regional peace studies could benefit from examining the viability of constructing a common identity through a common history.

KEYWORDS: International System; International Society; International Community; Northeast Asia.

When President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, I joked with some friends that this was an instance of “pre-emptive peace.” How could the United States now invade Iran despite the concerns over nuclear weapons production? How could Obama not do all that he possibly could to bring about a shift end to the ongoing American conflicts? The joke seemed to fit especially because Obama’s predecessor, President George W. Bush, had emphasized “pre-emptive self-defense” in the run-up to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. It dawned on me only later, as I began to write this paper, that here we saw another example of a meaningful break with the past, especially in the form that turned things on their heads. The past, and breaks with the past, are often neglected when attention is given to “here and now” policy recommendations or in the academic attempt to create theories that can predict, not simply prescribe. Admittedly, the past is considered, but often only as a “storehouse of data,” whence we may find the necessary points through which we can then draw trajectories in our graphs, attempting to predict the future.

These trajectories are disturbed, however, by historical “breakpoints.” Yet, they are problematic at least for two reasons. Although twenty years ago the fall of the Berlin Wall was immediately recognized as a grand historical point, most breakpoints are identified only afterwards given sufficient distance. They do not exist as something that one can see by just looking at history; but they are interpreted. In addition, more often than not, the actors of the day were unaware of the magnitude of change they were experiencing or perhaps catalyzing. On the other hand, these breakpoints are unpredictable. Although we might be able to draw certain future paths given the historical and contemporary conditions, it is logically impossible to predict the unpredictable. Here we are dealing with radical uncertainty. While “normal” uncertainty can be expressed in probabilistic terms because we know the range of possibilities, “radical” uncertainty concerns a range that is unknown and that cannot be known. To express this with a terminology of

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1 This is the case also with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Who would have known that the Soviet Union, and hence the Cold War, would come to such an abrupt end so fast after the fall of the Wall?

2 Often, at least in the field of economics “normal” versus “radical” uncertainty is known as risk versus uncertainty.
change, “normal” change obeys fixed rules while in “radical” change the rules themselves are
dynamic and there are no rules about the change of rules (e.g. Prigogine 1984; Prigogine 1997).
If placing this at the international level, the latter is fundamental in the sense that it relates to an
unpredictable change in the very way in which international politics is conducted.

These remarks are not meant as foundations for a philosophical discussion on history and its
use. Rather, they serve as a background thought for a conceptual analysis that is the proper
aim of this paper. Having participated in a number of conferences related to peace and security
issues in the Northeast Asian region it seems that there is a concern regarding the region’s fu-
ture, particularly in regional peace studies. The past is present in such discussions as providing
the “dots” on a trajectory to the future, for instance when the discussion turns to “rising China”
and its effects on the region (University of Incheon 2009), or when one considers the divided
Korean peninsula. Quite often the European Union is admired, and some have asked whether
it may be possible for Northeast Asia to strive towards a similar union or at least to reach a re-
gional collective security arrangement (Kyung Hee University 2008).

In this paper I do not wish to take sides on such questions, but I provide a conceptual analysis
of “systems,” “societies,” and “communities” in order to highlight some aspects that are necessary
to consider in light of such questions. In other words, in the often implicit advocacy for a collec-
tive security mechanism or regionalism, present in Northeast Asian peace studies, certain issues
must be cogitated if the aims (and the reaching of them) are to be meaningful and lucid.

My focus on the differences between systems, societies, and communities is rather simple,
especially given the identified desire to promote peace in the region while at the same time ap-
preciating the European experience. The international system differs from the international so-
ciety because it lacks certain fundamental shared goals that are present in the latter. Here, one
is especially drawn to the English School and Hedley Bull ([1977] 2002) with his demarcation
between systems and societies. This step is significant in comprehending that regardless of the
differences among the actors in the Northeast Asian region, they form a regional society while
being simultaneously part of the global International Society.\footnote{Note the use of capital letters with the global International Society.} In other words, the actors share
an identity (or even identities), a point that seems not to have been acknowledged in what lim-
ited experience I have of the region.

Second, when we discuss the plausible aim or the possibility for a regional organization that
would focus on collective security and the promotion of peace, we have already moved beyond
a discussion of a (mere) society. By stating thus, I recount a contemporary connotation of a story
of “progress.” Often in the International Relations (IR) literature, an international system is the most
fundamental arrangement, followed by an international society à la Hedley Bull ([1977] 2002),
and finally by an international community. Yet, such usage breaks with the past in two ways.

First, for instance in the 1930s both “international society” and “international community”
seem to have been used synonymously (e.g. Heggstad 1935). Second, what distinction was made
followed the old German sociological distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
(Tönnies [1887] 2001). The former, usually translated as community, is supposed to be more pri-
mitive and akin to tribes or clans, whereas the latter represents a modern, contractual society. In
terms of the idea of “progress,” the contemporary use of “international community” runs in the
opposite direction than the German distinction; the contemporary international community is alle-
gedly “more” than an international society.
This “more” that the contemporary international community is supposed to be becomes evident from the expectations we levy on it. We expect the international community to act on our behalf, or on behalf of others like in cases of grave humanitarian crisis. We call on the international community to bring peace to certain “hotspots” in the world, or we ask the international community to aid the victims of natural disasters. Thus, there are certain ethical and normative connotations implicit in the use of “international community.” But exactly who is this international community that is supposed to do these things, and why do we suddenly use “international community” instead of the orthodox “international society”? Is the difference between a society and a community only in the normative connotations?

The need for some conceptual thought should be evident, given that statesmen, policy-makers, the international media, and scholars alike increasingly refer to the “international community.” For instance David C. Ellis (2009: 1) accounts that “the term ‘international community’ has recently become commonplace in leaders’ and academics’ discourse and the subject of analysis.” For instance a quick Web of Science topic search of “international community” yields hundreds of results, while the numbers increase to thousands when conducting a Lexus-Nexus headline and first paragraph search.

These initial remarks have been brief and loaded with various assumptions and implications. I will do my best to clarify and justify them in the following sections. I begin by discussing the differences between “system,” “society,” and “community.” The subsequent section asks whether a global international community exists. An implication of this discussion for determining membership in international communities, namely that it is not actors per se that determine membership, is brought out in the final section together with a general conclusion. The concluding remarks highlight the significance of the presented thoughts for Asian peace studies.

System v. society v. community

Few, if any, would dispute that Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) Theory of International Politics has generated a vast amount of adherents and research. Waltz’s neo-realism focuses on the international system that is “composed of a structure and of interacting units,” (Waltz 1979: 79) where “structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. ⋯ Since structure is an abstraction, ⋯ [it must] be defined by the arrangement of the system’s parts and by the principle of that arrangement” (Waltz 1979: 80). The international system, then, is composed of states, or “the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems” (Waltz 1979: 95), where the structure is “decentralized and anarchic” (Waltz 1979: 88). Out of his fundamentals Waltz develops a theory of international politics that understands the international level as competitive (if not as a Hobbesian state of nature), where “patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly ⋯ as long as none of the competing units is able to convert the anarchic international realm into a hierarchic one” (Waltz 1979: 66).

Whatever the merits of Waltz’s theory, criticism has abounded. For instance, his inconsistent use of “structure” appears to refer to a number of different things (Kratochwil 1982: 27), he seems to make certain unwarranted assumptions about anarchy (Kratochwil 1982: 28; Wendt 1992), and there is evidence that he has based his understanding of the state on a confused reading of Rousseau (Behr and Heath 2009). Regardless of these and other criticisms of Waltz’s theory, his idea of an international system of sovereign states persists in IR.

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4 One is reminded of Wight’s domain of recurrence by this quote. See Wight, Martin. 1960. "Why Is There No International Theory." International Relations 2:35-46.
The English School, however, has traditionally differed from neo-realism by focusing largely on history and the international society. With its traditions arguably dating back to at least Hugo Grotius (Cutler 1991), the English School has focused on the idea of an international society based on common rules and laws. In this tradition, Hedley Bull ([1977] 2002) is taken often as the protagonist, whose originality lies in seeing the international level as a society rather than as a (mere) system (Hoffmann 1986: 185). Bull’s approach to order among sovereign states, then, begins with a simple question: What is order in world politics? In his answer, Bull ([1977] 2002: Ch. 1) differentiates between order in social life, international order, and world order. The latter two differ since international order refers to the society of states (Bull [1977] 2002: 8) whereas world order relates to mankind as a whole (Bull [1977] 2002: 18). Correspondingly, international society differs from world society as I discuss below.

Where usually it is considered that an international system is formed when sovereign states interact sufficiently to affect the calculations of the others, an international society is marked “by dialogue and … common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and [the actors, namely states,) recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Bull and Watson 1984: 1). In other words, for states to be part of a system, they must interact. Two states that are unaware of each other’s existence hardly form a state system. Yet, while a simple “billiard ball” world (Wolfers 1962) is sufficient for a system to exist, if there is significant interaction between the units of the system, and while a system is logically more elementary and prior to a society (Bull and Watson 1984: 1), a society would require something substantially more.

Bull ([1977] 2002: 4ff.) suggests three elementary goals that bring about the existence of a society: some protection from violence, some guarantee that promises and agreements are kept, and an arrangement of property rights. He emphasizes also the role culture and cultural change can have in transforming the international level instead of insisting on a highly limited possibility of change á la Waltz (1979). In other words, changes in the perception of common interests or rules could contribute to a transformation of the international level without necessarily requiring a move from anarchy to hierarchy.

International society should, however, not be confused with a conception of world society. A distinguishing feature between the two is membership. Where the international society has been perceived with a membership restricted to sovereign states, a “world society implies something that reaches well beyond the state towards more cosmopolitan images of how mankind is, or should be, organised” (Buzan 2004: 1). Thus, the membership of a world society is rather unlimited and includes “a complicated matrix of individuals and non-state groups and [transnational actors]” (Buzan 2004: 44). A similarity arises, however, when one considers whether or not international or world society must necessarily be universal. For instance, as Buzan (2004: 8) argues, “regional international societies can build on common global international society foundations.” In other words, multiple international and world societies can exist without there being a requirement for them to be universal and global. In fact, alternative (or competing) international or world societies may exist.

If pursuing further the distinction between a system and a society, an international system refers to primitive, yet significant interaction between independent states, and there could be several international systems in operation at the same time. For instance, the “Italian city-state system” existed simultaneously but independently from the state system on the Indian subcontinent in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, or that the latter existed in a different form when Ancient Greece was made up of city-states (Watson 1992: 77-84). There might be interaction
between such international systems, but that would suffer from a lack of recognition of the Other. To put it differently, the Other would be seen as “barbarians” (much like Persia was to the ancient Greeks), and interaction would be limited and most likely conflictual. This should not surprise us, since the two different international systems would “function” according to different rules. The rules, however, would be minimal in the sense of allowing co-existence and trade.

In contrast, the international system refers to a global system of independent political communities (or states) that shares such minimal rules. The European state system was projected onto the rest of the world (Koslowski 2000: 49ff.), thereby creating the global international system in its contemporary form. Below, I shall distinguish this global international system by capitalizing it as “International System.”

An international society, however, differs from an international system due to deeper and more meaningful interaction between states. The question remains, what distinguishes a society from a system, since arguably the existence of a system requires at least a minimal set of common rules, thus indicating at least some elements of a society (e.g. Watson 1987). Buzan (1993: 345-348) suggests that the solution lies in the idea of a shared identity, namely sovereignty. By recognizing and being recognized as sovereign, the shared identity “we as sovereign” is brought about and consequently also the international society is formed. In this respect one might use as an example the difference between the rules governing the conduct between European states within Europe and their conduct with such “outsiders” as the indigenous peoples in the New World or Asia (e.g. Grewe 2000). The European sovereigns considered themselves to be collectively different from the rest of the world since those Others were not recognized as sovereign by the Europeans. This example illustrates also how there may exist societies within independent international systems. In other words, the indigenous peoples in Latin America formed their own system, in which an “international” society or even societies existed. This Latin American system was independent of and different from the European system, in which there was an European international society. Whether such “sub-societies” covered fully their corresponding systems is another question, and perhaps Buzan’s (1993: 349-350) idea of concentric circles is useful in this regard.

When the European projection of power reached a global level and when the European international system turned into the International System, we observed a development towards the International Society. Particularly later, the universal membership of the United Nations strengthened the common identity of states as sovereign and as forming the global International Society with its particular rules, norms, and international laws following from their sovereign status. It is to this extent that recognition as sovereign may be considered as a precondition for membership in the contemporary International Society.

Different from the International Society, following Bull, world society refers to the mankind as a whole: “By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built” (Bull [1977] 2002: 269). Instantaneous global communication and other aspects of globalization appear as necessary conditions for the emergence of a world society beyond philosophers’ musings, and perhaps the global civil society is already what Bull had in mind. After all, we have clearly transcended transnational networks in the past couple of decades, something that has given rise to all sorts

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5 Notice the use of capital letters for the same purpose as with respect to the International System.
of hopes including a new “just” world order and a global legal system (e.g. Slaughter 2004), while the global civil society is supposed to represent the cosmopolitan consciousness.

Yet, in the case of “new world orders” we see imperial projects (Kratochwil forthcoming), or the construction of a world that reflects only particular values as confessed by at least one of the protagonists (Slaughter 2004: 27), while the global civil society is certainly not unproblematic (e.g. Chandler 2009). One doubts, therefore, whether a “true” world society is even desirable, since the imposition of a particular political project onto the rest of the world would mark the death of plurality and diversity, and therefore whether it would be better to rest one’s hopes on regionalism (e.g. Kratochwil 2009).

Regionalism, or at least a particular form of regionalism, may exemplify an international community. For instance one might argue that both the European Union (EU) and NATO each form an international community of their own (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005: 41-46). Yet, it is not fully clear why such regional arrangements would constitute communities rather than societies. The confusion arises when we consider that “community” as a term “carries a sense of shared values and, up to a point, a shared identity, and based on that a mutuality of rights, duties and obligations among the members” (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005: 33). After all, a shared identity was what distinguishes a society from a system. Moreover, sovereignty grants certain rights and imposes duties upon states, and hence there is a certain mutuality of rights and obligations within the International Society. Simply having more of the same – a stronger shared identity, and mutual rights and duties – seems insufficient for justifying the use of “community” rather than “strong society” or “close-knit society.”6 The new terminology warrants at least a qualitative difference in the shared identity if not the addition of something more.

The cases of the EU and NATO could be used to differentiate between a society and community by underlining the presence of a regionally shared identity. In other words, one might make the argument that the use of “community” is justifiable in order to distinguish between particular communities from societies within the same region, and that highly differing levels of shared identities exist in a given geographical place. Such a differentiation is especially called for because both international communities and societies seem to include only states in their membership. Thus, which countries are “European” – a question so dear to all who are familiar with EU enlargement debates – and are therefore part of the regional society of states is different from viewing the EU members as forming a community. On the other hand, tying such shared identities to geography is problematic. For instance in the case of NATO forming a community, access or being close to the Atlantic Ocean seems almost irrelevant for membership, if we consider for example that Hungary, a landlocked country far-removed from the Atlantic, is a member!

The use of regionalism or a stronger shared identity in distinguishing between societies and communities becomes more difficult if we take into account that – much like in the case of international societies – regional communities may exist but there could also be a global International Community.7 This global community seems to be referred to for instance in such statements as “in granting membership of the UN, the international community welcomes the signatory state as a responsible member of the community of nations” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001: para. 2.14). Obviously any references to regionalism

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6 This is of course only if one assumes that “society” and “community” differ. As discussed in the introduction, both the contemporary use and the old sociological distinction make a qualitative differentiation between the two terms.

7 Notice the use of capital letters to distinguish this global International Community from regional international communities.
are immediately out of the window, while at the same time it is difficult to see how among the highly varied UN members there would be a shared identity that would be strong enough to justify the move from “international society” to “international community.”

Thus, if regional identification and a stronger shared identity fail as useful tools in distinguishing between “society” and “community,” what other possibilities are there? Unfortunately, although the literature on international community is expanding, the concept is used inconsistently and its meaning remains unclear. Therefore the existing literature provides little assistance. For instance, in an early use the draft declaration from the Thirty-seventh Conference of the International Law Association in Oxford seems to use “International Community” as a referent to all sovereign states (e.g. Articles 1, 20, 21, and 53 in Heggstad 1935). More recently, a forum in Foreign Policy (2002: 29) invited “nine notable thinkers, activists, journalists, and policymakers from across the ideological spectrum to survey the international community and tell us what they see.” Unsurprisingly, these nine authors managed to provide us with at least ten different conceptions of “international community” ranging from “essentially, the United States and Europe” and “the community of international opinion generated by modern communications” to “a virtual community” and “a dangerous reference point for the naïve” (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005: 32).

One possible alternative path would be to return to the classical German sociological distinction between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* (Tönnies [1887] 2001). *Gesellschaft* is more contractual and representative of modernity, whereas *Gemeinschaft* is more primitive and typical of clans or tribes. Not to mention that it would be odd to speak of the international level as if sovereign states formed “clans” or “tribes,” there would seem to be at least two problems in following this approach. First, it would perpetuate the differentiation between inside and outside. Describing the “inside” as a modern society and the “outside” as analogous to tribes or clans would carry on the delineation between the two “realms.” Given for instance R.B.J. Walker’s (1993) *magnum opus*, it seems unnecessary to rehearse the common objections here. The second and a related problem is that the sociological distinction assumes a story of “progress,” at least connotatively. There is a “progression” from a primitive community to the modern, contractual society. This contradicts my impression of the contemporary use of “international community” as something “more” than a society. Thus, the “progression” appears to run in opposite directions.

Although the German sociological distinction has undoubted merit, it could not be translated directly into IR, and hence it is not an unreasonable idea to consider such alternatives as imposed identities. In contrast to a shared identity that is recognized by the “members” themselves, an imposed identity originates from the Other(s). To put it differently, the rest of the world has imposed an identity upon the EU as a whole, although the EU members themselves may not consider the EU to form a tight community. In fact, as becomes ever more apparent from the European voting turnout, a shared European political identity is hardly taking off at least among the citizens. Yet, from the outside the EU may appear as a close community.

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8 Effectively “international society” and “international community” are used synonymously.
9 This is especially since some salient features of tribes seem to be missing at the international level. On the salient features, see e.g. Morgan, Kenneth. 1979. "Clan Groups and Clan Exogamy among the Navajo." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 35:157-169.
10 Whether this is due to the “damage” or “merit” done by the English School is another question.
11 Since 1979 until the recent European elections in 2009 the turnout has steadily decreased from an approximate 62 percent to 43 percent. See European Parliament. 2009. "Results of the 2009 European Elections."
12 Naturally this perception is possible from the inside too, especially when we consider the role the European Court of Justice plays at a supranational level within the EU.
Similarly, one has a suspicion that in the case of NATO the shared identity cohesion is stronger when viewed from the outside rather than from the inside.\textsuperscript{13} Perhaps for the purpose of NATO, the shared identity of the members may be relatively strong, but one has his doubts about the extent of a shared identity for instance between Latvia and Turkey. This suspicion is reinforced when taking into consideration also the partner countries.

The brief discussion on the EU and NATO brings forth another aspect: actors have multiple identities, whether imposed or not. Many EU members are also members of NATO, and therefore they have these two identities in addition to the other multiple identities that they may hold. Some might be persuaded into arguing that it is the amount of shared identities, rather than their strength or “imposition,” that differentiates between a society and a community. A community would then be composed of members who share multiple identities, whereas a society would be formed of members sharing perhaps only one identity. In other words, a community would be the sum of multiple societies, if expressed in terms of shared identities. This, however, leads us to questions regarding how many and what kind of shared identities the actors need to have in order to form a community, while leaving unanswered the question: What is the qualitative difference between a society and a community?

If a simple focus on identities is less than conclusive, a better alternative might follow from paying attention to common political projects as a way for distinguishing between societies and communities. Societies have common rules and norms, and as discussed above, Bull ([1977] 2002: 4ff.) suggests three elementary goals that are present in societies: some regulations or restrictions on the use of force, and some insurance that promises will be kept and that property will be respected. None of this, however, indicates a presence of common political projects. Rather, the elementary goals allow for the pursuit of various projects, happiness, or whatever by bringing some stability of expectations and security. Yet, those common rules and norms that aim to establish at least the elementary goals are highly indeterminate, if for no other reason than because they may be achieved in various ways, all of which could be equally justifiable. Similarly, even once the elementary goals have been achieved, members of the society are left to pursue their own interests within the society’s framework. In other words, a society remains individualistic rather than communal in its focus.

From these remarks arises a precondition necessary for the move from a society to a community: the latter would require the presence of common political projects that in turn indicate a particular common direction that the community ought to take. Where societies provide the necessary framework for its members to pursue their interests, a community would share common interests. Naturally, there is no necessity for the common interests to dominate to the extent that they would subsume all individual interests. Yet, those individual interests would be constructed in relation to the common interests.

To explain this idea better, we may imagine that a community exists, where there is a certain but perhaps vague idea about the future. In this sense there is a common understanding of the general direction that the community ought to aim for.\textsuperscript{14} Despite this direction having hazy boundaries, the general direction is this rather than its opposite that way. It is, then, within this general direction with its hazy boundaries (and with its projected future) that the community members define their interests. This is different from a society, where such a common direction would be missing and where the society members could define their interests within a

\textsuperscript{13} In this context one could consider the internal “cohesion” with regard to the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

\textsuperscript{14} One can note here the possible “origins” for the normative connotations in “community” over “society.”
much wider framework and more vis-à-vis the other members rather than as a member of the collective. Naturally, this wider framework would be present also in the case of a community, but to an extent it would be taken for granted, as the “interesting” questions would have already transcended those relating to its structure.

To use a metaphor in order to illustrate this difference between a society and a community, the former could be represented as a three-dimensional space. This space would come to be due to the common rules and norms that constitute the society, and within this space the members of the society could pursue their private goals and interests. A community, however, would require an added element that is illustrated with a fourth dimension: time. Within this now four-dimensional space we can observe or experience a sense of direction, much like in physics there is a difference between speed and velocity. The latter includes not only motion but also a direction, and therefore it can be expressed as a vector. Yet, the direction of a community is more general and intuitive than determinate or precise.\textsuperscript{15} More accurate is, however, the common past. Communities have a past and a history that is common to their members.\textsuperscript{16} It is in this sense that the European Union has become a community for it has brought about a new, truly common history for instance for France and Germany as well as for Europe as a whole. Thus, although the community may not know what lies ahead or where it will arrive (if it will “arrive” at all) yet there is common past from whence it came.

A community, as it arises from the above, has common projects that give a general direction to it, within which its members may pursue their interests. Such a direction is missing from societies that simply provide a space in which their members may (inter)act. Yet, there is no necessity to expect that the direction of a community is like a vector, or that there is a clear endpoint in sight. The direction may even change 180 degrees at times and remain open-ended, but there is first of all a sense of direction and second, that this is a common direction due to the common past.

Consequently, a common identity emerges in communities. It is different from a shared identity due to a qualitative difference. A shared identity might be referred to as “we,” but a common project would denote “us,” or what I call here a common identity. Although this distinction may appear scholastic, I wish to maintain it for the sake of bringing out a small yet significant difference.

In this sense, the EU is a community, because there are rather strong common political projects such as the provision of the “four freedoms.” At times there are competing projects within this community, as was exemplified well by the debates on deepening versus widening. Yet, despite such opposing projects, there is a common sense of direction for the EU, although how to get there (or where “there” is) is not pre-determined. Finally, rather than it being a direction that “we as members of the EU” are taking, it is “our” direction. The argument should become clearer if one considered for instance other regional arrangements, such as ASEAN or Mercosur, that seem to lack such common identity and direction including a common past.\textsuperscript{17} There may

\textsuperscript{15} In this context, see the problems of exact classification in e.g. Davis, James W. 2005. Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

\textsuperscript{16} Of course such common histories are “constructed,” as the experiences from the Balkans show, but the more important point is that such common histories can be constructed so as to “give birth” to the community.

\textsuperscript{17} This is not to argue that for instance the Latin American countries do not have a common past as having been oppressed by the “discoverers.” It is to argue that a common history making the people into a single community is missing. Obviously this does not mean that it would not be possible to construct such a common past. It is merely an observation of an apparent state of affairs.
be a shared identity as “Asian” or “Latin,” yet common identity combined with a common political project is missing unlike in the case of the EU.

The International Community?

At the international level we may observe some international communities, of which perhaps the best examples are the EU and NATO. An International Community, however, would denote a global international community, and here the usual candidate is the United Nations. It is the aim of this section to discuss to what extent such suggestions are credible, and whether an International Community would be plausible.

As discussed in the previous section, an international society is constituted by the presence of a shared identity: sovereignty. Sovereign states, by being recognized as sovereign by themselves and by each other, form an international society. The contemporary global International Society has its roots in Europe, whence the European international society was projected upon the rest of the world, ultimately thanks to the decolonization process and the fall of the Soviet Union - transforming the other political communities into “similar” sovereign states. Similarity, however, might be restricted to a particular understanding of “sovereignty,” as expressed by United Nations membership, and to that extent predictions about the end of history were appropriate (Fukuyama 1992). Be that as it may, the notion of “sovereignty” is rather thin and contested, but it can nevertheless be considered to extend universally enough to found the International Society with its “universally” shared rules and norms, and elementary goals, as argued by Hedley Bull.

A global International Community of sovereign states, however, would require something more. The previous section argued that a community differs from a society due to common political projects and therefore also due to a common identity “us” that is distinct from a shared identity “we.” Moreover, a global International Community would also require a global ethos, or fundamental values (Schimmelfennig 2002: 426).

Do such common political projects and identity exist at the global level? For instance Kofi Annan (Annan 2002: 31) answers in the affirmative, when he argues that the “international community does exist. It has an address [on the East side of Manhattan]. It has achievements to its credit. And more and more, it is developing a conscience.”18 A more orthodox answer, though, would be along the lines of Errol Harris (1999: 75): “there is no (…) international ‘community’ (…) only an association of sovereign states. A ‘community’ is a society in which common interests are given precedence of individual and special interests.” By extension, Harris fails to see that common (global) interests are given precedence over individual and special interests. If considering the current fate of the Kyoto Protocol or the amount of signatories to the Rome Treaty, both admittedly dealing with common interests, Harris’s pessimism does not seem completely misplaced.

Both views, by Annan and Harris, have their problems. Annan (2002: 30) seems rather utopian in claiming that “there is a shared vision of a better world for all people as set out, for example, in the founding charter of the United Nations.” Anyone familiar with post-1945 history and the Charter of the United Nations is also familiar with all the debates that have surrounded the multiple interpretations of this alleged “shared vision.” Harris, on the other hand, seems confused about the differences between societies and communities, but most importantly he

18 Despite the use of small letters, Annan is referring to what I have capitalized as the International Community.
appears to require an unfounded prioritization of common over individual interests. Is it not possible for both to exist equally or for them to converge at times? Are individual interests necessarily conflictual with common interests? Here, I am naturally not arguing that a “natural” harmony of interests exists – something that E.H. Carr ([1939] 2001) refuted by his focus on being realistic about the world in which we live in and the conflicting interests that exist – but we should also remind ourselves that interests are not given or external to the actors. Rather, actors define their interests within particular circumstances. Therefore, it is possible that actors define their individual interests to be at times in line with a common interest, for instance by recognizing the likelihood of a tragedy of the commons. After all, this is why much of international law exists or why it is followed by most states, most of the time (Henkin 1968)!

Kofi Annan, however, is closer to the mark by focusing on certain presumably globally shared values and norms. Common constitutive values and norms comprise the ethos that defines the collective identity of a community (Schimmelfennig 2002: 426). To the extent that it is possible to identify a global ethos, we may conclude that the International Community exists. While the UN Charter is mired with its problems in this respect, “humanity” and “human dignity” seem to have gained ground over the past decades as strong candidates for providing such a universal ethos. For instance, human rights have supposedly become the new universal standard of civilization (Donnelly 1998). If it is true that respect for human dignity (in the form of following human rights) constitutes a global ethos, we may be able to suggest that the International Community exists. There are, however, at least two major problems.

The first problem is that a focus on common humanity as the foundation of the International Community leaves behind states. As such, there is nothing to object, but it does create a need for redefining “International Community.” As discussed in the previous section, the term is often used in various ways, and to use common humanity as a foundation would be to contribute to inconsistent use of the term. Thus, following the English School, it might be better to invoke “World Community” (compare with world society and note the capitalization) rather than the International Community, if the reference point is to be some cosmopolitan idea of humanity. Here one is left to wonder, however, about the difference to a World Society.

The second problem is perhaps more fundamental since it relates to the very idea of universal human rights or a universal understanding of “human dignity.” Thus, if considering for a moment that the reference point of the International Community were human dignity, what does the latter mean? As argued by for instance Michael J. Perry, the “inherent dignity … of all members of the human family” (United Nations 1945: Preamble) is “cosmologically embedded; it is … embedded in a religious cosmology” (Perry 2000: 16). All the various religions in the world serve as testimony that universal values may be attained in the abstract but not in practice. Similarly, human rights are often charged with being imperialist, culturally or religiously insensitive, “sexist,” or negligent of group rights (Langlois 2009: 19-22). In a word, human rights may be charged as being an expression of a particular “Western” ideology based on Christian teachings and liberal (market) democracy. It is unnecessary to decide the “verity” of these assaults here, since for the present purposes it is sufficient to note that such assaults exist. Their very existence testifies that while universal norms and values may be shared in the abstract, a move from such abstract notions to the actual practice of upholding or achieving them is highly problematic. Hence, a global ethos is also likely to remain at a rather abstract level and in that sense as somewhat meaningless.
If a reliance on a global ethos in arguing for the existence of the International Community is less than straightforward, does the idea of common global political projects fare any better? Here one might return to the discussion on the United Nations and human rights.

On one level the United Nations does represent common political projects at the international level. To give one example, let us consider the use of force. The membership includes virtually all states, including such “rogue” states as North Korea19 or traditionally “neutral” Switzerland,20 and by signing the UN Charter the members “unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security” and “practice tolerance and live together in peace” (United Nations 1945: Preamble). To this end, the members agree to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force” (United Nations 1945: Article 2.4). This is a relatively new development if considering that it was only in 1907 when the use of force was officially forbidden for the purposes of collecting debt (The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 1909), and that in 1945 the UN Charter introduced the first general ban on the use of force. From a perspective, the abolition of the use of force in international relations is one common political project that one may recognize.

The legal abolition of war from international relations serves as an example of another common political project at the international level, namely the legalization of international politics. Beyond the orthodox role of international law as a coordinating and regulating tool, and beyond such fundamental principles as *pacta sunt servanda*, the “rule of law” and ideas of universal jurisdiction have appeared or perhaps better, returned with a vengeance. Rather than resorting to arms, law is to resolve political problems,21 Law, allegedly free from politics, is supposed to provide a value-neutral resolution of conflicts,22 and in this sense it is “only” technical and “instrumental.” Yet, combining this with the idea of a common humanity and how certain acts affect us all, particularly those committed by *hostis humani generis*, it is not difficult to see how the law is not simply instrumental but that the International Community is being constituted through universal jurisdiction (Addis 2009). The constitution of the International Community through the “rule of law,” however, is not shared by all despite the claims by some liberals that it *ought to be* (e.g. Slaughter 2004) – except perhaps in its abstract form – and hence it suffers from similar problems as “human rights” or “human dignity” in providing a global ethos.

On the other hand, the above seems to suggest that the International Community is in the making through the construction of a common global ethos. This global ethos might result in taking the form of a particular interpretation of human rights and human dignity, or as the realm of the “rule of law,” whatever that is supposed to mean. These are political projects, shared perhaps by a significant number of states, but they are insufficiently common political projects, at least if compared with the abolition of the use of force or with more “technical” issues such as climate change.23 Paradoxically, perhaps, the former political projects are based on an emphasis on the individual that end up underlining the community, namely the International Community under construction. Finally, it is not difficult to draw parallels between the contemporary making of the International Community and how the International Society came to

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19 Here I am referring to the highly value-laden assertions by the Bush administration, not to any personal assertion.
20 Finally in 2002 Switzerland joined the United Nations.
21 Does one sense a return to “idealism” in this respect?
22 In this context one may consider for instance such heroic attempts as one European University Institute’s doctoral student’s persistence in trying to find a legal solution to the problems in the Middle East.
23 This is not to argue that issues in relation to climate change are not political. In fact, certain aspects of the climate change debate are extremely political. Yet, at least here we see a more “concrete” global project.
be. If this International Community “under construction” will ever become, I suspect that it will be easy to compare it with the imposition of the European international society onto the rest of the world. This time, however, instead of arms we might see the “rule of law” and “universal” values used as the weapons of choice.

Conclusion

At present it seems safer to conclude that the International Community does not exist, if it is taken to require common global political projects, a common global identity, and a common global ethos. Simultaneously, however, one can notice at least traces of attempts to constitute the International Community by masking particular political projects in universalistic language. In that respect, there may be international communities, each with their own common projects, identity, and ethos. One may even venture to predict that the number of such international communities increases as the various international political projects gain a stronger foothold. These, however, are propositions best left for another occasion, since it was not the purpose of this paper to suggest exactly what international communities exist or are in the making, but rather to propose on what basis we might know who would be part of an international community and whether they exist.

The other implication of my discussion relates to the membership in international communities, namely to the question “who is the international community.” Those who expect an operationalization of the concept and a subsequent list of actors will be disappointed. My argument has been exactly that the membership depends on the common political projects that various actors have, namely the common past and direction they share, and on the extent of sharing a common identity “us” in recognizing this common direction. Moreover, because actors have multiple identities, they may be members of multiple communities. Therefore the actors per se are not the determining factor but rather which identity they hold – voluntarily or through imposition – in a given situation in deciding membership. In this sense the concept “international community” is not a single entity: not a “what” but a “who.” The global International Community, if it becomes to be, would be such a single entity, but even in that case it would not mark the death of international communities, in plural.

The international community is “imagined,” at least in some senses of Benedict Anderson’s phrase. As Anderson (1991: 6) observes, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.” Like the state, the international community lives in our imagination. Yet, international communities are “second-order” imagined, since their members are not “real” like people but states that are themselves imagined communities.

There is, however, a significant difference between these two imagined communities, between the state and the international community. Where loyalties have been transferred to the state, no such transfer seems to have taken place with respect to international communities. Again, the European elections serve as evidence in this respect with regard to the best example of an international community. Similarly, those who argue for the existence of the International Community seem to treat it more as a form of an “invisible political community” that reflects their rejection of visible political communities (e.g. Chandler 2009: 65).

Be that as it may, there does seem to be a transfer of expectations. This becomes evident from uses of language that personify the international community (e.g. in International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). Who (not what) is being addressed in such
cases depends on the circumstances. It is here that a focus on the common political projects, (imposed) identities, and ethos that provides the key to the answers we give.

The relevance of these thoughts for Northeast Asian peace studies need not be deciphered. Given the interest in pursuing debates concerning the region’s future in light of a “rising China” or comparing Northeast Asia’s chances to imitate the “European experience,” it is necessary to take seriously the differences between systems, societies, and communities. Obviously the region constitutes a system, and despite rather strong initial resistance by China and Japan the region was integrated into the European state system and society writ large. To that extent there is a shared identity among the regional actors, but only insofar as being a member of the global International Society. Certainly there is a three-dimensional space within the region where politics may take place, but what seems to be lacking is the fourth dimension: common political projects expressing a sense of a common past and future along with a common identity that would transcend borders. These are required for a collective security arrangement among all regional actors to be meaningful. This, however, would entail achieving a break with the past, or perhaps better: it would be necessary to “rediscover” the common past and engage in “pre-emptive peace.” Perhaps the latter has been one underlying theme in the past twenty-five years of Peace Forum.

References


Constructivism and Social Psychology in Peace Studies: Understanding Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament in East Asia

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What guidance can academics offer to promote peace in East Asia? This article argues that using international relations theory—in particular, constructivism—and social psychology allows for a better understanding of ways to encourage nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the region. Examples from East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Taiwan, illustrate the utility of these lessons.

KEYWORDS: Constructivism; Social Psychology; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; Nuclear Disarmament; NGOs.

With continuing nuclear crises in the Middle East and East Asia, the question of how to promote nonproliferation and disarmament is more important than ever. The application of constructivism and social psychology to the issue highlights multiple ways to encourage countries, organizations and even individuals to help stop the spread of nuclear weapons. These findings are particularly relevant in considering the promotion of peace in East Asia.

Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and associated agreements—known as the nuclear nonproliferation regime—are more important than ever. The regime embodies the nuclear nonproliferation norm—that is, it provides the normative foundation for saying, “Civilized states don’t seek nuclear weapons.” Before the NPT, acquiring nuclear weapons was an act of national pride; after, it became an “act of international outlawry” (Graham 2002). Some may question the NPT’s utility in East Asia, given North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003, as well as its nuclear testing in October 2006 and May 2009. However, on what basis could the international community expect Pyongyang to disarm without an international agreement? Without the NPT, pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program likely would be dismissed as illegitimate great power bullying. If there is any hope at all for North Korea nuclear disarmament, it is because of the legitimizing force of a robust international regime against nuclear proliferation.

The NPT does more than just draw a line in the sand. It also creates social mechanisms that can influence how policymakers think about the value of nuclear weapons. For example, social psychology has found that the need to appear consistent is a powerful motivator of human behavior. Without an international agreement, it is impossible to argue that North Korea is the only rogue state in the world with nuclear weapons.

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behaviour (Tetlock and Goldgeier 2000). States that have signed and ratified the NPT, as well as participated in treaty review conferences and other associated activities, are less likely to later withdraw from the NPT and/or covertly seek nuclear weapons. This is true not only because individuals feel a need to act consistently but also, because, over time, a bureaucracy dedicated to the goals of the NPT grows within the state, gaining influence and leverage. Such a bureaucratic establishment makes it harder to reverse course—a form of institutional consistency develops. The institutionalization of the nonproliferation norm in China is an interesting example. As Chinese officials learned the value of arms control from educational exchanges, primarily with the United States, they then became proponents of it within the Chinese government, leading to strengthened compliance with the nonproliferation norm (Medeiros 2007).

Another social mechanism embedded in the NPT is what psychologists call a “descriptive norm” — that is, people notice what we do at least as much as what we say. The more people who do X, the more everyone else thinks that X is the right thing to do (Cialdini and Trost 1998). In this way, the NPT creates a clear descriptive norm that shapes how policymakers view those who do and do not adhere to it. Almost every state in the world is a member of the NPT, and almost all of those states adhere to their treaty commitments. So the NPT is about more than words and lectures—it’s also about overwhelming global compliance, which helps to influence how elites conceptualize nuclear weapons. Indeed, few countries are lining up to become the next “rogue” state. Indeed, in the case of Japan, senior defence analysts agreed that even if public opinion was more amenable to a Japanese nuclear weapons program, Tokyo would still be reluctant to go nuclear because of the pressure from the international community. As one Japanese analyst argued, “Japan will not take the nuclear option, not only because of our domestic policy, but also because of our commitments and our relationships with other countries” (Rublee 2009: 94).

Social psychology also helps us understand how the NPT changes the social cost-benefit equation of nuclear decision-making. Some states support nuclear nonproliferation because they are persuaded that nuclear weapons are not in their best interest. However, other states refrain from nuclear weapons because they are conforming; that is, they may wish to develop nuclear armaments, but consider the social costs too high (Rublee 2009). Without the NPT, the cost-benefit equation changes dramatically for these states, and not in favour of nuclear nonproliferation. The cases of South Korea and Taiwan shed light on this principle. Both countries had serious nuclear weapons programs, and both stopped the programs due to pressure from the United States, reinforced by the existence of the NPT (Hersman and Peters 2006). It wasn’t just that Washington asked the countries to forgo nuclear weapons: it asked Seoul and Taipei to honour their commitment to a near-universal treaty. Certainly, US security guarantees were likely the most important part of these two countries’ nuclear restraint. But if the NPT were to collapse, would pressure from Washington suffice? This question is important particularly because the International Atomic Energy Agency, which performs inspections in NPT-member countries, would likely lose its authority for its watchdog function if the NPT collapsed. In this case, the ability of the United States or any other country to know what types of nuclear activities were taking place would be severely curtailed.

All of the above-described normative benefits would disappear if the NPT were weakened or if the treaty collapsed. In that case, the normative costs of going nuclear would drop, and states around the world may reconsider their nuclear restraint. The policy conclusion is to maintain and strengthen the NPT so that embedded social mechanisms remain robust.
Rethink Our Approach to “Rogue” States

Another relevant lesson from social psychology is from the “in-group vs. out-group” literature. People are more likely to accept normative pressure from those they like, while normative pressure from the “disliked” tends to backfire (e.g., rebels who gain status by breaking the rules) (Petty and Wegener 1998). For this reason, a rogue state is unlikely to respond well to lectures from the country benefiting most from the status quo, which is why normative pressure from the U.S. may simply add fuel to the fire.

A better way to approach problem states is through countries and experts considered neutral. Libya, which gave up its nuclear weapons program in 2003, would be an especially good choice. The Libyans can argue from experience about the benefits of abiding by the NPT, including increased global economic integration and greatly reduced concerns about state security. Another good choice is China, whose experts can talk about the value of focusing on economic development from the point of view of a developing country. Other neutral states that will not be seen as mouthpieces of Washington are also better positioned to make effective normative arguments.

Social psychology also tells us that creating conflict destroys the fertile ground necessary for normative influence. Conflict polarizes people, leading them to shut off normative messages from “enemies.” The policy lesson here is if we are negotiating to end a nuclear weapons program, we should avoid creating new points of conflict in other areas, thus increasing the likelihood that problem states will comply. This does not mean that we should avoid conflict over the issue of nuclear proliferation. Rather, if stopping nuclear proliferation is our highest priority, we need to move other conflicts to the background until the issue is solved. Therefore, when US President George W. Bush said he “loathed” Kim Jung Il and called him a “pygmy,” he was creating new points of conflict with North Korea, which was likely counterproductive to solving the nuclear issue. The better course of action is to minimize conflict if solving the North Korean nuclear issue is our highest priority (Rublee 2009). Whether this is realistic or not is a judgment call for policymakers. The point is that policymakers should realize that introducing new areas of conflict will likely undermine existing normative influence we have on the nuclear issue.

Support Peace NGOs

Research shows that in three different democracies, peace oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) helped keep the countries non-nuclear by making the political costs of going nuclear prohibitive (Rublee 2009). So while conservative elites may have preferred the nuclear option, they instead decided to stay in power and settle on other ways to manage insecurity, such as accepting a security guarantee from another country.

While peace NGOs perform many tasks, activities that attract media attention are particularly helpful in influencing government policy. By focusing public awareness on the nuclear issue, peace NGOs make it harder for governments to craft policy undermining either nuclear nonproliferation or disarmament. Some peace NGOs are becoming increasingly effective in leveraging media coverage. For example, Peace Depot in Japan is a small NGO with big impact. The group publishes reports that outline the Japanese government’s promises on nuclear issues, and then grades the government based on their action (or inaction) that year. The Japanese media report extensively on Peace Depot materials, amplifying their influence (Rublee 2008).
further snowball effect, the positive publicity has increased the credibility of Peace Depot, leading both politicians and academics to call on the NGO for advice and insight. In fact, the Disarmament Group of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) used Peace Depot’s draft Treaty for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) extensively in creating their own draft treaty on the same issue.

Peace groups are also acting creatively – and on shoe-string budgets. For example, the New Zealand-based Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND) facilitates cooperation and information sharing among anti-nuclear parliamentarians around the world. If members in one country find a particular tactic effective, they can share it world-wide with other members, who can then adopt the strategy for use at home.

Because they can leverage their influence and adapt tactics to their local situation, peace NGOs are a low-cost yet effective way to promote the twin norms of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

**Small, Steady Steps on Disarmament**

Recent events have heartened supporters of nuclear disarmament – from U.S. President Barak Obama’s recent speech in Prague, to the Russian nod to further reduce nuclear stocks. What can we do to continue the momentum toward nuclear disarmament? Social psychology might advise, “Small, steady steps.” When asked to make big sacrifices, people often refuse. But people find it easier to make small sacrifices and will often agree to do so, which makes them much more likely to consent to larger sacrifices for the same cause later on. This is because “commitments grow their own legs”: once a small commitment is made and kept, people often internalize the commitment, making bigger sacrifices more likely (Cialdini 2008).

So instead of pressuring nuclear weapons states to move toward disarmament immediately, a better method is to ask for small but sure steps in that direction, such as ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and, of course, further reductions in nuclear stocks. In the case of Asia, nuclear disarmament will not happen anytime soon, with five nuclear weapons states (China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). However, advancing a NWFZ in East Asia is an easier step to visualize and achieve. By getting the ball rolling, incremental efforts will likely lead to internalized commitment to nuclear disarmament, making the ultimate goal more likely.

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Peace Studies and Peace Linguistics Now: What has Language Got to do with it?

PATRICIA FRIEDRICH

Peace Linguistics, a field of study concerned with the intersection of peace, language, communication and power, is starting to figure among the several disciplines contributing to an interdisciplinary Peace Studies. This short article describes the potential realms of research and action for Peace Linguistics and argues that an understanding of the relationship between peace and language is vital for the forging of social justice and human rights around the world both at the micro and macro levels.

KEYWORDS: Peace; Language; Peace Linguistics; Sociolinguistics; Cross-Cultural Communication.

The following are not summaries of actual events, but they could be, as they are inspired by events that take place every day around the world. They are a collage of observations about language and its employment in the maintenance of some users in a position of relative low power. An ESL teacher penalizes a student for not following a typically Anglo-American underlying rhetorical pattern in a composition and does not explain what the issue might be. We, as users of language, make use of war metaphors even when we are talking about peace. A teenager is excluded from a given social network because his variety (dialect) is deemed less prestigious than the aspirational variety of the group. A businesswoman in an international trip is unable to close a deal because she is incapable of understanding the discourse patterns (not the language) of her counterpart from another culture and therefore assumes the latter is being difficult. A child in a multilingual context is prevented from receiving education in his native tongue because funds have not been provided for language programs besides those in the official language.

In all these examples, language, as well as the dynamics surrounding it, is at the center of conflict; participants or individuals in leadership positions vis-à-vis these situations of communication did, one way or another, disregard or were simply unaware of the power of language and of its role in the maintenance of peace both at the individual and the macro level. As it turns out, language is often forgotten when it comes to social dynamics despite the fact that its presence is ubiquitous in human interaction.

For many years, individual disciplines such as contrastive rhetoric, international management, and communication studies have attempted to provide pieces of the linguistic puzzle that could help us engage in more peace promoting dialogue. However, until very recently, these disciplinary orientations had not been brought together by any transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary effort to investigate and foster peaceful uses of language in any systematized way, that is, their efforts, albeit relevant to peace, were not focused on peace itself. Furthermore, language had not yet provided its important contribution to Peace Studies in a consistent form.

In the 1990s, however, things started to change. More and more concern for the social and critical aspects of language came to the forefront of Applied Linguistics investigations (Penny-

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cook 2004, for example). Then well-know scholar David Crystal used the term Peace Linguistics (or Peacelinguistics) first in his *The Penguin Dictionary of Language* (1999) and then in *A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics* (2003:341). He described Peace Linguistics as:

A term reflecting the climate of opinion which emerged during the 1990s among many linguists and language teachers, in which linguistic principles, methods, findings and applications were seen as a means of promoting peace and human rights at the global level.

The charge to make peace a focus of investigation in still one more realm of human experience – the linguistic realm – was then taken up by individual scholars, most notably at first Gomes de Matos (1996, for example), arguably the first self proclaimed peace linguist. Since then and concomitantly in many parts of the world, scholars, activists, and educators have been engaged in several aspects of the effort to bring peace and social justice to different communities through language.

That attempt, however, is not without complicating factors. First of all, it is clear that within certain networks, the very mention of peace is met with skepticism. A certain belief in the impossibility of long-lasting peace and a disbelief in a framework for the implementation of peace ideals seem to be at work in some instances. In the case of Linguistics, fear exists that the politics of knowledge and of language itself severely hinder any possibility of linguistic equality, at least within the social systems we dwell in (Pennycook, 2001). Secondly, many individuals forget that peace is not to be equated with the absence of war (i.e. negative peace, Galtung 1964) only, but can rather be seen as the building of solid social structures (i.e. positive peace, Galtung 1964) that allow individuals to have their human rights (including linguistic rights) respected. In that sense, languages, be it through education, sound policy making, or awareness raising, have much to contribute to peace, particularly because education and language can be seen as institutions in and on themselves.

Despite the potential criticism, peace linguistics in its several ramifications is becoming an influential orientation and a hub for those who want to add a component of critical education and social justice pursuit to their research and practice. I tend to include, among Peace Linguistic efforts, those studies in Linguistic Ecology and Biocultural Diversity (Nettle and Romaine 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas 2001), which see in language and culture an extension of preservationist effort in other areas; studies in Linguistic Rights (Skutnabb-Kangas 2006), which aim to provide guidelines and a rationale for linguistic education; efforts to provide access to mother-tongue initiatives so that languages and cultures can be valued; research attempts to provide adaptive technology for people with special linguistic needs; studies in Cross-cultural Communication, which aim to divulge the linguistic patterns associated with particular cultural and belief sets; and studies in World Englishes (Kachru 1983 and after), which have significantly contributed to the demystification of notions about standard language as intrinsically superior, language ownership as pertaining to native speakers, and monolingualism as the world-wide rule. While a formal affiliation of these disciplines and areas to a Peace Linguistics paradigm is still elusive, their contribution to aspects of peace building is undeniable.

Peace linguistics in its current conception can be said to be concern with three main aspects of the intersection between peace and language. The first one is the use of language in “communicating about peace” (Gomes de Matos 2000: 339) as in Peace Education, that is, language as a vehicle for the communication of peaceful ideas and for the furthering of a critical pedagogy of peace. The effort to implement a curriculum of peace can be pursued at all levels of education, and, as Crystal (1994) points out, can impact children from an early age,
children who will then grow up to comfortably think of peace as part of their universe the same way they are increasingly thinking of conservation as a necessity.

The second aspect or object of study is language itself and regards what Gomes de Matos (2000: 339) calls “communicating peacefully, constructively, humanizingly,” particularly in the ways we use terms to create a culture of peace on the one hand or a culture of conflict on the other. The example above of the use of war metaphors falls within this realm of concern. So does our attempt to foster terms that celebrate and revere differences in human characteristics and experience. Finally, the third aspect is the investigation of the effects socio-political dynamics and forces have on languages and their users. An example of that is the potential analysis of the above scenario of exclusion given a particular variety or dialect or an (in)ability to reconcile the impact cultural beliefs and values have in one’s rhetorical patterns. I have in the past differentiated between the latter two aspects by referring to them as pertaining to Peace Linguistics and Peace Sociolinguistics respectively.

Regardless of how we classify these facets of human interaction, we must recognize that they do indeed permeate a lot of situations of communication. Therefore, the late inclusion of Linguistics within the realm of disciplines contributing to an interdisciplinary Peace Studies is surprising and to a certain degree indicates how we tend, to our own disadvantage, to take language for granted. In a way, we acquire it and then forget about it.

The absence of the linguistic realm can be felt at the macro level as well. Historically speaking, while Conflict Resolution, Peace Psychology, and Peace Education, for example, have long been associated with Peace Studies, Peace Linguistics is still, as a consolidated effort, in its infancy. Nevertheless, the future looks promising particularly because, as arguably never before in recent times, recognition that knowledge has to be pursued from many perspectives simultaneously is now more of a norm in academia than the exception.

In terms of theoretical orientation, Peace Linguistics can greatly benefit from frameworks already in use elsewhere in Peace Studies. Because language dynamics mirror, influence, and relate in many complex ways to other aspect of social interaction, critical approaches that relativize and contextualize human experience vis-à-vis language are most useful. Initiatives that bring together Linguistics and other branches in Peace Studies, such as Psychology can also have a significant role in constructing a new peace paradigm.

When it comes to practical activities within Peace Linguistics, a naturally applied field, a host of possibilities can be explored. They range from diplomacy to symbolic acts, and from teaching activities to legal action (Barash and Webel 2002). In each of these activities, it is possible to focus on those uses of language that dignify and uplift human beings. Thus, Peace Linguistics can, for example, explore the ways in which diplomacy can be conducted not as a winner-takes-all activity, but rather as a constructive dialogue that allows all parties involved to communicate their needs. Likewise, pedagogies can be implemented so that students have satisfactory models of how to interact with one another. Far from being a naïve attempt at superficially avoiding conflict, Peace Linguistics bases itself on the premise that conflict usually erupts when individuals feel threatened and posits that if these same individuals see their human dignity respected, they will be more likely to engage in constructive dialogue rather then in destructive altercations.

Perhaps some of the most exciting developments in the study of peace and its relationship to language are the several networks that have been born out of a desire to positively impact education and policy making. Group efforts such as those represented by Linguapax, Terralingua,
and Nonkilling Linguistics, for example, have enriched and furthered our understanding of the
dynamics between language and peace.

Linguapax, (Linguapax) has as its goal “to rally linguistic communities worldwide around
the belief that languages, as essential vehicles of identity and cultural expression, are inseparable
from the goals of peace and intercultural understanding.” The organization also aims to fur-
ther the goal of plurilingual education. Terralingua’s ecological goal (Terralingua) is to foster
“a deeper understanding and appreciation of the vital importance of biocultural diversity for the
survival of all life on earth.” The group is also helping map the areas of the globe according to
their biocultural diversity. Finally, the School of Nonkilling Linguistics (nonkilling), as a branch
of the Center for Global Nonkilling, hopes to unveil the ways in which different disciplinary
orientations, in this case Linguistics, can help “promote change toward the measurable goal of
a killing-free world.” What these and other initiatives show is that the connection between
peace, language, communication, culture and power is very strong and also that we can all
contribute our part to a world in which respect for diversity, celebration and upholding of hu-
man dignity, and an understanding of cultural and linguistic differences are accessible to all.

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Promoting, Building and Sustaining Peace Through Sporting Interaction in Israel

JOEL ROOKWOOD

Contemporary armed conflicts are often fought within and adjacent to communities. This results in damage to physical and social infrastructure, the normalisation of violence, and mass displacement and hardships which reduce social cohesion. Various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have established micro level grassroots initiatives to promote, build and sustain peaceful societal co-existence in fractured post-war communities. In recognition of sport’s global popularity and perceived suitability, sports-based projects have been established to help foster peace. By examining related challenges and possibilities, this paper examines the theoretical framework, socio-political context and logistical elements of Football for Peace, a peace building programme implemented in Israel.

KEYWORDS: Peace; Conflict; Football; NGO; Development.

Within the past two decades many parts of the world have experienced rapid change, with transformations permeating sociological, environmental and political spheres. A plethora of authors across various disciplines have addressed such developments in an attempt to provide and frame meaningful description and explanation. Innovative technological and scientific design and invention in fields such as communication and transportation have modernised the way in which many people coexist. However, despite the advancement and achievements of contemporary societies humans have not thus far managed to prevent with any irrevocability one of the most significant threats to true societal advancement: warfare. Setting the significance of this threat in context, Barash (2000: 3) argues that: “There is reason to believe that our most pressing problem is not hunger, disease, poverty, social inequality, overpopulation, or environmental degradation, but rather violence that human beings commit and threaten to commit against others.” All over the globe people continue to engage in conflict with one another – indeed fifty-seven ‘major armed conflicts’ have been fought since 1990. (Katono (2009) defines such conflicts as the use of armed force between military forces and/or organised armed groups, with battle-related deaths reaching at least 1000 people in any given year). Engagement in such violence is often motivated by combinations of hatred, power, greed and pride, together with various allegiances and affiliations to and intolerance of civil, national, ideological, ethnic and religious identities (Rookwood 2009a). In a rapidly changing world, acts of organised violence seem to represent one of few constructs which transcend generational exclusivity.

Although global media coverage often focuses on contemporaneous inter-state wars, such reporting could be considered disproportionate, given that the majority of recent conflicts have been intra-national rather than between independent states. Katano (2009) states that only four out of the fifty-seven major armed conflicts fought since 1990 were fought between states.

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Lederach (1997) contends that civil conflict fosters deep societal divisions in which individuals who perceive themselves to be threatened often seek security in narrower, more localised identity groups. Frustrated group members sense unity amongst others in organisations that are able to frame a holistic explanation of experience, one which blames antithetical groups and presents them as an unjust and corrupt enemy that must be fought and defeated. Viable means of engaging with such enemies are frequently represented as exclusively either confrontational or isolationist, with the former presented as an inevitable outcome. Enemies are often dehumanised with individual responsibility diffused, in order to justify the indiscriminate murder of adversaries for a higher purpose (Dolnik and Gunaratna 2009). Civil wars frequently produce severe humanitarian crises, the cost and extent of which is rarely understood, due to the complexity and dangers associated with undertaking meaningful analysis. In addition to the human causalities and the psychological and socio-economic impact on survivors, the physical landscape can also become a victim of conflicts. The majority of recent armed conflicts have been fought within and adjacent to communities rather than on clearly defined battlefields (Machel 2001). Subsequently architectural infrastructure and the social fabric of communities it serves are often destroyed, rendering the post-conflict reconstruction phase more problematic. Large scale displacement, exposure to impoverished conditions and the experience of fragile relations often contribute to the reduction of community cohesion and other social controls. In addition, the attempts to re-conceptualise violence from a normalised function to a dysfunctional act are met with numerous challenges. This is a particularly prevalent problem when representative groups such as governments and international agencies are perceived to be incapable or uncommitted to the provision of services which can most effectively support post-conflict social development. The attempt to diminish the reliance of the human race on organised violence is fraught with complexities and challenges. Promoting, building and sustaining peaceful solutions are not simplistic objectives. Barash (2000: 1) claims that: “The hard reality is that peace can barely be glimpsed, never mind grasped; what is frustrating, therefore, is not that peace is so close, but that it remains to far away.”

Establishing peace in some fractious regions has involved various degrees of conflict. For example, at the end of the Cold War the communist system in Europe was significantly weakened and in the multiethnic Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the communist party began to lose its ideological potency. The Yugoslav republic had been a conglomeration of six regional republics and two autonomous provinces. The region stretched from the Balkans to modern-day central Europe, but proved a politically and ethnically unstable alliance (Sack and Suster 2000). In the late 1980s national and separatist ideologies and groups provided a direct threat to the stability of centralised Yugoslav control. Defining incidents in the republic’s division occurred in June 1991 and February 1992 when first Croatia and then Bosnia and Herzegovina passed referendums for independence (Ramet 1996). The latter multiethnic republic was inhabited primarily by Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Slavs and the declaration of its independence served to initiate an armed conflict commonly referred to as the Bosnian War, which lasted from March 1992 until November 1995. Various factions were involved, including Serbs, Bosnians and Croats, with allegiances and objectives fluctuating during the various stages of the war. Thousands were killed and displaced in a complex and drawn out conflict punctuated by genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape and psychological oppression (Cigar 1995). International troops were introduced to help re-stabilise disputed territories. After the conflict most of the regional republics were roughly divided on ethnic lines. Many of the now independent states were scarred by the war, with NATO peacekeepers engaging in a
continued presence in the region. Several distressing and elongated processes were then undertaken including recovering bodies from mass graves, relocating and returning to homes, rebuilding demolished communities and convicting guilty parties in war tribunals. The widespread infrastructural and architectural damage and the considerable physical and psychological scars inflicted on the people rendered the social transformation procedure a distressing and protracted experience (Lloyd 1999). However there is evidence to suggest that, even in such troubled regions, war has ceased and genuine reconciliation has helped foster the sustainable construction of peace, represented through the establishment of life-affirming and life-enhancing values and structures (Barash 2000). When one considers the recent advancement of human achievement, there is also cause for hope in relation to conflict prevention, intervention and culmination. Regimes of seemingly intractable oppression have collapsed and warring factions have engaged in meaningful reconciliation resulting in prolonged periods of peace.

The positive transformation of modern societies also extends to an evolving acknowledgement of environmental consciousness, and an increasingly empathetic approach to international human rights. Such developments must however be considered with an appreciation of the limitations, injustices and manipulative behaviour which human beings continue to engage in. The gross distribution of wealth between affluent and impoverished elements of society, the consistent patterns of social and political injustice, the rarity of representative governance, and the misuse of our planet’s resources all serve as compelling evidence which can be set against the ‘development’ of modern societies. These examples and issues illustrate that peace and development form part of a multi-disciplinary subject, incorporating geographical, economical, sociological, psychological, anthropological and political concerns, amongst others. As academics we have a responsibility to contribute meaningfully to the debate. We are obligated to be vigorous in our approach but not so complex in constructs and lofty in language that we lose the capacity to engage with the ‘real world’. We should feel compelled to connect with politicians, aid workers, students and individuals from other affected groups, in order to share innovative ideas and disseminate examples of both ineffective and successful practice in a manner that might encourage, inform and contribute to work in comparable contexts. Effective analytical research conducted on peace-building initiatives should be published for “those wanting to run such a project in other political climes” (Whitfield 2006: 174), providing a “valuable resource for those concerned with similar projects and initiatives taking place in different parts of the world” (Sugden 2007b: 181). This inspires challenging questions relating to transferability and repeatability, and whether generic models can be drawn to tackle societal problems, or whether each problem and its solution are definable only in their own context-bound terms.

Significantly, movements which aim to promote, build and sustain peaceful co-existence in fractured post-war communities continue to develop. Although the implementation of such harmonious concepts has proven difficult in many fragile and unstable communities, individuals and agencies are committing substantial human, political and financial resources to contribute to the peaceful advancement of various societies. Reflecting this movement, academics and practitioners have recently begun to engage in practical, reflective and analytical debate focusing on the questions of who should intervene, when and how (Dolnik and Gunaratna 2009). In most post-conflict scenarios developmental goals are principally non-militaristic and include stabilising social order and facilitating the effective transition from a cycle of violence to a culture of peace. Such objectives are realised by providing for refugees and supporting their return, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, implementing proportionate policing
procedures and providing services and programmes to promote social development and build peace. The framing of such stabilising procedures has been chronologically categorised, from a pre-conflict phase of preventive diplomacy, to a mid-conflict stage of peacemaking and peacekeeping, to a post-conflict phase of peace building (Katano 2009). When considering Korton’s (1990) typology of organisational response to human need, the latter stage can be classified as a form of developmental rather than humanitarian intervention. This article examines post-conflict peace building, but also explores the significance of promoting and sustaining peace throughout this process. Peace promotion relates to the public endorsement and effective advancement of the idea of peace, and the committed encouragement of key populations to engage in the programmes, behaviours and structures necessary for the realisation of peace. Specific problems can be encountered in this process relating to perceived or experienced vulnerabilities and structural tensions. These can transform into open violent conflict if effective peace building interventions are not implemented and if institutions do not have the capacity to manage and transform these tensions into sustainable peace and social development. Post-conflict recovery needs to be receptive and sensitive to both the problems of potential conflict relapse, and the challenges and fragility of peace promotion. Development procedures and policies should therefore be orientated towards related objectives, by devising and implementing effective conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting initiatives that address root causes of conflicts and are mindful and sensitive of their destructive impact.

Peace building is a significant process as this can help to “prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples” (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 475). This is a multifaceted and complex procedure (Donnelly 1993), which incorporates numerous aspects of development such as protecting human rights, building a supporting economy and policy, and engaging in personal and community development (Riak 2000). More specifically, Schirch (2004) argues that peace building involves four key aspects, namely values, skills, analysis and processes. Values refer to the fulfilment of needs and the protection of rights, undertaken with an underpinning ethic of peace promotion as well as interdependence. These include physical needs such as food, shelter and health, social needs such as security, belonging, dignity and recognition, and cultural needs such as religious identity and freedom. Skill development is important for transforming tensions into cooperative relationships, built on commonalities of purpose. These include practical and communicative procedures including mediation, inquiry, dialogue and creative problem-solving. Analysis is an important element of the process in order to develop a meaningful understanding of local contexts, to determine the needs of community members and the mechanisms that could contribute to a relapse of violence and to identify the relational dynamics between types of conflict. Finally, key peace building processes relate to reducing violence, transforming social relationships and developing sustainable capacities through intervention, education, research and evaluation. Peace can be sustained if there is long-term commitment to community stabilisation and recovery. This necessitates the implementation of effective peace building governance in order to ensure the effectiveness of post-conflict recovery and rebuilding mechanisms. This is particularly pertinent for specific groups who remain vulnerable to conflict. In this respect it is important to provide access to development resources in order to support peaceful reintegration and co-existence in post-conflict communities.
NGOs and youth sport initiatives

The various forms and stages of the peace building process typically involve contributions from a number of organisations operating across various levels. On a macro level governmental, business and religious institutions engage in the peace process on national and international scales. On a national and regional level smaller businesses and organisations contribute in this respect, with grassroots programming often implemented at community level. Importantly this paper examines a micro level community-based initiative focused on promoting, building and sustaining peace, devised and implemented by a non-governmental organisation (NGO). Such organisations typically focus on humanitarian and/or developmental needs, and this paper is located in the context of the latter. Tandum (2000) suggests that those involved in this field often derive motivation from an ideological and spiritual commitment to social reform. The Football for Peace (F4P) programme examined here is managed by a secular organisation, although it emerged out of another venture that reflected a Christian desire to foster peace. In general terms, the requirement of community reconciliation in post-war societies usually involves developing social bonds to reduce tensions between members and to forge or renew the sense of community. Tidwell (1998: 134) claims that a lack of “human contact, engagement and bonding can contribute to hatred between ethnic groups.” Consequently some NGOs have sought to foster peace and reconciliation by facilitating such interaction. In post-war Liberia for example, forgiveness festivals were staged following the double civil war, the first of which commenced in 1989 and the second culminating in 2004. The festivals were established to celebrate and promote peace through song, dance, drama and poetry, which also featured speeches from child soldiers openly admitting to their actions and seeking forgiveness from other community members for their involvement in the atrocities (Wessels 2009). The festivals were intended as fun experiences but also carried important messages about the value and requirement of peace promotion, and the significance of traditional cultural activities which reinforce connections with those who share a common cultural heritage (Giddings 2009). In addition, other NGOs have engaged in education-based responses, developing value-based programmes that stress the significance of learning and the importance of peaceful interaction in fractured communities (Rookwood 2009a).

Furthermore, some international agencies have utilised sport as a vehicle to promote a peaceful message and to encourage individuals to engage in sporting interaction as part of the peace building process. Team sports such as football have proven particularly significant in this regard. The simplicity of the game helps explain its extensive popularity, as consistent regulations are internationally applied, and there is a minimal requirement to understand practical or linguistic variations (Richardson and Rookwood 2008). Consequently, sporting governing bodies and NGOs have noted the suitability of the sport as a tool to promote peace and social development, and have sought to apply it in such contexts. Football (known as ‘association football’ in distinguishing it from rugby codes, and referred to as ‘soccer’ as an abbreviated form of the term ‘association’ in countries with more popular national variations) is the world’s most popular sport. The fundamental regulations of the codified game were developed within nineteenth century English public schools under the umbrella of ‘muscular Christianity’. This philosophy involved promoting a person’s “moral and spiritual health at the same time as their physical health” (Lupson 2006: xvi). Sporting competition was considered to contribute to character development, by encouraging the normalisation of behaviours such as adhering to rules and the officials who uphold them, and by acknowledging and respecting the perform-
ance of opponents. Football in particular was employed initially as a means of encouraging school pupils to develop character, represented through qualities such as self-control, unselfishness, fair play and courage (Rookwood and Buckley 2007).

The international diffusion of sports such as football also partly reflected their perceived capacity for nurturing social order (Riordan 2003). Football was popularised in Africa largely through colonisation, and Giulianotti (1999: 91) argues that a key purpose in this regard was to “civilise the savage.” Such prejudices have been completely eroded in many contexts, although a number of practitioners continue to note the propensity of the sport in nurturing social order. Football has notably been used to promote peace in numerous politically and socially tense environments (Riak 2000), with publicised cases from Liberia and Northern Ireland serving as notable examples. Within the former nation, football has been employed in order to facilitate the peaceful re-integration of former child soldiers into post-war society (Rookwood 2009a). The latter example is one in which football contributed to the peace process by combating bigotry and racial tension (Sugden 2004). The use of sport as a developmental tool has also been recognised by the U.N. This can be seen in the UNESCO International Charter for Physical Education and Sport, a document which advocates: “Placing the development of physical education and sport at the service of human progress, promoting their development, and urging governments, competent non-governmental organizations, educators, families and individuals themselves to be guided thereby, to disseminate it and to put it into practice” (UNESCO 1978). Similarly, numerous NGOs have devised and implemented sporting projects in fractured communities in order to establish moral boundaries, encourage co-existence, and provide a peace building platform to facilitate meaningful and sustained social change.

Children (defined under international law as people under the age of eighteen) are often the primary victims of warfare. As Newman (2005: 19) argues: “the most sinister effect of modern wars is the damage they wreak upon young people’s social worlds.” In a direct sense, exploitative practices facilitate the forceful abduction and recruitment of youth combatants. Wessells (2009) underlines the global significance of this problem, claiming that approximately 250,000 children are involved in armed conflict at any particular moment. Indirectly, the burdens of social transformation in conflict-ridden and post-war contexts also often fall disproportionately on children, who: “typically comprise half the population in war-torn countries” (Wessells 2009: 349). For young people the experience of conflict, particularly a protracted war, often results in them becoming socialised through warfare. Having witnessed adult behaviour that normalises and glamorises nationalism and violence, youth populations can be denied an appropriate reference point for conceptualising peace, and instead be drawn into violence. Conflict may be perceived as the most plausible opportunity to avoid powerlessness and deprivation and assert a powerful and immediate authority (Brett and Specht 2004). In post-war contexts young people often feel marginalised and excluded from reconstruction activities, as such efforts are often concentrated on adults. The former are therefore often rendered the: “demographic majority that sees itself as an outcast minority” (Sommers 2003: 1). As a consequence youth engagement in socially constructive initiatives is imperative, if we are to help: “break this war system and...convert a culture of war into a culture of peace” (Wessells 2009: 349). This transformation requires careful attention to reconciliation and peace building initiatives. The suitability of the sport and the significance of involving the population group in question collectively serve as the rationale for developing opportunities for young people to interact through football in order to promote, build and sustain peace.
The significance and applicability of football as an educational and developmental tool for youth populations has been noted, particularly in socio-politically tense environments where perceived differences would otherwise prevent participation and the sharing of sporting experiences (Rookwood 2008). Community football initiatives have been implemented in various contexts therefore (see Rookwood and Palmer 2008) as a means of encouraging segregated groups to congregate in shared space for a football project. The remainder of this article is focused on a unique football-based initiative staged in Israel. This project is collaboratively implemented by experienced and skilled British volunteers (including the author of this paper), together with locally-based staff. The programme is subject to specific limitations, challenges, and possibilities, and it is important to examine the project accordingly. It is also useful to explore the context as well as the details of the programme in order to appreciate the nature and impact of the initiative, rendering the resultant lessons more meaningful.

Football, peace and co-existence in Israel

F4P is a British Universities initiative staged in Israel since 2001. According to Desmond Tutu this programme, “of conflict prevention through sport… in Israel with Arab and Jewish young people has been the result of both vision and sustained hard work. The story will encourage and activate everyone interested and involved in peace work” (Whitfield 2006: i). The conflict in Israel and Palestine is deeply rooted in history, with complex and widespread contemporary manifestations. It is possible to present only an outline of the contextual frame in which this project operates, but it is important to at least meet that objective in order to understand the strengths and limitations of the work. The state of Israel was formed in 1948 in somewhat controversial circumstances. The land selected to create modern-day Israel gave the persecuted and ‘homeless’ Jewish race a national home, yet the chosen territory was internationally recognised previously as Palestinian. The Zionist movement which saw the political possession of the land move into Jewish hands was intricately intertwined with a physical location. Jews consider Zion a prophetic and poetic designation, a definitive reference to the existing Israeli capital of Jerusalem. There are biblical references from the tenth century B.C. to the ancient hills of Jerusalem named Zion, a word which appears 152 times in the Old Testament as reference to Jerusalem. It was the city King David made capital of Israel 3000 years ago and for Jews, it remains the spiritual home of Judaism. Zion has come to represent the Jewish homeland, the symbol of Judaism and of Jewish national aspirations, with Zionism serving as the name given to the national movement of Jewish people. It is a connection between the people of the book and the land of the bible. The state of Israel was resurrected following a brutal campaign of anti-Semitic persecution and nationalist discrimination, which mobilised political support. However, even Jewish ‘sympathisers’ need to be mindful of the recent history, the legitimacy and circumstances surrounding the Zionist movement and the treatment of Arabs living in Palestine during its transformation into Israel. Palestinians also claim rightful ownership of the land, which is also home to significant Islamic symbols including the Dome of the Rock. Sugden (2007a: 2) states that: “In 1948 only 160,000 Arabs stayed in Israel; the rest, some 640,000, fled mainly to neighbouring Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (today the Palestinian diaspora number is in the region of 3.5 million). Approximately 2.5 million Palestinians live in the Occupied Territories (West Bank and Gaza), some of the most densely populated place on earth.”
Conflicting claims and counterclai ms based on religious, political and humanitarian positions, pertaining to the ‘rightful ownership’ of the land have been argued over repeatedly. Significant inter-territory issues such as: the Lebanese wars, the Syrian territory disputes, the attacks directed at and perpetrated by the people of Gaza, the Jewish settlement movement, the demolition of West Bank Palestinian homes, and of course the legitimacy and implications of implementing a two-state solution, all continue to dominate the socio-political dialogue and media representation. Consequently the status of Jewish-Arab relations who continue to live side by side in Israel is often overlooked (Liebmann and Rookwood 2007). Given that relatively large populations of both Jews and Arabs (amongst other groups) currently co-inhabit the small slice of land clinging to the Mediterranean Sea, it is important that progress be made in the context of peaceful co-existence: As Said (2002: 208) argues: “We cannot co-exist as two communities of detached and uncommunicatingly separate suffering:... the only way is of rising beyond the endless back-and-forth violence and dehumanisation is to admit the universality and integrity of the other’s experience and begin to plan a common life together.”

As an exemplar manifestation of such a ‘plan for a common life’, the World Sports Peace Project (WSPP) was established by Geoffrey Whitfield in 2000. The initiative was founded on Christian principles, and served as a prerequisite for F4P. The organisers of the former programme entrusted the project to John Sugden at the University of Brighton and the British Council, who re-modelled and renamed the project in 2003. F4P now serves as a secular organisation underpinned by neutrality and is not affiliated to any religious or political groups. The exchange of the word ‘sport’ for the term ‘football’ in the organisation’s title is notable as this represents the focus of F4P, which in turn reflects the nature and direction of sporting passion in Israel, shared (albeit with fluctuating tendencies) by both Jews and Arabs. Football is a significant sport in Israeli society. It has been used as a propaganda tool by the Israeli team who, representing the newly established state travelled to USA to partake in three well attended victories in September 1948. The structure of the domestic league and its competing clubs was founded on political lines, and at club level the influence of federations and political interests was initially absolute. For reasons pertaining to political expediency the Israeli national and club teams became affiliated to the European governing body UEFA in 1992. In addition, the sport’s global governance body FIFA readmitted Palestine as a member state in 1998 causing problems for some talented Israeli-Arab Palestinians who have to decide which football ‘nation’ they owe allegiance to (Sugden, 2004). The Israeli connection to Europe in particular enabled supporters to ‘reach out’ to the wider world through some of the globe’s most prestigious cup competitions. Contemporary club football is widely supported in Israel, culminating for some successful teams in recent qualification for European competitions and the recording of “some notable achievements” (Ben-Porat 2006: 262) in the process.

As a function of the privatisation of the public economy, the development of a reciprocal model of player migration, the professionalisation of the financial infrastructure, the formation of a footballer’s market, the privatisation of clubs, and ultimately the commodification of Israeli football, the game has altered in significance and structure. Regional and national identifications adopt various modes of expression, and the correlation between representative football teams and representative identities is manifested through the mediation of supporters. As the political football model was replaced by a commercial one in Israel, ties to nationalism have been weakened and expressions of regionalism strengthened: “For the supporters, given their emotional identification, attachment and loyalty, football is their cultural phenomenon, and only secondly economic and political” (Ben-Porat 2006: 271). Largely due to perceptions
of and opportunities for Arab involvement, disagreements with the nation-state appropriation of club successes and the exposure to organised conflict, inter-ethnic violence has played out in football contexts. The game has been utilised by those with manipulative intent, and fan cultures associated with the domestic game have attempted to reinforce nationalist identities in order to legitimise ethnic violence. However, disproportionate media coverage has overstated forms of football disorder, and evidence suggests that the extent to which it permeates the social fabric of the sport is limited (Rookwood 2009b). The experiences of the WSPP and later F4P indicate that as a function of the widespread passionate interest in football, youth engagement in the sport at a grassroots level is largely unaffected by violent and political connotations, and can positively impact inter-faith and ethnic cooperation and coexistence in Israel.

Lending weight to this argument, F4P successfully promotes peaceful interactions in northern Israel. Each year more than sixty staff and students primarily from the University of Brighton, together with Jewish and Arabic volunteers from Israel, partake in a UK training camp followed by various football projects in Israel. Lessons learned from these experiences have been disseminated in other European academic institutions, via external involvement on the project, the development of university curricula and the publication of related material. In addition F4P has received a degree of media attention, particularly regarding the programme run in Tel Aviv during the week England played Israel in a qualification match for Euro 2008. This was endorsed by celebrities such as the England team manager Steve McClaren. These examples illustrate that micro-level peace building initiatives can have wide reaching implications beyond the impact on project recipients. The F4P model employs a value-based football coaching programme to facilitate peaceful integration in Jewish and Arab societies. The coaches are supported by respected local figures who provide practical and linguistic support. The students follow guidelines provided in a specifically produced manual, which emphasises values that promote co-operation and mutual understanding and aid conflict prevention and co-existence. These include trust, respect, neutrality, responsibility and inclusion (Rookwood 2008). Lambert (2007: 20) argues that: “The challenge for the coaches is to identify specific concrete behaviours that are attached to those values and to reinforce them so that they may be taken beyond the football field.” Beedy (1997) refers to these concrete behaviours as “teachable moments”, which coaches are trained to identify and respond to during the project.

The values are infused within the coaching sessions in numerous different ways. For example, trust is implemented through various team-bonding exercises and problem-solving activities, both during the coaching sessions and through the post-session social interactions. Some camps are residential offering further opportunities to emphasise this element. Respect was integrated in the programme by encouraging players to use one another’s name and shake hands after sessions, for instance. Ramsbotham et al. (2005) argue that if you respect your adversary, you are more likely to sustain an effort to find peaceful solutions to any disputes you may experience. In emphasising respect and inclusion, the role and value of the individual in the pursuit of collective achievement was emphasised through various team-based activities. These drills and games highlight the problems that occur when players are isolated and discounted, and the accomplishments that can be realised when the contribution of all players is respected and utilised. Inclusion is considered a key prerequisite for cohesion and as Stidder (2007: 95) argues in the context of F4P: “A focused approach to the teaching of desirable human qualities through the medium of football can be achieved and group cohesion can be developed.” Finally, neutrality was imbedded primarily by avoiding reference to, preference for or intolerance of ethno-religious or socio-political identities and ideologies. Coaches are
reminded of the importance of this principle in their coaching manual: ‘F4P is a politics-free zone. Those who participate in F4P – players, coaches, parents, administrators – leave their political views and ideological positions outside. This does not mean changing political and ideological standpoint, this is not our business. But we do require that such positions are not expressed in and around the F4P experience’.

Football is employed as a conflict, non-codified and competitive activity during the various stages of the initiative. For example, coaches often attempt to cause a conflict situation during coaching sessions, to teach participants about positive means of conflict resolution whilst in a safe and controlled environment. As Townsend (2007) argues, the essence of coaching philosophies on such ventures lies in the children actively attempting to solve disputes and overcome hurdles as they arise. The coaches incorporate drills which allow players to practice mitigating such dilemmas. This is potentially problematic as it relies on the capacity of coaches to provide opportunities for controllable forms of conflict to take place, and necessitates the provision of a secure environment. However, coaches are trained in this respect, as are both the Hebrew and Arabic speaking assistants, who are familiar with the respective pre-existing participant groups. Non-codified versions of the game were also applied during training relays which incorporate handling the ball and players, and in competitive games, where possession is regained and maintained by handling rather than kicking the ball. Also, various apparatus that are not permitted in football are sometimes used, including hockey sticks and hoops. Football is deliberately misapplied in such unorthodox formats to emphasise a given value.

Importantly, football is also employed in a competitive context. Each project culminates in a ‘festival day’, providing players with an unregulated environment to illustrate the tactical, technical and moral lessons they have learned. Teams are mixed in relation to identities perceived to be in conflict, (i.e. ethnicity), which prevents a victory representing a triumph over ‘the other’. Instead teams of mixed identities must cooperate in order to be successful in the tournament. Teams are randomly allocated the name of an English Premier League club, and Stidder (2007: 95) reflects on the impact of the 2006 programme by stating: “Team Fulham... did not win because they were best footballers, but because they were the best team. Whilst their technical ability was no more than average, their commitment towards each other and their willingness to work as a unit had enabled them to progress through a series of competitive games and ultimately win the final.” Before the tournament players are reminded of the F4P core values, and encouraged to reflect related attributes during the festivals. However, the games are not refereed by an impartial observer, and instead players are relied upon to self-regulate matches. This serves to encourage participants to manage and be responsible for their own performances and that of their team-mates. The coaches hope that the competitiveness of the tournaments does not diminish the integrity of the players’ performances.

This model provides a meaningful gauge of the degree to which participants integrate the project values into their behaviour, albeit on a short-term basis. However, a key challenge of using football here to foster ethno-religious integration and maintain peaceful interaction relates to the sustainability of the programme. This is informed in part by the validity of long-term indicators and related conduct, which provide a sense of the extent to which central values are disseminated. The project is run annually, and in some cases additional contact is facilitated by local coaches during the year. Each location (there are approximately five each summer) hosts up to six single-sex groups, each containing a mix of Jewish and Arab boys and girls who live in the same area. This deliberate organisational policy helps ensure that regular social contact is at least a logistical possibility, even if some of the parents of the players resist or forbid their
child the opportunity for more frequent inter-ethnic football interactions. Inevitably such factors prove difficult to ‘measure’, a point which is representative of the challenges of programmes of this nature. Gauging their direct and indirect impact is problematic. Importantly, the difficulties associated with proving the ‘effects’ of sport should not and in the case of F4P have not been used as an excuse by the organisers to reduce it. In addition the project invokes other challenges, some of which are illustrated by Doyle (2007: 65):

Some of the children had not been briefed about the rationale behind the coaching, were impatient when values rather than football were being discussed and were behaving in a disruptive manner. A couple of coaches had found that observing and reflecting upon the teachable moments had been very problematical for them. They had found the tri-lingual situation difficult and that several of the group were very resistant to the aspirations of the project.

This introduces another potential weakness of F4P in relation to the meanings gauged from the programme. As with the interpretation of any personal experience, each player and coach involved in the initiative adopt individual ideological positions and engage in the project in different ways. Some perceive the initiative as a political engagement, others view it as a programme that was “making a difference” and others merely consider it an opportunity to play football. It is not possible to fully represent, reconcile or explain this diversity. However, it is important to state that even well intentioned, effectively managed projects will not produce the desired outcome or have the desired impact on every recipient.

Another significant limitation of F4P regards the political context in which each project is implemented. As the experiences of the last decade illustrate, there has been considerable variation in this respect. There is evidence that the immune system of some Israeli communities is breaking down, weakened by violence and hatred, manifesting itself in political and military engagements which fan the flame of racial resentment and undermine the grassroots progress. The Israeli peace process has not always permeated communities at a micro-level, and as McTernn (2003: 159) argues in this context: “A peace process that fails to take time to engage with local communities and to build bridges both within and between them, religious and secular, is unlikely to survive the tensions festering below the surface of either community.” The 2006 F4P project that eventually took place in December was originally organised for July, but due to Israel’s war with Hezbollah this had to be cancelled at the last minute. I was one of fifty coaches at a London airport waiting to board a plane to Tel Aviv when news came through that the conflict in Israel had resumed after a relatively prolonged period of ‘peace’. Some coaches had already arrived in Israel including F4P organiser John Sugden (2007b: 173), who offers this reflection of the experience: “As we drove and listened to the radio, it was reported that missiles had struck Haifa. This meant that virtually all of the communities that had been lined up to host F4P projects were well within missile range. I knew that it would be impossible and irresponsible to allow F4P 2006 to go ahead.” Despite the significant challenges, limitations, weaknesses and even dangers incurred by those involved in F4P however, its consistent implementation (following annual evaluative analysis) demonstrates the collective perception that it makes a meaningful – albeit small – contribution to the peace process.

Successful social movements are usually the result of local awakenings, which often have roots at a micro level. The depth of involvement of Jewish and Arab community leaders, coaches and players ensures that F4P is not simply reliant on overseas expertise and experience, but is also constructed from local traditions, endorsed by respected personnel and engaged in by a portion of the future decision makers of Israeli society. The hope for the organisers of F4P is that this will be part of its legacy. Opportunities for inter-ethnic interaction are extremely lim-
ited in Israeli society. Many of the young people are taught to live in warped circumstances in
societies that exist in a perpetual state of disaster preparation (Grossman 2008). As the perception
evolves of two colliding cultures being demonised, stigmatised and oversimplified, with
conflict, both experienced and predicted, amplified through the media, ethno-religious enmity
and suspicion is frequently fostered. Rigid, narrow-minded definitions are developed and pre-
sented, with most external groups divided according to those who are ‘with us’ and those who are
‘against us’. However, the warmth and empathy that abounds from the people of modern Israel
is underrepresented by journalists and broadcasters, and yet is so often evident with first-hand
experience. The challenge for the Jews and Arabs living in Israel is not simply to alter the me-
dia portrayal, but to translate empathetic relations to ‘the other’, to engage in programmes, ac-
tivities and dialogue which serve to wear down the hatred and suspicion bred through iso-
lation. The F4P experience demonstrates that football-based interactions can offer an alternative
to intimidation, violence and separation. F4P offers a platform to develop opportunities for
hundreds of young people growing up on both sides of the ethno-religious divide to rise above
the circumstances of their birth, to alter the negative points of view instilled in their mindset
from an early age, and to escape the claustrophobic alienation, diminishment and conflict they
are subjected to. Through F4P youth participants and adult coaches, parents and observers are
also encouraged to establish and sustain relationships which can weaken biases, prevent vio-
lence, reinforce positive impulses and enable constructive dialogue and peaceful coexistence.
It is such activities which serve to promote, build and sustain peace.

The application of the values of neutrality, trust, respect, responsibility and inclusion which
are central to F4P require those involved to encounter and recognise the wishes and legitimacy
of ‘the other’. The challenge that coaches face is to reflect and instil this notion within the
football experience, so that each individual would be committed to the complexities, be toler-
ant of the mistakes, and supportive of the development of ‘the other’. This objective neces-
sitates both a collective and an individualistic approach. The former involves stirring the col-
lective conscience in binding people together despite their ethno-religious and socio-political
differences, and stressing the commonalities which transcend the boundaries of religion, lan-
guage and culture. The value system employed in F4P may not be a perfect embodiment of the
moral intersection between Jewish and Arabic principles. Developing a meaningful value sys-
tem necessitates framing the issues and explaining the choices. By working with local repre-
sentatives, the organisers have succeeded in selecting and implementing values that are tested
against the realities of a common life. Importantly these values are locally perceived to suit
contemporary society. However, given that culture represents a constantly altering compilation
of attitudes and practices which develop according to contemporary conditions, the evolving
nature of Jewish and Arab societies and relations may require a future reconstruction of the
value system. Over time elements of these structures may be refined, discarded or replaced by
sharper more representative values. From an individualistic approach F4P helps to remind the
young participants what they share with others, and the importance of respecting all partici-
pants. Evidently this relies on individual responsibility, something the coaching staff and local
devotees and organisers are keen to stress. Grossman argues that: “Wars, armies, regimes and
fanatic religions try to blur the nuances that create personal, private uniqueness, the non-recur-
rent wonder of each person” (Grossman 2008: 51). However, the intimate cross-cultural engage-
ment facilitated by F4P provides each participant with personal contact with those ‘on the other
side’. Creeds, declarations and symbolic gestures are not enough to sustain a meaningful impact.
Peace is not build on words alone. F4P is however more than a model. For the project to be suc-
cessful transformation is required, not merely information. Words therefore must be operationalised, and football, although problematic, helps us find a sincere expression to shared values.

Conclusion

Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different centres of energy and daring, those ripples build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance (Robert Kennedy 1966—in MacArthur 1999).

Some authors have questioned whether peace is something that can be achieved or whether it is an objective that can merely be approached. Grossman (2008: 89) for example argues that: “In Jewish and Israeli consciousness, the word peace is always deeply connected with a wish, a hope, not necessarily an existing, concrete state.” For some, the concepts of peace (or shalom or salam) are just that, concepts. They are ideas, symbolically represented as a horizon that continually recedes as one approaches it. Taken on this level, ‘achieving peace’ may appear problematic, even impossible. However, there is evidence of genuine desire for reconciliation from people keen to replace enmity with amity in the Middle East, keen for the peace process to have more beneficiaries than victims. F4P is an example of how an idealized and problematic yet shared, democratic and passionate vision can be transformed into reality. With human actions, relationships, systems and analysis, definitively defining peace and providing proof that it has been achieved are not simple tasks. Clearly there are no simple solutions to conflict resolution and peace building. The war-peace paradigm is complicated, interconnected and rarely understood. However we should demand that humans who propagate conflict behave more responsibly and we should invest in the development of systems and patterns of sustainable and peaceful co-existence. Barash (2000: 2) claims that it is possible to develop “a way of living that will nurture life itself, and of which its citizens can be proud.” He argues that the ‘fact this serves all interests’ could encourage people to behave rationally, creatively and compassionately. Critics may argue that dissimilar and even conflicting interests, objectives and philosophies apparent in so many fractured communities prevent this from becoming a reality. However, it is not a mere ideal to identify and implement systems, policies and programmes that provide a genuinely positive contribution. For sociologists and academics in other fields, we might consider such value-led positions as problematic. However we can agree on some fundamental elements as Barash (2000: 3) illustrates: “peace, we proclaim, is better than war, just as social justice is better than injustice, environmental integrity is better than destruction.” It is therefore, better to promote, build and sustain peace, than conflict.

The modern existence of the state of Israel is for some almost defined by conflict. The warring fractions have produced a polarised and conflict-ridden society, where citizens representing various positions in the ethno-religious and socio-political spectrum have been born into war, they have been schooled in it and in some cases almost programmed for it. The relatively young state is yet to experience a single decade in which its inhabitants have felt secure within permanent, stable, defendable and internationally recognised borders (with the notable exception of the sea, the most natural and fluid of elements). Security needs to be defined not simply as spatial stability and military strength however, but also in terms of a representative government, domestic unity, a stable economy and the provision of accessible and challenging education. Community-based programmes operate on a micro-level, and in isolation will have a limited scope. However, if widespread, meaningful, inclusive and sustainable initiatives are effectively
implemented, then the collective influence could be powerfully impacting. The F4P model was devised specifically for the Israeli context. Although elements are applicable in other political climes, and can be transferred accordingly (see Rookwood 2008 for examples), such particular challenges necessitate a tailored response. However, for all programmes of this nature, the suitability, realism, practicality and flexibility of the values, the capacity of coaches and commitment of leaders to deliver programmes, and the receptiveness of participants and extent to which players absorb values to guide future action all form the basis on which projects should be analysed.

Ideas, models, theories and forms of practice should not simply be enforced on recipients by external partners. There must be collective decision making. Ultimately however the ownership and management of such ventures should be placed in local hands. Structurally, academics can contribute by emphasising that peace building initiatives in fractured communities must involve values, skills, analysis and processes. Practically, programmes must also be built on activities which positively reinforce connections with those who share a common cultural heritage. The work of F4P illustrates the suitability of football in this context as a vehicle to help promote, build and sustain peace. Football serves as a powerful metaphor for relying, trusting and demonstrating confidence in one another, and sweating profusely in the collective pursuit of common goals, goals which importantly are considered largely positive from both ends of the political and religious spectrum. Different contexts many require other vehicles for social change. The achievements of this community-level initiative may seem insignificant given the relatively small numbers of participants; however the success is demonstrated through youth engagement in behaviours which continue to elude the global scale of adult interactions. F4P is an investment in people and an investment in peace, and as the British ambassador to Israel, His Excellency Sherard Cowper-Coles stated during the F4P prize-giving in 2004: “From small acorns such as these, giant trees will grow” (Whitfield 2007: x).

References


Partnership Toward a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: The First Decade of Peace Education in Taiwan and Beyond

THERESA DER-LAN YEH

Peace education has been conceptualized as part of civil and moral education in Taiwan since 1949. With the nation’s withdrawal from the United Nations, peace gradually disappeared from the elementary and secondary school curriculum. The return of peace education to the formal educational setting started with the first college-level education for peace course offered in 1997. Other attempts from both higher education and civil society have substantiated the spontaneous and conscientious efforts to promote peace through education and their contributions have enriched the depth and width of peace education in Taiwan.

KEYWORDS: Peace education; Taiwan; curriculum.

Taiwan has long been identified as one of the areas with imminent threat of armed conflicts by international politics analysts. In the face of the menace of warfare from China, the international and domestic political climates in and around Taiwan have even been more severe in the last fifteen years. The international scene is inevitably related to the prominent rise of China in the world economic system, which is bound to have impacted on Taiwan’s claim for sovereignty and its sense of peace and security when China becomes a trade partner, not an ideological opponent any more, of almost every country around the globe. The domestic agitation has rooted in the long-lasting clash between the local political parties appealing to ethical/linguistic differences among Taiwanese people in the election campaigns. As a consequence, it grew into mutual distrust, suspicions and accusations between the domestic rivals on a daily basis fueled by print media and radio stations. The social uneasiness and intense political antagonism have created a rather negative cycle filled with mutual accusations of abuses, corruptions, and retributions in the public discourse.

While experiencing volatile roller-coaster rides, as triggered by external or domestic events, Taiwan in the last decade witnessed conscious efforts to build peace in every aspect from different sectors of the society. These efforts are starting to exert influences in and around the country, and voices for peace are making real splashes in Taiwan’s society. This paper reviews the initiatives and achievements of these peace building efforts in formal and informal educational settings since 1997, with the purpose of depicting a picture of the first ten years of peace education in Taiwan, and hopefully, it will point to the direction and strategies that would contribute to sustaining the peace that Taiwan has enjoyed in the last 60 years. Since peace education has been associated with various progressive educations in literatures, such as human rights education, disarmament education, and development education, an inclusive definition would make the unwieldy field even more difficult to treat in a scholarly manner. In this paper, peace education refers to that which is designed around the concept of peace, rather than the aforementioned key terms commonly seen in literatures.

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The Scene Before 1997: “Peace” in the Mandatory Educational Curriculum

Peace education with its modern origin in the West only entered Taiwan not long ago. Yet, the concept of peace is no stranger to the educational curricula in the past. In fact, peace is equivalent to two Chinese characters together, he (harmony) and ping (evenness, fairness), two out of the eight major virtues\(^1\) of Chinese culture as identified by the Nationalist regime shortly after it moved to Taiwan in 1949 for the citizens and students to observe. Peace (he ping) also constitutes the last one of the “12 Principles for Youth” to abide by at the time: “Peace is the foundation of social relations.” For more than thirty years, he ping enjoyed a prominent status in both elementary and secondary educational curricula in which he ping was mainly conceptualized in terms of the country’s obligations and responsibilities toward other countries in the world. Since its forced withdrawal from the United Nations in 1978, Taiwan has gradually been limited to only a few international activities and hence tremendously reduced its international visibility. This increasing isolation of the nation from major international arenas is reflected in the education curriculum standards modified in the 1990s. At the time, peace (he ping) no longer stands as an independent moral concept to be observed and taught in schools, only certain substantial core value of peace could be spotted in concepts or behavioral indexes related to justice, respect, appreciation for difference, and interpersonal nonviolence. The dissolving process of peace as an essential civil character to be developed can be further illustrated by the changes made in junior high and elementary school curricula on civil and moral education throughout the years.

In the first secondary curriculum standards promulgated by the Ministry of Education (MOE) after the Nationalist regime settled in Taiwan, world peace was posted as one of the four civil education objectives, and the will and act of promoting world peace as part of civil responsibilities was encouraged in students (MOE 1956). The consequent general revisions in 1962 and 1972 both postulated “being a global citizen for a peaceful world” as the third-year curriculum focus in junior high schools. Ten years later, in 1983, a new version of the civil education curriculum came into effect. In this revision, world peace-building was replaced by harmonious cultural life blending science, media and intercultural exchange together. The dictions such as “peace” and “the United Nations” and the recommended student activities such as the “Model UN Security Council” and the “Forum for Sustaining World Peace” disappeared from the 1983 curriculum. Only the ideal world condition aspired in Confucianism – shih chieh ta t’ung (great harmony in the world) – was retained (Wang 2004).

A similar trend can be found in the elementary school curriculum standards. As early as 1968, the then President Chiang Kai-Sheik commanded the course “Living and Ethics” in the curriculum to be designed around “the four pillars (of the nation)\(^2\) and the eight virtues” and their applications in daily lives. Ever since peace has been one pedagogical want of the “Living and Ethics” course curriculum. In the 1975 curriculum standards, peace constitutes a separate teaching unit of the course from the fourth through the sixth grade. The content covers interpersonal and international relations, nonviolent behavior, and work needed for justice and world peace. Eighteen years later, in 1993, a new edition of the curriculum incorporated he ping into the jen ai (benevolence and compassion) virtue unit in the “Living and Ethics” and was officially no more an independent section of the course. However, some of the content criteria in the 1993

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\(^1\) The eight major virtues are loyalty / honesty, filial piety, benevolence, compassion, truthfulness / trustfulness, righteousness, harmony and fairness.

\(^2\) The four pillars of the nation are propriety, righteousness, integrity/purity, and shamefulness.
edition can be identified as related to peace education. Wang in her analysis of the 1993 curriculum found certain desirable behaviors did relate to peace core values, such as empathy, appreciation for differences, justice and environmental concerns, and non-violence. Behavioral indexes include respecting others’ opinions, accepting criticism, helping others, forgiving others, thinking in others’ shoes, appreciation for others’ strengths and foreign cultural artifacts, cherishing nature, plants and animals, being fair, abiding the laws, defending justices, knowing rightness from wrong, cooperation and no bully (Wang 2004). A further examination of the curriculum standards across the fields reveals that peace per se is not directly discussed or required as an ethical principle to live by. Moreover, the essential concepts and skills of peace building such as conflict resolution, disarmament and nonviolent activism, usually considered as indispensable in peace education (Reardon 1998; Sharp 1973), are not covered at all. The name and the essence of peace education have officially disappeared from the formal educational settings in Taiwan at this time.

The fact that he ping (peace) ceased to be a separate pedagogical unit or even disappeared from the curriculum represents the drastically decreasing preference for peace education in Taiwan when peace was generally understood to be some rhetoric that disguises the military attempt of China to “unify” with Taiwan. The misunderstanding reached its peak in 1995-6 when China launched its ballistic missile test across the sky above the Taiwan Island. Under such circumstances, advocacy for peace or peace education could be challenged as siding with China or even a threat to Taiwan’s national security. The prospect for peace education has never seen so dire in Taiwan.

The First Decade of Peace Education (1997-2006): The Blooming Conscientious Efforts

The reappearance of peace education in the educational scene in Taiwan did not occur as the result of any top-down educational curriculum reforms, rather as a conglomeration of individual conscious efforts from higher education and non-governmental organizations.

Higher educational Level

In the past, peace-related courses were offered occasionally in colleges of law and colleges of social studies in Taiwanese universities, bearing titles such as “Conflict and Peace.” Due to the nature of post-secondary education, those courses usually fall within the category of Education about Peace, rather than Education for Peace, according to the division criteria proposed by Brock-Utne (1994) and Fisk (2000). That is, college-level courses usually center around the more formal learning of subject matters: acquisition and creation of knowledge of those peace-related subjects, rather than the development of attitudes, values and behaviors for furthering peace. Without doubts, those courses do contribute substantially to the field of peace studies and an adequate level of knowledge would certainly, to some degree, inspire students to work for peace, yet there has not been a clear correlation between the knowledge one acquires and the attitude and behavioral changes one adopts (Brock-Utne 1996). This gap dictates a pressing need for education for peace in Taiwan.

The first education for peace course bearing the title of “peace studies” was offered in National Taiwan University, the largest and oldest university in Taiwan, in the spring semester of the 1997/1998 academic year. Combining her academic background in Speech Communication and trainings in Peace and Conflict Solution Studies (Yeh 2003), the instructor tried to accomplish two objectives in the course titled “Communication for Harmony: An Introduction to
Peace Studies”: one is to help students living more peacefully in their daily lives with non-violent communication and conflict management skills, the other is to cultivate future students of peace studies by translating recent scholarship into the local context (Yeh 2002).

The course is designed around an integrated, wholistic definition of peace which aims at eliminating violence in varied aspects of the culture of war along a continuum of fear-anger-hatred-aggression-violence-war-environmental abuse, and promoting social justice and inclusive security at the same time. The topics covered in the course range from bias and stereotype management on an intrapersonal level to ecological sensitivity and environmental activism in larger contexts (Fig. 1). The skills taught and practiced include non-religious meditation, conflict resolution, and assertive communication. As Yeh admits, the course structure and content in this design can easily go beyond a single instructor’s capability and she needs collective efforts in the future such as team teaching. Yeh (2002) also suggests a series of coordinated leveled courses, rather than a single one-shot course, since peace education has historically been, and currently is anything but homogeneous, usually covering a broad range of stances and approaches. In fact, Yeh’s integrated design can well be complemented by other more subject-oriented courses such as “Peace discourse since 1900” and “Hate Speech and Resistance Discourse” in the same university. Since 2005, Yeh has tried to integrate peace education pedagogy into the undergraduate curriculum across the discipline in Taiwanese universities through her participation in local conferences and lectures at various university teaching development centers around the island. Given the limited success, these pioneering attempts to bring the element of education for peace into a university course has opened doors to further improvement and development of more education for peace courses on college campuses in Taiwan.

Fig. 1. The course structure of “Communication for Harmony: An Introduction to Peace Studies”

Around the turn of the century, peace education courses came into being in some private universities in Taiwan, i.e. Tamkang University and Fu Jen Catholic University. Since 2001, Chien-Fu Chen and his associates have endeavored to establish a “Peace Education Program” and a “Center for Peace Education” at Tamkang University. The cross-disciplinary nature of the Peace Education Program brings many of the existent courses together into a four-sub-area core curriculum: (1) peace studies theories and activism, (2) interpersonal communication and conflict management, (3) multiculturalism with focus on respects and tolerance for differences, and (4) global perspective. In addition to offering college-level program certificate, the Center for Peace Education is concerned with peace education in elementary and secondary schools including curriculum research, development and policy review (Chen 2002). Although the “Peace Education Program” and the “Center for Peace Education” have not been officially
established, Chen’s initiatives have paved the road to a more comprehensive vision of peace education in Taiwan.

In Fu Jen Catholic University, a peace research center, John Paul II Peace Institute, was established in 1997. The Center, though focusing on studying cultural and philosophical issues related to peace from a Chinese and Catholic viewpoint, has contributed to peace education via its annual Peace Lectures and conferences and by participating in national planning of human rights education. It also assisted the Taipei 28 February Memorial Museum to connect with other peace museums for launching joint educational programs. Unlike the social science orientation that underpins the Tamkang conception of peace education, the Jesuit scholars at the Institute are heavily influenced by their philosophy background and thus adopt a more humanistic approach toward peace. They have applied the Catholic teaching of peacemaking, mainly reconciliation and forgiveness, to the current understandings of peace and peace culture in Taiwan. For example, Edmund Ryden SJ, the first director of the Center, has drawn resources for peace education from local traditions and cultures in Taiwan and publishes treaties on the subject (1998, 2002). This attempt has been duly reflected in the college-level courses they teach.

Edmund Ryden offers peace and human rights courses in Fu Jen University and Soochow University highlighting the related events in Taiwanese history and cultural practices regarding peace with an aim to localize the western origin of advocacy for peace and human rights. Also focused in his courses are the domestic peace campaigns in the past and present and their impacts on contemporary Taiwan. Since 2003, he has developed a course entitled “Peace Education,” the first of its kind in Taiwan. The content of peace education is conceptualized to be non-violent action for human rights as guidelines to realize peace in the society. The historically prominent peace movements in Taiwan are featured as good practice models for the young generations (Ryden 2003).

Another important Catholic institution working closely with Fu Jen University on peace education is the Taipei Ricci Institute in Taiwan. One of the long-term research projects at the institute is to investigate the interactions of peace and Chinese culture. Benoit Vermander, the current director, surveyed Taiwanese attitudes toward peace and found that Taiwanese people seldom question the effectiveness of militarization and death penalty in maintaining national and social peace. He further observed that peace discourse in Taiwanese media and public discussion tends to be very abstract, filled with moral rhetoric (Vermander 2000). In 2001, Vermander published a book in Chinese entitled “Peace Education: Facing Conflicts, Building Harmony.” Although bearing the term “peace education” in its title, the book does not specify how peace education should be conducted; instead, the book elucidated the challenges and opportunities Taiwan has in building a culture of peace from that of war through education. He advocates future studies of violence through a series of stages: facing it, recognizing it, understanding it in its context and impacts, and analyzing the attitudes and value systems behind violence. This method of studying violence is considered by Vermander to be the best way to restore justice and ensure peace in a culture where preference for harmony is central to the social norms of conduct. If conflicts and violence are partially caused by differences, he would like to engage people in intergroup dialogues to first understand and then connect with one another (Vermander 2001).

Considering peace and development as part of human rights education content, the Chang Fo-Chuan Center for the Study of Human Rights at Soochow University has also been playing an essential role in Taiwan’s peace education. The center offers peace-related courses at the undergraduate level and in its master’s program, and invites internationally acclaimed scholars
of peace education to visit Taiwan; it also sponsors students to participate in peace education events outside the country, such as the United Nations University for Peace in Costa Rica and Peace Camp in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. From 2002 to 2006, the center hosted annual forums on peace, development and human rights education for college instructors to exchange teaching experiences and course syllabi. Although the forum was no longer held due to insufficient funding, it has successfully disseminated the seed of peace education to many college professors.

**Elementary and Secondary Education Level**

For elementary and secondary schools in the new millennium, peace education is not specified in the 2003 national Nine-Year Joint Curriculum Guidelines, yet partial essence of peace education is embedded in certain core components and core competences formulated in the guidelines including respect for others and different cultures, humanitarian attitudes, and a global perspective (both culturally and ecologically) situated in mutual interdependence, trust and cooperation. However, peace education was not completely forgotten by those who are concerned. In 2003, Journal of Education Research (Taiwan) published a “Peace Education” issue exploring the possibility and approaches to incorporate peace education into the elementary and secondary curricula. Almost all the scholars and teachers represented in the issue agree that the concept of peace, justice and non-violence should be infused into the existing school curricula, rather than setting up a separate pedagogical unit or learning areas. Besides, Tamkang University hosted several peace education workshops, partially funded by the Ministry of Education, in 2004 for in-service teachers to develop the capacity and strategies to incorporate peace education into their daily teaching. Several teachers also shared their education for peace experiences with peers in the workshops (Chen 2004).

In a further analysis of the 2003 national Nine-Year Joint Curriculum Guidelines in comparison with peace education core values, Wang (2004) concludes that the “social studies” learning area is the most eligible one for infusing peace education. In accordance with this conclusion, she develops and carries out a series of lesson plans embedding peace education into the elementary teaching, and records students’ responses in her master’s thesis. Yet, with a closer look at the Curriculum Guidelines, among the positive and progressive vocabulary used there, it is obvious that conflict resolution is restricted to the collective level of intercultural exchange, mainly between nations or cultures, while interpersonal conflict management is not given a proper place in this curriculum, even though some techniques commonly used in conflict management are included in the curriculum’s core competences such as listening attentively, communicating effectively, and sharing with others. This may be due to the fact that conflict is not recognized as natural in daily life but something to be avoided rather than treated in Taiwan, which further points to the need for more peace education in the elementary and secondary school curriculum.

Toward the end of the first decade of the century, peace education has been off to a good start in Taiwan, in particular at the post-secondary level. Courses have been continuously offered in colleges and universities with focuses ranging from regional conflict and peace to human rights and peace education methodology (Table 1). Certain skills recommended for peaceful living have already been covered in the current grade 1-9 curriculum. For education for peace to take real effect in elementary and secondary schools in Taiwan, however, at least a higher degree of prominence should be given to conflict resolution skills and competence in the future revision of the national Curriculum Guidelines.
Table 1. Peace-Related Courses in Taiwanese Universities in 2008 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Taiwan University</th>
<th>SooChow University</th>
<th>Tamkang University</th>
<th>Fu Jen Catholic University</th>
<th>National Chung Hsing University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Peace Discourse Since 1900</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law/ System Violence and Individual/</td>
<td>International Affairs and World Peace/ Peace and Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Hate Speech and Resistance Discourse</td>
<td>History of Human Rights Thought/Human Rights Philosophy</td>
<td>War and Humanity</td>
<td>Peace Education</td>
<td>World Peace Seminar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil Society Sector
The varied efforts from the formal educational settings are not the only type of peace education in Taiwan; they also find resonance in non-governmental organizations and their campaigns for peace. Most of these organizations may not consider peace education as their major missions; yet through forums, trainings, public lectures and publications, they have informed the public of the importance and feasibility of peace and non-violence. The Taiwan Peace Foundation came into being in 1997 with a Peace Research Center focusing on ethnic relations and equality on the island. Given its strong theory and research orientation, the foundation has cooperated with the Taipei 28 February Memorial Museum in many public educational activities to improve inter-ethnic group relations in Taiwan. The first director of the Taiwan Peace Foundation, Wen-Shong Huang, initiated the Research Association of National Peace-Security in Taiwan in 1999 to promote the concept of non-violent civil defense as an alternative to the increasing militarization of Taiwan. It has been very active in networking with like-minded activists and scholars in East and South Asian countries to work for regional peace. From time to time, the association holds forums, conferences and mediation trainings for the interested Taiwanese to increase their understanding and practice of civil defense.

Established in 2000, the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan is the first grass-root organization completely devoted to comprehensive peace education on all levels as its major mission. The foundation’s director Chien Hsi-chieh considers education the best means to transform “peace, the concept” to “peace, the reality.” Immediately into action after the establishment, proactive trainings and activities have been designed to further understanding of peace-related issues such as peace youth camps in the indigenous regions, inter-ethnic group dialogues and open forums, peace/war film festivals, and the annual Reconciliation Day on the last Saturday of the year. In these activities, the foundation constantly collaborates with local scholars and educators. Under its advocacy, a network of teachers and professors interested in peace-related education was formed in 2001. This Taiwan Rights-Peace-Development Education Consortium encourages sharing of resources and expertise to promote peace education on campus and has held four conferences and several smaller seminars ever since. To reach out more to the younger generation and the larger public, the foundation has created the first peace-focused website in Chinese which collects news reports and articles relevant to peace and war in the region as well as around the world. The website also offers more learning opportunities for the general public including virtual book clubs on various themes such as women and peace, inter-ethnic relations.

Other non-peace specific NGOs also contribute to peace education in Taiwan. The Dharma Drum Foundation has dedicated part of its resources to peace-promoting education. It sponsored the “2004 Taipei Forum of World Youth Peace Summit” in which 120 young Taiwanese
together with young people from other countries learned how to work for a more peaceful world to come. Though a Buddhist organization, the Dharma Drum Foundation invited Hindu and Catholic church leaders as well as local leading figures in the fields of sociology, cultural studies, economics, ecology and technology to participate in the forum. After the event, one hundred young people were selected to receive a six-month “World Youth Peace Ambassador Training” to strengthen their competence in fostering interpersonal and international peace. Similar but smaller-scale activities on preparing young people for peacemaking were held in 2006 and 2007.

In addition to religious denominations, women’s organization started to notice the impact of violence on women’s peace and security. The Women’s Wakening Foundation, the oldest women’s NGO in Taiwan, held a series of peace-theme panels in 2004 to raise the public’s awareness on how violence in war and in daily life prevent women from participation in all decision-making levels and how women around the world make their resistance. The Foundation for Women’s Rights Promotion and Development managed to include peace as one of the four important agenda for Taiwanese women to participate in the United Nation’s NGO activities and held open forums in 2008 and 2009 to train government employees and women activists. While these women’s organizations’ intent is to incorporate international and global perspectives into local women’s movements, their attention on the United Nation’s agenda for women in which peace is a key area of concern has enriched the content of peace education by providing a gender-sensitive dimension of peace to the general public.

**Beyond the First Decade**

Peace education, although a very recent concept introduced into Taiwan, has started to bloom on this island. Since 1997, college-level courses, conferences and publications on peace education have increased at a steady rate. More and more teachers, students, and citizens realize that peace is what we can desire and achieve, not just a spiritual or moral ideal. The cooperation between different levels of educational institutions and between academic and social organizations has interwove a network in which peace educators exchange information and resources, and at the same time support for one another in many forms of educational activities. More importantly, the budding network allows creativity shared and visions communicated. This conglomeration of efforts from various sectors of the society indicates the need for peace education in today’s Taiwan, and this need was only addressed by individual teachers and scholars, it barely receives any substantial or systematic attention from the government at this time.

After a decade of these pioneers, an array of peace-related progressive education courses and curricula are competing for resources in educational and civil settings including human rights education and environmental education. Yet, when the dire global financial situation seems to be casting a shadow on the resources available to progressive education in Taiwan, whether or not we could afford continuing the current laissez faire attitude towards these courses and activities has become a recent issue of concern (e.g., Chien 2001; Wang 2005). Perhaps it is time for Taiwan to review the interrelations among the several types of progressive education and integrate them into one wholistic paradigm. Among these education genres, peace education with the covering-all definition of its key term (peace), can be a very eligible candidate for the umbrella term to integrate these courses into a comprehensive curriculum. It can either serve as a general education curriculum in colleges and universities, or a unifying initiative to integrate the see-

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1 The six areas are information education, environmental education, gender equity education, human rights education, career development education, and home economics and care ethics education.
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mingly unrelated six areas in the issue curriculum for the elementary and secondary education (MOE 2003). Either way, Eastern Asian cultural roots and local contexts need to be incorporated into the peace education curriculum; research findings should be transformed into teaching pedagogies and applied to everyday experiences.

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Vermande, Benoît. 2000. Conflict and Reconciliation- Building Taiwanese Culture of Peace. Taipei: Li Shu Publisher.


**Appendix: Peace-Related Websites in Taiwan**

Taiwan Peace Foundation(臺灣和平基金會)
http://www.twpeace.org.tw/about/about.htm

Center for Peace (和平研究中心)
http://www.twpeace.org.tw/center/center.asp

John Paul. II Peace Institute (若望保祿二世和平研究中心)
http://peace.ls.fju.edu.tw/old/news.htm

Research Association of National Peace-Security in Taiwan (臺灣國家和平安全研究協會)
http://www.geocities.com/tranps2000/

Taiwan Peacetime Foundation (臺灣促進和平基金會)
http://www.peacetimeonline.org.tw/

Chang Fo-Chuan Center for the Study of Human Rights (張佛權人權研究中心)
http://www.scu.edu.tw/hr/index.htm

Taipei Ricci Institute (台北利氏學社)
http://www.riccibase.com/new/ricci/rihp001.htm
This paper describes and analyses a recent series of initiatives undertaken at Nanjing University, one of China’s leading Higher Education institutions. The university undertook a partnership with Coventry University’s Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies to establish peace studies as a discipline in Chinese academia, through a series of conferences, publications and translations. The authors argue that research and other educational activities orienting Chinese politicians, opinion-makers, public, and children towards peaceful solutions, skilful conflict resolution, and a commitment wherever possible to nonviolence will be very much in the interests of China domestically, and the international community more generally. This paper discussed in detail a short series of peace education books for use in Chinese schools.

KEYWORDS: China; Peace Studies; Nanjing; Peace Education; Coventry; Reconciliation; John Rabe; Peace Research.

China’s rise to power changes the face of international relations throughout the world. Even a few years ago, China was often characterized as a regional power, perhaps with limited global outreach. Now its influence is evident far beyond the Asia Pacific region. Power transitions are notorious for political instability and rivalry, often leading to international conflicts. By a unique combination of circumstances, this transition seems to have been so far achieved relatively peacefully: perhaps because the USA has been so fully committed to armed conflicts in other regions since 2001; or for other reasons. One positive factor has been that the Chinese leadership has committed itself to a peaceful international environment, as we have argued elsewhere (Hunter and Liu 2006). However, as China’s power and aspirations continue to increase so rapidly, tensions will inevitably manifest. Will China and its neighbours be able to sustain peaceful relations into the future? We believe that research and other educational activities orienting Chinese politicians, opinion-makers, public, and children towards peaceful solutions, skilful conflict resolution, and a commitment wherever possible to nonviolence will be very much in the interests of China domestically, and the international community more generally. This paper describes and analyses a recent series of initiatives undertaken at one of China’s leading Higher Education institutions: Nanjing University in Jiangu Province, which is consistently ranked among the top five universities in China.

Peace Studies in China

China traditionally has been open to innovations from outside its borders, just as it has inspired and informed many developments in the rest of the world by the export of Chinese technologies and ideas. Yet this openness is usually associated with a process of sinification or acculturation. Thoughts and practices as far removed as Marxism, Buddhism, the internet, cin-
ema and capitalism have all entered China from outside, but we now find them in typically Chinese incarnations, part and parcel of contemporary Chinese society to such an extent that Chinese citizens do not find them especially “foreign.” A recent well-known formulation of this process was the designation in the early 1980s by Deng Xiaoping of his economic and political reforms as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”: reforms which have made China one of the most powerful countries in the world in a remarkably short time.

In the past decade, peace studies has likewise made an entry into Chinese academia, in the first instance due to the hard work of staff at Nanjing University, partly in a collaboration with Coventry University, UK, funded by the British Council. It is no coincidence that Nanjing and Coventry have taken the lead in this discipline: both cities suffered in the Second World War, and have since taken up the difficult challenge of memorialising conflict and victims with the long-term aspiration of reconciliation with perpetrators rather than revenge.

This challenge has been especially severe in Nanjing, whose population suffered from some of the worst atrocities of the 20th century during the Japanese invasion. Memories of the 1937-1945 war, as well as the 1945-1949 Civil War, and the Cultural Revolution, though, can be a peace resource, if an ambivalent one. China probably suffered more casualties through the violent conflicts of the 20th century than any other country in the world except for Russia: there are estimates of some ten million casualties at the hands of the Japanese alone (White). One would expect these tragedies to lead to a great consciousness of the futility and destructiveness of war, and a commitment to more peaceful methods of resolving conflicts. And without doubt, one meets many Chinese who are openly committed to peace and opposed to war as a matter of principle.

Anti-war, or at least anti-Japanese, sentiment is memorialized in various places in China, but nowhere in a more moving fashion than in the city of Nanjing itself, where there is a Holocaust Memorial museum dedicated to victims of the Japanese atrocities there in 1937-1938; and on the campus of Nanjing University, the former residence of John Rabe. This residence now houses an exhibition on the German civilian responsible for a civilian protection zone established in Nanjing in the late 1930s, and is also a centre for the study of conflict resolution. These museums may make us question the purposes of telling the public about the massacre of Chinese civilians: Is it warning against repetition, an attempt at constructing a different attitude for the future, or a way to reproduce distrust, hatred, and fear? The question is important, because China certainly has a pro-conflict as well as a pro-peace heritage. Thinking about issues of peace, harmony, conflict and related topics inevitably spring from deep cultural traditions embedded in different scripts, linguistic patterns, philosophies and religions. On the level of common-sense or popular wisdom, the idea of nonviolence probably seems completely bizarre to the great majority of Chinese citizens. Although Buddhism has some residual influence, it certainly did not penetrate the society in the same way as, for example, Hinduism did India or Christianity some Western cultures. There has been no real call to religiously-inspired non-violence in China. On the contrary, most Chinese would probably have a common-sense, utilitarian approach to the issue, and assume that violence is unavoidable in many situations, as a lesser of two evils.

Yet we also find an abundance of peaceful thought in Chinese traditions. The Middle Way, the basic principle of action delineated by Confucius, harmoniously unifies ren – benevolence – with li – correct behaviour. The essence of ren is to love others. It is the highest internal

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2 Other gross estimates are Soviet Union, 20 million deaths; Poland and Germany, 5 million each.
standard, to act honourably when handling relationships among people, while *li* functions as a kind of external norm for one’s behaviour. Confucianism advocates a moral, peaceful ideal, namely that inter-personal and also international conflicts should find resolution through moral means rather than by war, even if war be the “Just War” proposed by some Christian thinkers. Confucius was the first thinker in China to put forward the ideal as “to convince others by morality”, laying the foundation for the subsequent Confucian mode of resolving disputes. This ideal demonstrated such enormous power in politics that it could even substitute violent mechanisms, like criminal laws or military power, in governing a country. Meanwhile, Daoist thinkers also developed flexible or compromising ideas on peace. As Johan Galtung, the founder of Peace Studies puts it: “thoughts of peace and violence coexist in Daoism, warning people to be prepared for danger in times of safety”, and he specially emphasizes that peace studies is as practical a science as medicine, using Chinese traditional medicine as an excellent analogy. Therefore he has adopted the principle of mal-adjustment and rebalancing between *yin* and *yang* in his writings.

The development of the Chinese Communist Party radically challenged any traditional anti-military sentiments, even among intellectuals. Many Chinese felt deeply humiliated after the foreign invasions staged by European and then Japanese armies. Peaceful political movements failed to secure national independence, and it was only the brilliant military successes of Mao Zedong that finally led to the expulsion of first the Japanese and subsequently the pro-American nationalists. In the period from approximately 1950 to 1980, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, the Red Army was at the forefront of Chinese politics, society and culture, and was glorified in literature and film. Many Chinese are still proud that their armed forces can ensure national independence, stand up to the USA and Japan, and ensure that China has a strong voice in the world.

What kinds of topics are open to peace research and teaching? The Chinese government and education authorities actively encourage the study of the Japanese invasion and imperialist aggression in Asia. Likewise, they appear to have no objection to theoretical issues like the ideology of pacifism in other countries, religious dialogue, conflict resolution skills, and peacekeeping in various parts of the world. In fact, such research is already going on at other universities, for example in the works of Wang Zhicheng (2003), who has made available a thorough evaluation of the phenomenon of inter-religious dialogue in numerous original works and translations; and those of Han Hongwen (2002) who has published a substantial analysis of European and U.S. peace studies literature.

Outsiders’ perception about censorship and surveillance in China is often exaggerated or unfounded concerning these topics. Nevertheless, there are definite constraints on publications, and on activities that academics or researchers could undertake. Three areas of peace studies, which have featured quite prominently in the West, could probably not at present be adopted in Chinese institutions. First, some Western peace research arises from close co-operation between academics on the one hand, and mass movements or protesters on the other. Many conferences or internet groups explicitly bring together students, peace activists, NGO workers, and professors, for example. The situation for Chinese scholars with regard to co-operation may be more parallel to the big state-funded institutions in Scandinavia like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, which are more closely tied to government agencies than to grass-roots groups, and which focus on security studies. Second, an important aspect of peace research in the West has been the calculation and subsequent critique of government military spending, as well as monitoring of military hu-
man rights abuses, support for conscientious objectors and so on. Third, peace activists have often supported peaceful movements for regional autonomy, where an ethnic minority has demanded more independence or rights from a central government. Chinese academics would probably not feel able to take part in either of these areas of activity, at least not at present. The Chinese government views secessionist movements as a threat to territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and as such is fundamentally not open to comment. If any deal is ever to be made, it will be made by the central government, not brokered by outside observers.

Peace research and teaching at Nanjing University

Peace research in China started in 2000, when co-operation was formally established between the World History Study Section in the History Department of Nanjing University and the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University. From 2002, one or two Chinese lecturers each year attended advanced studies on Peace Studies in Coventry University, while Coventry staff held lectures and seminars in Nanjing. Peace Studies as an academic discipline for students started in 2003 after Professor Liu Cheng had completed a graduate course in Coventry University’s Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies. By 2009, about 1000 students from arts and science faculties had attended the programme. One student wrote after a class: “It can not be denied that the Peace Studies course has exerted an influence on my life. I have really acquired something which is not offered by other traditional methods when I try to tackle problems through peaceful means.” “On the course,” another student wrote, “I always meet a dilemma. I want to believe or try to convince myself that these theories could be realised, but at the same time I often feel depressed when faced with big differences between theory and reality.” Another student thought that the Peace Studies course could serve as “a little spark which can kindle a great fire”. Reactions by Chinese university students – showing a variety of different concerns and evaluations – have proved that it is both necessary and urgent to progress peace research in China.

Nanjing University researchers have made considerable contributions: the first Chinese translations of works by Rigby (2001), Galtung (1996) and Barash and Webel (2002) among others; the first major original textbook on peace studies in Chinese, authored by Liu Cheng (2006); a series of three monographs on peace thinking in Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism; papers on peace studies published in journals such as Foreign Social Science, Nanjing University Journal and Academia Bimestris; eight edited volumes of Peace Archives; and three Peace Studies courses for both undergraduate and postgraduate students in Nanjing University. In addition, the university began to recruit postgraduates and doctoral candidates on peace research in 2004. As a formal start-up for peace research in China, the International Symposium on Peace Studies in March 2005 received wide coverage and allowed more Chinese academics to understand the implications of Peace Studies, enormously advancing teaching and research in the area.3

However, Peace Studies in China also confronts many challenges: First, until now Peace Studies has not had any special research organization or academic major in any Chinese university. Although Nanjing University has been working hard on building up a special centre for peace research, the final decision is still in question, as is its funding. Secondly, another problem is whether or not Peace Studies can obtain full recognition from academic circles. As

3 Hunter (2007) is an edited collection of the conference proceedings.
Peace Education with Chinese Characteristics

is well known, China suffered a century of humiliation by foreign powers, “being beaten for lagging behind” as the expression goes. Many academics may believe that Peace Studies only states some ideals, but does not offer any achievable reality. Third, in a developing country like China, graduates majoring in peace studies will soon encounter the fierce realities of the job market, where they may suffer compared to those with qualifications in other fields of study, such as IT, management or engineering.

There are historical examples of how China has shown itself to be a nation which loves peace and opposes violence. Despite the Ming dynasty’s technological and military capacity to invade other countries, Zheng He’s peaceful overseas voyages formed a strong contrast to those that opened Western colonialism, to give one example. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the government has adhered to a foreign policy of non-intervention based on “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and focused on peaceful rather than violent means to settle disputes. In the 21st century, a new generation of leaders have announced the “Peace Rising” path of China on its way to becoming a great power. In other words, peace and development have always been the two main targets for both the Chinese government and people, an aspiration which is largely shared by the peace studies agenda.

Another of the Chinese government’s goals is the construction of a “Harmonious Society” which can be characterized as follows: the acceleration of economic development with an emphasis on the individual human being; advocating for a new-style of modernity with “twofold gains” in human efforts to transform the natural environment; promotion of a society based on the values of equality and justice in which all exert their ability and live on good terms with others; and to build a society with a robust legal system and orderly management. All these objectives could also fall into the category of peace research.

Peace Education

The authors are particularly pleased with a recent achievement at Nanjing University, which reflects the commitment and creativity of people engaged in peace studies there. In 2009, Nanjing chubanshe [Nanjing Publishing Company] published a set of three books for use in elementary, middle and high schools, co-authored by five staff and students, and edited by Liu Cheng, in a series titled Heping chengchang congshu [A series on growing up in peace]. The titles are:


Each of the books has around 100 pages and are mostly text but also include a wide selection of colour and black-and-white photos, cartoons and other artwork. The books have a modern feel overall, with use of textboxes, stories from schoolchildren and parents etc. They were produced not so much for any academic advancement within the university, as they are outside the normal scope of academic research, but as a contribution to the wider society. The first book, for young children, focuses on “Love and Peace”; its main sections are titled: “Love and Nature”, “Passion for Life”, “I Love My Family”, “My Dear School”, “Passion for the Country” and “The

Each book has a preface by Professor Qian Chengdan who is one of China’s most distinguished and most senior contemporary historians. Currently at Beijing University, Qian, who also holds an Honorary Doctorate from Coventry, was formerly at Nanjing, where he took the initiative in developing the peace studies programme. His preface explains:

As we read studies of world history, we find that since the earliest times human beings have been pursuing peace through violence, in their longing for a world where peace is permanent. Yet wars continue unremittingly, getting worse every year. So from the study of history we find a curious phenomenon: war has become the means to realise peace. But peace is not only the absence of war: it encompasses struggles for justice, development, human rights, ecological balance and so on. It also influences international relations, and is relevant to nations, communities and individuals. In fact, the mere absence of war is a negative peace—humanity must still strive to build another kind, positive peace: and this kind of peace can be achieved only through non-violence....

This series of short books opens the door of peace education for the young people of this country, its texts and graphics are superb; it contains a lot of new knowledge and new viewpoints. It is really worth reading by young people, teachers and parents. ‘Love and Peace’ emphasises the role of love. Without love there is no peace: love for oneself, for nature and for society, that is a basic idea of our peace education, which suits the development level of young children. The general orientation of ‘Peace and Understanding’ is to help students to understand peace within the context of the physical and psychological changes they themselves are experiencing as young teenagers, while giving them some methods and techniques of conflict resolution. ‘Responsibility and Peace’ expands on various issues related to peace studies, for example examining the content and methods of peacebuilding and overcoming violence; and points up the responsibility of each one of us as individuals in implementing these ideals.

So we now have “peace education with Chinese characteristics”. The books were published only a few months ago, and it still remains to be seen how widely they may become used in Chinese schools; but even if they never become formal texts in a curriculum, they will hopefully be an inspiration for future developments. To give a more detailed idea of the content, we will look again at the second volume which addresses children in the sensitive and formative early teenage years.

The first pages focus on a topic about which many teenagers feel passionately: the state of the natural world. The section opens with photographs of pristine landscapes, and mentions how central a healthy environment is for humans and for all life: it then describes some effects of desertification, which is a particular problem in China’s northwestern provinces. It then moves on to issues of environmental protection, and threats to well-being posed by over-use of pesticides and other toxic substances. The next sub-section discusses some aspects of ecological theories, taking the earth as an interactive and integrative system which needs to be functioning holistically to ensure the healthy survival of its parts. This is illustrated by photographs of threatened species, and summarises by saying that the earth is humanity’s only home: it needs protection.

The next section deals with topics dear to a teenager’s heart: sex, gender and relationships. It opens with an interesting introduction to what in academic language would be called “social construction of gender”, comparing social attitudes to gender roles with biological determinants such as chromosomes, quoting the opening of stories such as “once upon a time, there lived a brave young man and his pretty young wife. The young man went out every day to the hills for hunting and chopping wood; his wife was at home washing clothes and cooking…” This is the opportunity for a discussion about expectations, what a young woman could achieve in differ-
ent kinds of society, and gender inequalities in senior positions. Then, the text moves on to the physical and psychological changes that occur in adolescence, how they impact on relationships, possibly trigger factors for self-doubt and anger, and some positive suggestions for coping with this tricky period.

The third section is an interesting take on how to develop a stable and creative personality. The writers explain that at this age it is very easy to be overwhelmed by emotionality and by the early onset of sexuality, and a young person needs to think carefully about his or her behaviour and understanding of the issues. For example, the text touches on the question of forming a positive self-image, handling negative emotions and low self-esteem, making the most of one’s talents and background. There are some short accounts of teenagers handling difficult situations at school, for example a young girl from a country village who is treated as a country bumpkin by classmates at the new city school she attends. The text also addresses the issue of how teenagers move along from self-centredness to a more mutual understanding of relationships, sometimes illustrating this process with the experiences of well-known individuals like Faraday, Chekhov, Franklin Roosevelt and others.

The fourth section takes the argument a stage further, and describes in particular how teenagers can analyse two of their main environments: the school and the family. Traditional Chinese culture is of course well-known for its emphasis on filial piety, and even today children are perhaps more respectful of older people than are others in their age groups in the West. Still, Chinese kids, the internet and mobile phone generation, are nowadays much more savvy and independent than former generations: probably more inclined to challenge teachers and parents, to assert their own identities and ideas. Incidentally, judging from the content of this section, Chinese teenagers may also criticize and push up against each other in a number of ways: some of the ideas for managing conflict relate to ways of handling tricky relationships with parents and teachers, but also problems of bullying and exclusion amongst teens themselves.

The final section moves the reader on from what are essentially concerns of childhood to serious social and political issues such as justice, war and nuclear energy. These are difficult issues in any culture, and Chinese children would surely find it interesting to be exposed to the different ideas and views put forward here: for example the discussion on the potential for destruction of nuclear power, but also its capacity for clean energy generation. And the seeming righteousness of war in some circumstances, such as national defence against invasion, contrasted with the passion for nonviolence exemplified by Gandhi and Martin Luther King that eventually led to successful social movements. The authors conclude:

Peace demands mutual tolerance, equal treatment, harmonious development, sharing the enjoyment of this world. This implies that every single person must have the concept of equality when dealing with his or her neighbour, must deal peacefully with every thing that is close by, must be broadminded in dealing with the contradictions that we find everywhere, must use some wise and skilful means to work, non-violently, to resolve conflicts. Therefore to protect and develop peace is a responsibility that all individuals must take upon themselves.

**Conclusion**

China’s further development demands a peaceful international surrounding and a stable domestic environment. This fact is openly acknowledged by Chinese political leaders, who have to manage numerous social protests at home, partly initiated in response to economic polarization and land degradation. At the same time, Chinese leaders have to be alert to international risks at this period of power-transition from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
New contradictions and conflicts have come to the surface with globalization and modernization. Peaceful methods to eliminate divergences and to conciliate conflicts, as the core of Peace Studies, will hopefully be seen as worthwhile as both theoretical study and practical activity. Peace Studies’ fundamental value is peace, which is testified through the application of theory into practice. We personally hope that one effect of our classes is that students who have experienced peace education will show more inclination to solve problems by peaceful means. We have good reasons to believe that, now it has been initiated, Peace Studies in China will never come to a halt. Universally, the goal of the Peace Studies is consistent with the basic interest of all humankind, including the Chinese people. Specifically, it is part of the ancient and profound Chinese culture, that has made and will make great contributions to the further development of Peace Studies. We hope this paper elucidates some of the themes that Nanjing University has been working on in the past decade. We especially hope that younger generations in all countries will come to adulthood determined to follow a peaceful road to development and to avoid the tragedies of wars that have devastated the environment and the lives of millions of innocent human beings in Nanjing, Hiroshima, Hoengsong, Baghdad and countless other places around the world.

References

Towards a Global Peace Museum Movement: 
A Progress Report (1986-2010)

PETER VAN DEN DUNGEN*

Few peace museums existed in the world (with the exception of Japan) until fairly recently. From the 1980s onwards, and accelerating in the 1990s and continuing today, such institutions have become increasingly popular and are spreading worldwide. Some museums and individuals have played a pioneering and stimulating role. Conferences, networks, and publications demonstrate that the concept is widely accepted and it has become possible to refer to a global peace museum movement. Parallels can be drawn between the emergence and growth of peace research or peace studies and, a generation or so later, of peace museums.

KEYWORDS: Peace Research; Peace Museums; Museums For Peace; Peace Museum Movement; Kyung Hee University; Dr. Young Seek Choue.

When peace research emerged in the aftermath of World War II, the classical maxim “Si vis pacem para bellum” (If you want peace, prepare for war) was widely rejected by peace researchers who instead adopted such mottos as “If you want peace, understand war,” and “If you want peace, prepare for peace.” In his famous essay on perpetual peace (1795), Immanuel Kant made it clear that eliminating war from society involves arduous labour and the construction of legal frameworks, within as well as between societies. The purpose of studying peace – of the factors which promote peace, and those which prevent or hinder peace – is to become a peacemaker or peace-builder and contribute to this seemingly difficult but lofty goal. The advent of the nuclear age has witnessed, slowly but surely, the institutionalisation of the study of peace and the gradual growth of a peace profession. Although the military frequently also claim to be peacemakers, this expression is best reserved for those who are led by Gandhi’s saying, “There is no way to peace, peace is the way” (rather than by the belief in the application or threat of violent force). Next to war academies, peace academies have emerged – such as the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies at Kyung Hee University. It is largely in the academic realm that such institutes are to be found, increasingly all around the world; in the political sphere and at the level of government, the traditional “Departments of War” have become “Departments of Defence,” and of “Security” – which can be seen as euphemisms, but perhaps also as a reflection of the growing recognition that “war” is no longer an acceptable or efficient way to deal with conflict. At the same time, and in virtually all countries, the military establishment remains a central and well-resourced part of society, unlike the “peace establishment.” This discrepancy in resource allocation and institution-building is obvious also when one compares the numerous and well-resourced military museums with the few and often impetuous peace museums. The latter are a new kind of institution which, unlike university peace studies programmes, aim to inform the general public in the expectation that visitors

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will be persuaded not merely that peace is desirable, and necessary, but also possible and thereby encourage visitors to become involved in working to bring about a more peaceful world.

To some extent, the emergence and growth of peace museums follow a pattern similar to that of peace research and its institutionalization, albeit a generation or so later. The initial phase of peace research was characterized by the foundation of a few pioneering institutions which inspired similar ventures elsewhere. Those early institutions did not always survive, as was the case, for instance, with the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, the French Institute of Polemology in Paris, and the Polemological Institute at the University of Groningen (The Netherlands). When the number of institutions and individuals involved in peace research reached a critical level, their cooperation was facilitated through conferences and associations, and research results were published in a growing number of specialized journals as well as books. Since the establishment of the first peace studies programme at Manchester College in Indiana (U.S.), in 1948, such programmes have spread around the globe to such an extent that it has become difficult to survey the field and keep abreast of developments.

Before elaborating the analogy with the emergence and growth of peace museums it is appropriate to mention here one tremendous effort to survey, if not peace studies per se, the wider subject of peace. This was the publication in 1986 of the first-ever *World Encyclopedia of Peace*, in four volumes (Laszlo and Yoo 1986). It is a pleasure to acknowledge that the initiative for this long-overdue project (as well as its financing) we owe to Kyung Hee University’s founding father and first chancellor, Dr. Young Seek Choue. It is no coincidence that the establishment of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies and the appearance of the *World Encyclopedia of Peace* are contemporaneous. In every field of academic enquiry whether the natural sciences, or social sciences, or the arts and humanities – encyclopaedias and other reference works such as dictionaries and bibliographies provide essential information on the field and its divisions and thus greatly help to orientate those who want to find out more about it. To his own surprise and dismay, Dr. Choue found that students of world peace were bereft of such an elementary and vital tool and he set about rectifying this great anomaly.1 The absence, until recent times, of a comprehensive encyclopaedia of peace and equally of peace studies institutes and programmes, are indicative of the traditional neglect of the pursuit (including the study) of peace and the prevalence of the military paradigm.

The absence of peace museums until recent times is part of the same phenomenon and can be contrasted with the great number of military museums. A recent guide contains information on over 140 such museums in the UK alone (Sibun 2007). A guide to peace museums (narrowly defined) in the UK would have one entry only – the Peace Museum in Bradford – and visitors would be disappointed by the smallness of the museum and the absence of any modern display techniques, both owing to lack of finance.2 The Peace Museum in Bradford is not mentioned in the article on peace museums that I proposed and contributed to the *World Encyclopedia of Peace* since that museum, and many others, were not yet in existence then (van den Dungen 1986).3 Also, several museums were in the process of being set up and were unknown to the

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1 Pursuing research in the early 1980s in the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., and in the New York Public Library (two of the world’s greatest libraries), Dr. Choue ‘was deeply disappointed to find out that there was not a reference book on peace while various books and encyclopaedias were available in every other field.’ Letter of 15th April 2000 to the present author.
3 In what follows no references will be made to the updated article that appeared in the second and much enlarged edition of the same encyclopaedia: New York: Oceana Publ. & Seoul: Seoul Press, vol. 4, pp. 245-256.
author at the time (when the internet and search engines were not yet available). Twenty-five years after the article was written, what is striking in retrospect is the small number of peace museums referred to – mainly the well established ones in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Peace Museum in Chicago. While the former have been renovated and extended (and many other peace museums have opened in Japan since then), the latter museum – which was such an inspiration for peace activists and an encouragement for supporters of the peace museum idea – proved unable to firmly establish itself as a fully-fledged museum.

**Peace Museums in the U.S.**

Because of its uniqueness as the only peace museum in the U.S. for many years, as well as because of its excellent exhibitions, the Peace Museum in Chicago enjoyed a certain international acclaim. Today, its place has been taken by the Dayton International Peace Museum, established in 2004 in neighbouring Ohio. The museum, which occupies the whole of an attractive 19th century building near the city centre, suddenly received national and international attention towards the end of October 2009 when its volunteers wrote letters to President Obama requesting that he consider donating some of his Nobel Peace Prize money to the museum. This was followed up by a formal request from the museum itself which was made public during a press conference on 18th November, a few weeks before the award ceremony in Oslo.

Regardless of the outcome of this approach, it will have brought for the first time the existence of the museum, and even the very notion of a peace museum, to the attention of many citizens, especially in the U.S. The Dayton peace museum was the idea of Christine Dull who with her husband and the support of other local enthusiasts was able to realise her dream. Ten years earlier, Sanford Hinden had launched an exciting project for a Metropolitan Peace Museum in New York, the world’s capital city which is also the headquarters of the United Nations. There can be no better place in the world to inform, educate, and inspire its inhabitants about peace than through the establishment of a peace museum in that city. Following the tragic events of 11th September 2001, and the plans for a memorial at Ground Zero, there was a brief moment of hope that the museum might become this memorial. More recently, Nitza Milagros Escalera and other educationalists at Fordham University in New York have launched a project entitled PASOS for creating a Museum of Peace-Building in the city. Elsewhere in the country, in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) – the city where the U.S. was born, and in the state which, a century before, was founded by Quakers – an ambitious plan for a major peace museum building was launched in 2007 under the title Envision Peace Museum. It “seeks to add forceful momentum to the mounting wave of people-initiated struggle worldwide, to help break cycles of violence, and prove that indeed, ‘another world is possible’” (Envision Peace Museum).

The same idea also inspired Thomas Vincent Flores (2001), a professor of peace-building and conflict transformation at Emory University in Atlanta, to develop an elaborate and persuasive plan for a National Peace Museum. In the same city, a plan for a Global Peace Museum is one of seven huge projects of a grassroots umbrella organization called “Atlanta: City of Peace” (www.atlpeace.org). Initiated by John Naugle, the organization urges the city to develop the legacy of Martin Luther King (who was born in the city) and of his mentor, Gandhi, and thereby become a world centre for the promotion of peace and nonviolence. M.L. King famously had a dream; much of it has been realised, and sooner than expected (as illustrated also by the election of President Obama). John Naugle and his fellow workers are entitled to dream, and to hope that at least one of their ambitious projects will be realised. Indeed,
it was Alfred Nobel’s intention that idealists, who have such a hard time in this world – faced as they are with apathy, cynicism and downright hostility –, should be supported. A few months before his death he declared, “I would like to help dreamers, as they find it difficult to get on in life.” (Abrams 2001: 8). The proliferation of peace museum projects put forward in recent years particularly in the U.S., often independent of one another, is a new phenomenon which was not yet on the horizon in the 1980s and which suggests that the peace museum idea is “in the air,” and that an increasing number of peace educators recognise the necessity of creating such institutions. It remains to be seen to what extent the public displays, programmes and ethos of the forthcoming Peace Education Center, an integral part of the new headquarters building of the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington D.C. (established in 1986 by Congress and funded by it), will function as a peace museum (Flores 2008).

Peace Museums in Asia

In the same way that peace research institutes have gradually spread from outside the North Atlantic area to much of the rest of the world, so peace museums are now also being established in other parts of the world. However, there is a significant difference in the sense that Japan has many peace museums, and the earliest and best known ones in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have contributed to a wider understanding and acceptance of the notion of peace museums. It is interesting to note in this connection that the main focus of the Tehran Peace Museum, founded with the help of the city in 2007, is showing the cruelty of war and of Weapons of Mass Destruction, including the devastation of the two Japanese cities by nuclear weapons. The Tehran Peace Museum has grown out of a temporary exhibition organised the previous year by the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS), an Iranian NGO. It is estimated that as many as one million Iranians were wounded or killed as a result of gas attacks by the Iraqi army during the long war with Iran in the 1980s. Dr. Shahriar Khateri, a medical doctor who, as a fifteen-year old volunteer survived the war and witnessed its devastation, has been a pivotal figure in the creation of both SCWVS and the museum, and in fostering cooperation with the atomic bomb museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

A visit to the same museums inspired Dr. Balkrishna Kurvey (2009), a former history lecturer at the University of Nagpur (India) and since then president of the Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection (IIPDEP), to establish a small “No More Hiroshima: No More Nagasaki” Peace Museum in his city. Inaugurated on 6th August 1999 (Hiroshima Day), the museum focuses on the effects of nuclear warfare and the need to abolish nuclear weapons and war. Appropriately, the museum/exhibition has been given temporary accommodation in a hospital in the city and works closely with medical experts and scientists. Now that the country of Gandhi has joined the nuclear weapons club, with Pakistan following suit, educating citizens, old and young, about the perils of the nuclear age and the promise of peaceful conflict resolution, has become more urgent than ever. India has of course several Gandhi museums; they are in an excellent position to bring the philosophy and achievements of the world’s foremost theoretician and practitioner of nonviolent social change to the attention of the citizens of the world’s largest democracy. The opening decade of the 21st century has also seen several initiatives for establishing peace museums in Pakistan. An imaginative Children’s Museum for Peace and Human Rights, founded in 2001, is under construction in Karachi (cf. www.cmphr.org/). The museum is a natural outgrowth of a Human Rights Education Programme that has been active in the country since 1995. The targeting of especially
young people and school children is also the concern of the Interfaith Peace Museum that was opened in Islamabad in 2008 under the auspices of an NGO, the Interfaith League against Poverty (I-LAP, cf. www.ilappk.org/). The museum was established to promote a culture of peace and to invest for peace rather than for war and weapons of mass destruction, arguing that “the more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war.” In spite of limited resources, the museum is active in various peace education programmes, including the promotion of reconciliation and interfaith dialogue.

The need for peace museums, especially in conflict zones and in border areas of countries where peace between neighbours is precarious, has been persuasively argued by Syed Sikander Mehdi. Recently retired as professor of international relations at Karachi University, he writes, “Hostile and hot borders, like those between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are clearly among the important sites in South Asia where such museums should be built up,” and they would “exhibit, teach and preach peace, prevent wars from taking place and promote a culture of togetherness and sharing.” (Mehdi 2008: 184). He has beautifully detailed the rationale, contents, and promise of a peace museum in Wagah, the Punjab village that was divided between India and Pakistan following the partition of India in 1947 (and ever since a traditional hot-spot as well as the only operational land border crossing between the two countries) (Mehdi 2005). Likewise, he has argued the case for a peace museum on the Torkham border, a vital and historical crossing point between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Khyber Pass (Mehdi, forthcoming). During most of 2008, Mehdi was a Japan Foundation Fellow at the Kyoto Museum for World Peace at Ritsumeikan University (one of Japan’s leading peace museums) researching Japanese peace museums and elaborating plans for the creation of such institutions in his own country. It should be mentioned here that Professor Ikuro Anzai, the Kyoto museum’s director from 1995 until 2008 (when he was appointed its Honorary Director), has inspired the creation of other peace museums in Japan as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific region and continues to be a pivotal figure in the development of a global network of peace museums. Likewise, and more recently, Steve Fryburg, the first director of the Dayton International Peace Museum, has been instrumental in the creation of the peace museums in Tehran and Islamabad, referred to above, and continues to be an effective promoter of peace museums in his own country and beyond. This is somewhat reminiscent of the pioneers of peace research such as Johan Galtung, Kenneth Boulding, and Bert Röling who inspired and encouraged others to enter the field and establish peace research institutes or peace studies programmes in the early days of the peace research movement.

**Peace Museums in Africa**

Such a pioneering role has also been played by Sultan Somjee in Africa. Formerly an anthropologist in the Division of Ethnography of the National Museums of Kenya in Nairobi, he has undertaken extensive research and collection of artefacts and oral traditions related to a culture of peace in Eastern Africa. In the 1990s he established the East African Peace Museum, a network of community based museums which one day would result in a National Peace Museum of Eastern Africa “that would celebrate our diversities of the art of peace making of a hundred cultures of peace,” sharing their oral and visual knowledge of peace (Somjee 1999: 213). Today, the Community Peace Museums Foundation has a membership of ten peace museums and peace museum projects in diverse ethnic regions of Kenya. Its coordinator, a pupil of Somjee, is Timothy Gachanga (2008), who is also the curator of the Akorino Peace Museum.
Like his mentor, he has written beautifully and incisively about the nature and purpose of peace museums in Africa—in many ways so very different from museums in the western world and a great enrichment of the growing and diverse family of peace museums worldwide. Sultan Somjee is now continuing his anthropological research, and specifically the promotion of a culture of peace through the rediscovery and teaching of indigenous peace culture and its display in peace museums, in Canada, working with First Nation Canadians in British Columbia (Somjee 2006).

In the period under consideration here (the past twenty-five years), Africa—a much troubled continent of so much potential—has produced six Nobel Peace Prize laureates, starting with Desmond Tutu (1984), followed by Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk (1993), Kofi Annan (2001), Wangari Maathai (2004) and Mohamed ElBaradei (2005). Together, they represent the whole of the continent, from north to south, east to west, and they have been honoured for a wide diversity of peace work, including peaceful conflict resolution, human rights and democracy, sustainable development, UN, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is likely that they, or their admirers and supporters, may want to establish educational institutions—such as peace museums—in order to honour their work and build on it. In fact, a peace museum will be a central part of the Desmond Tutu Peace Centre which will open its doors in Cape Town, South Africa, in the near future (cf. www.tutufoundation-usa.org/the_peace_center.html). And can it be long before there will be a permanent, living memorial to Nelson Mandela—who is universally admired and one of the great moral voices of our time—which should be as inspiring, uplifting, lively and colourful as the man himself. The Robben Island Museum, off the coast of Cape Town, founded in 1997, can be regarded as a museum for peace because of its intimate associations with Mandela and other leading figures in the long struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

Peace Museums in Europe

From its beginnings at the opening of the 20th century, the Nobel Peace Prize has established itself as the most prestigious award for honouring peacemakers, whether individuals or organizations and campaigns. Together, the laureates of the past one hundred years and more represent an unrivalled introduction to peacemaking in all its complexity and variety and which can inspire peacemakers today. Initially conceived as a Peace Prize Museum, the Nobel Peace Center opened in Oslo in 2005 as part of the celebrations marking the centenary of the peaceful separation of Norway and Sweden (Mjøs 2005; van den Dungen 2006a). The first peace museum to show an extensive display of all the peace laureates was the Caen Memorial: A Museum for Peace which opened in 1988. The museum is mainly about the fate of France in World War II, and the Battle of Normandy; in 2002 the museum opened a large extension entitled Worlds for Peace and for which Johan Galtung (2006) was the main advisor. He also contributed to the making of the European Museum for Peace which was opened in 2001 in the medieval castle which dominates the small Austrian village of Stadtschlaining in Burgenland province. Since the 1980s, the castle has also served as the headquarters of the Austrian Study

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4 See also the project “Heritage, Museums and Memorialisation in Kenya” with its partner museums such as the Ababa Community Peace Museum on Mfangano Island in Lake Victoria (www.ababu.museum/), the Embu Community Peace Museum, and the Lari Memorial Peace Museum. Cf. www.open.ac.uk/Arts/ferguson-centre/memorialisation/project.
Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and of the European Peace University established subsequently.

Of course, well before Nobel established his peace prize, great peace philosophers and activists can be found throughout history and in all civilisations. They and their achievements are the focus of a small Peace History Museum in Hindelang (in the Bavarian Alps in southern Germany) which opened its doors in 1999. The museum aims to show that “peace is possible” and thereby inspire and encourage its visitors. The museum is the creation of architect and peace educator Thomas Wechs, who during the past three decades has been promoting tirelessly the establishment in his country of memorials, gardens, exhibitions, and museums devoted to peace. With the support of Pax Christi (the main Catholic peace organisation) he founded in 1980 the Peace Museum in Lindau (in an attractive 19th century classical building, and in an idyllic location on Lake Konstanz, on the German-Swiss border) and remained its director for nearly twenty years. Several other peace museums were established in Germany in the 1980s which were to some extent the result of an upsurge in the anti-nuclear weapons movement of that time. Of particular interest is the Anti-War Museum founded in (West) Berlin in 1982 by Tommy Spree. I was unaware of this (as well as of some other peace museums that had been established in Germany at this time) when I wrote my article for the World Encyclopedia of Peace (1986). However, the article devoted one section to the Anti-War Museum established in Berlin in 1925 by Ernst Friedrich, a radical anti-militarist whose museum was destroyed when the Nazis came to power in 1933. Spree is his grandson who has re-established the museum and continues the excellent peace education work of his grandfather (Kaplan 1999). The article also introduced the world’s first peace museum, established in 1902 in Lucerne, in the heart of Switzerland, by the Polish industrialist and early peace researcher Jan Bloch to warn of the nature and consequences of a future war between the great powers of the day. His prediction that such a war would be an unmitigated catastrophe proved to be accurate; his museum became a victim of World War I. In 2002, on the 100th anniversary of the inauguration of the museum, a programme of events was organised in the city and now there are proposals for the re-establishment of a peace museum as part of the Lucerne Initiative for Peace and Security (LIPS) (Troxler 2004; van den Dungen 2006b).

In 2013 the world will celebrate the centenary of the opening of the Peace Palace in The Hague, one of the first buildings dedicated to the pursuit of peace and peaceful conflict resolution (seat of the International Court of Justice of the UN since 1946). The various exhibits and works of art on the themes of international justice and peace, scattered throughout the imposing building, make it possible to regard the Peace Palace as a special kind of peace museum. Moreover, in 1999, a Museum of the International Court of Justice (and of the other institutions housed in the Palace) was inaugurated in the south wing of the Palace by the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Particularly during the past ten years the municipality of The Hague has made great efforts to profile itself as the world’s leading city regarding peace, international justice and security (Bouhalhou 2007) and also plans for a peace museum – possibly in cooperation with the UN – are currently under active consideration. Since 1995 the city is home of a peace museum which is of special significance to Koreans. On the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japan, the private Yi Jun Academy Foundation inaugurated the Yi Jun Peace Museum in the heart of the city. One of the most honoured figures

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5 As indications of the growth of a culture of peace, it can be noted that – apart from peace museums – also peace monuments, memorials, parks, and gardens have proliferated in recent decades. See various publications by Edward W. Lollis (2010, 2009a, 2009b) and especially the many wonderful websites he has created: www.maripo.com.
in Korea’s struggle for independence in the early years of the 20th century, Yi Jun died in the museum building (then a hotel) in 1907 when the Second Hague Peace Conference was being held and where, as a member of a small delegation, he did not succeed in gaining his occupied country’s admission to the conference. The re-discovery and restoration of this important historical site is a precious contribution to the heritage of both Korea and The Hague. The Foundation’s director, Mr. Kee-Hang Lee, has also initiated a campaign to establish a peace museum in Korea to promote the unification of the cruelly divided country. Meanwhile a small but active Center for Peace Museum was founded in Seoul in 2003; it grew out of the “Say Sorry to Vietnam” Campaign that addresses issues arising from the Korean participation in the Vietnam War. The museum aims to foster a popular and participatory peace education and peace movement.

On the 25th anniversary of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies (GIP) at Kyung Hee University it is gratifying to know that the university is proceeding with the development of plans for an ambitious UN peace museum and peace park at the university’s global campus. Most peace museums have been created independently of peace institutes or peace studies programmes but it is only natural that the latter would give rise to the former. In the present case, it is the university which has created GIP and the UN peace museum (still in the project phase) and both owe their origins to the vision of Chancellor Choue and his passion for world peace and the UN.6 Now that Mr. Ban-Ki Moon is at the helm of the world organisation it is an auspicious time to bring to fruition the UN peace museum and peace park idea. Their realisation will be a most appropriate way to celebrate his leadership of the UN and at the same time to contribute greatly to peoples’ support for it. It will also be the fulfilment of another inspiring vision of the founder of the university, and will be a great credit to it. Kyung Hee University would follow the pioneering example of Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto (one of its partner institutions abroad) and would become only the second university in the world to establish a peace museum on its campus. In the U.K., plans for the Peace Museum in Bradford to become part of a new and exciting Senator George Mitchell Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Leeds Metropolitan University recently had to be abandoned. It is now anticipated that the Peace Museum will in due course move into a purpose-built museum on the campus of the University of Bradford, home of one of the world’s earliest and by now largest and best known departments of peace studies.

Conferences & Publications

As part of the World Civic Forum 2009, initiated by Kyung Hee University and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and held in May in Seoul, several panel sessions were organised on the theme “Museums for Peace: Constructing a Peace Culture in the World.”7 This is likely to have been the first time that the subject of peace museums was included in the programme of a large conference concerning global issues, world civil society, and the building of a humanitarian planet. The panel sessions on peace museums took place under the auspices of the International Network of Museums for Peace (INMP) which was invited to become an in-

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6 Dr. Choue obtained the approval of the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for the establishment in Seoul of a UN Peace Park and Peace Museum. See the reference mentioned in note 1, and also Donald Gerth, “International Association of University Presidents (IAUP)”, pp. 50-58 in World Encyclopedia of Peace, 2nd ed., vol. 3, 1999, at p. 54. This article contains an excellent overview of Dr. Choue’s many efforts and achievements as regards world peace.

7 For details, see Kyung Hee University & The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009: 25-26, 59.
Towards a Global Peace Museum Movement

Institutional partner of the World Civic Forum. INMP was founded in 1992 at the first international conference of peace and anti-war museums, organised by the “Give Peace a Chance” Quaker Trust, and held at the University of Bradford. Subsequent conferences have taken place in Stadtshaining (1995), Osaka and Kyoto (1998), Ostend, Belgium (2004), Gernika (2005), and Kyoto and Hiroshima (2008), with the seventh conference scheduled to be held in Barcelona in 2011. These gatherings have greatly contributed to the coming into existence and the subsequent strengthening of a network of individuals and organisations involved in peace museums (or projects to create them). Fifteen issues of a newsletter were published during a ten year period (1993-2002). Whereas the first issue had four pages, the last one had ten times that number, indicating the steady growth of the field. The conferences have also resulted in the publication of substantial proceedings and other publications. Among the latter are directories of peace museums; a separate guide to peace museums worldwide was first published by the UN Library in Geneva in 1995, with a second edition in 1998. The most recent directory was edited by Dr. Kazuyo Yamane: Museums for Peace Worldwide (2008). These developments – the holding of the first conferences (to bring people together to exchange information, co-operate, encourage peace museum projects), the creation of a loose network, and the publication of the first directories as well as an informal newsletter – mirror similar developments in the establishment and evolution of peace research/peace studies at an earlier time. None of these manifestations of an emerging and growing field were visible twenty-five years ago (and none of them are referred to in the 1986 article published in the World Encyclopedia of Peace).

It is also telling to compare the first multi-author publication on peace museums, edited by the leading Swedish peace educationalist, Åke Bjerstedt (1993) with the volume edited by Ikuro Anzai, Joyce Apsel and Syed Sikander Mehdi (2008), and published on the occasion of the 6th international conference in Kyoto and Hiroshima. Peace Museums: For Peace Education? comprised 52 pages (the papers of four contributors, three of whom were European); Museums for Peace: Past, Present and Future comprises 230 pages (the papers of sixteen authors, hailing from Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central America).

Institutionalization & Professionalization

One of the authors who contributed to the earlier volume is Terence Duffy, at the time a lecturer in peace studies at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland and initiator and director of the Irish Peace Museum Project in Londonderry. The author of several publications on peace museums, he was one of the first to introduce these institutions in professional museum journals such as Museum International (published by UNESCO), Museums Journal (U.K.), and ICOM News: Quarterly Newsletter of the International Council of Museums (Paris). As a result of his efforts, some of these journals devoted a special issue to peace museums, museums for peace, and museums of war and peace. He has also fostered closer relations between peace museums and ICOM (an NGO which is the international museum organisation and which has formal relations with UNESCO). More recently, Iratxe Momoitio Astorkia, the director of the Gernika Peace Museum, has been involved in similar efforts. During the 2005 international conference of museums for peace, held in Gernika, she invited Wulf Brebeck, the president of the International Committee of Memorial Museums for the Remembrance of Victims of Public Crimes (IC MEMO), to introduce this committee (one of thirty international commit-
tees that make up ICOM). At the conference it was decided to change the name of the network from “International Network of Peace Museums” (INPM) to “International Network of Museums for Peace” (INMP), thereby broadening the membership. It remains to be seen whether INMP, or its members, will in due course constitute a new international committee of ICOM. Thanks to the efforts of Sanford Hinden of the Metropolitan Peace Museum Project in New York, in 1998 the Network became associated as an NGO with the Department of Public Information of the UN in New York. In more recent years, the Network’s representative at the UN has been Joyce Apsel who teaches human rights at New York University and who formerly was director of the Anne Frank Centre in the city. A further and important step in the gradual institutionalization and professionalization of INMP is the opening of its secretariat in The Hague early in 2010 (made possible through the support of the city). The office is located in a large and modern building very near the Peace Palace and where the city is facilitating several NGOs working for issues such as peace, development, human rights, and international justice to have their headquarters.

Conclusion

From the above sketch it can be seen that during the past twenty-five years peace museums have gradually established themselves throughout the world as important centres for peace education of a large public and the trend for the creation of such museums strongly continues. They are increasingly playing a vital role in the development and promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence. They can be seen as representing a further development of the gradual process towards building an “infrastructure” for peace which saw, early in the 19th century, the emergence of the first organised peace societies and which would develop into the international peace movement of today. The First and Second Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907) witnessed the first deliberate efforts on the part of governments to bring about a new kind of world order in which peaceful arbitration would take the place of war to resolve disputes between states. That war had become dysfunctional as a result of the increasing lethality of weapons was decisively shown in World War I which led the powers to create the first world organisations for the maintenance of peace – the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The end of World War II ushered in the nuclear age. The imperative of survival, and thus the need to avoid nuclear war, was a major stimulus for the emergence and institutionalisation of peace research and peace studies. Peace museums are the latest addition to the tools which forward-looking society has created to advance the long struggle against war and violence. Few countries have experienced the pain of occupation, war, division, and military dictatorship as long and as intensive as Korea.

I would like to salute the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies and Kyung Hee University for their contribution and continuing commitment for the peaceful unification of the country, and a peaceful world.

References


Moving Beyond the War Memorial Museum

KAZUYO YAMANE

A war museum tends to be used to glorify war while a peace museum tends to make visitors criticize war and think and act for peace. War memory displayed at public peace museums in Japan tends to exhibit only about Japan’s victim side of war while private peace museums exhibit Japan’s aggression honestly. How is it possible to move beyond war museums? It would be necessary to have spaces for holding lectures, concerts, showing films and so forth and to discuss impressions and opinions so that they may be able to think and act for peace.

KEYWORDS: Peace Museum; War Museum; Japan.

Over fifty museums in Japan are classified as peace museums - more than in any other country. The most famous one is the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum which was founded in 1955. In the same year, the Nagasaki International Culture Hall (since 1996: Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum) was built. The Okinawa Peace Memorial Museum was created in 1975, reminding its visitors of the only battlefield in Japan during World War II with some 150,0001 people killed. Initially, these museums tended to show the horror of war only from victim perspectives, leaving aside exhibits on Japan’s aggression.

Many witnesses of the US air raids of Japanese cities during World War II started to record their experiences during the Vietnam War in the late 1960s. A number of peace museums were established in the 1970s, among them was the Osaka War Memorial Exhibition Room for Peace that became the Osaka International Peace Centre later. In Kōchi, a city in the south-western part of Japan, an exhibition on US air raids opened in 1979 and the Grassroots House was also founded in 1989. In the 1980s, temporary “war exhibitions for peace” were displayed in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and other cities to commemorate the anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945), and the defeat of Japan (August 15, 1945). The receptive response from the Japanese public was overwhelming, and people began to call for permanent peace museums. Also the anti-nuclear movement demanded that local governments build peace museums as well. Thus, numerous public peace museums were founded during the 1990s such as the Kawasaki Peace Museum, the Kanagawa Plaza for Global Citizenship, the Saitama Peace Museum, the Osaka International Peace Centre and the Kyoto Museum for World Peace. In the 1990s, many private museums were also established, for example the Shizuoka Peace Centre and the Grassroots House in Kōchi.

This proliferation of peace museum construction has resulted in considerable differences between museums receiving public or private sponsorship. It seems that public exhibitions are seen as problematic, because historical truths such as Japan’s aggression are barely shown. This can be explained by the political influence of nationalists in Japan who tend to glorify war and thus also tend to attack exhibits presenting Japan’s aggression in World War II to the public.

* The author is a part-time lecturer of Peace Studies at Kōchi University, Japan, and editor of Muse: Newsletter of the Japanese Citizens’ Network of Museums for Peace. An earlier draft of this manuscript has been presented at the World Civic Forum held on May 5-8, 2009, in Seoul, South Korea.

1 The number of the casualties in Okinawa is based on an investigation by the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Katsube 1992:25).
Matters of historical truth can be more easily exhibited at private museums. We will take a closer look at how war memory is exhibited at peace museums and at war museums. To this end, the Yushukan War Memorial Museum at Yasukuni Shrine will be compared to the Kyoto Museum for World Peace. Lastly, methods of utilizing museums for peace education will be examined by introducing a case study of the Grassroots House.

The Concept of War Memory

War memory varies among individuals, domestic groups and nations. For example, the atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki remember World War II fundamentally different from American veterans. Accordingly, the war memory preserved and exhibited at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum contrasts with the one at the National Air and Space Museum in Chantilly, Virginia, USA. In Hiroshima, the hardships of the atomic bomb survivors are emphasized, while there are no exhibits showing the experience of the victims in Chantilly.

Another cross-border divergence concerning war memory surfaced in 2004, following the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on New Year’s Day in Tokyo. A shrine of the Shinto religion, the Yasukuni shrine honors the estimated 2.5 million Japanese soldiers killed in wars since 1853. International controversy springs from the fact that fourteen A-class war criminals that were found guilty at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, held after WWII, were enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine in 1978. An editorial in The Korea Times (2004) criticized that Koizumi’s visit was ostensible to pay tribute to Japan’s war dead, but the shrine also honors several of Japan’s World War II criminals, including World War II-era Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. So, Koizumi cannot simply defend his visit, as he did, by saying that history, tradition and custom must be respected in any country.

The historical background which must be recalled to understand such Korean criticism is that Koreans suffered from Japan’s colonial and military rule from 1910 to 1945. Their war memory is completely different from that of Koizumi who admires Japanese rulers during World War II. The South Korean government went on to warn that “Japan needs to face the fact that Japanese words and actions based on distorted perception of history destroy the development of the relation between Korea and Japan” (Köchi Shimbun 2004). Seoul suggested that the Japanese government build an alternative facility to the Yasukuni Shrine; however, the Japanese authorities did not react to this suggestion positively. The South Korean government also offered to research history jointly in order to revise Japanese history books. In the absence of government action, historians from both countries have exchanged opinions at the NGO level and a joint history book as a result was published. Japanese government officials refused to be involved.

Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine has become controversial not only overseas but also domestically. 631 Japanese citizens filed a lawsuit at the Osaka District Court in August 2001 against Koizumi claiming that his visit was in violation of the constitutional separation of religion and state. Chief Judge Hiroshi Muraoka ruled in February 2004 that the Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was not private but public. However, the judge did not go on to make clear whether the visit was in fact unconstitutional. Yet, in April 2004,

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2 Article 20 of the Constitution of Japan reads as follows: “Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.”
the Fukuoka District Court for the first time ruled that Koizumi’s 2001 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was contrary to the Japanese Constitution. Koizumi responded, “I can’t accept the ruling. I don’t understand why (my visit was) unconstitutional … I will visit it again.” (The Daily Yomiuri 2004) His attitude seems to show a lack of critical reflection on his own war memory and concept of history.

**Definitions of War and Peace Museums**

The classification of museums into war and peace museums is not self-explanatory. In some cases, the label may be misleading. For example, the Imperial War Museum in London includes a section of oral history where visitors can listen to stories of pacifists from cassette tapes. But on the whole, war museums tend to glorify war by exhibiting weapons, soldiers’ uniforms etc., while peace museums criticize war and make visitors think of peace and act accordingly. Johan Galtung refers to war museums as “museums telling the story of war, or of one particular war. Some of them glorify (war), directly or indirectly; and many inspire action supporting the next war.” (1998: 8) On the other hand, “A peace museum informs us about peace and how to get there … The museums that call themselves peace museums today are, however, mainly anti-war museums; there is very little about peace and very little about how to get there; except for one approach: war abolition, war negation.” (Galtung 1998: 12)

Japanese peace museums are anti-war museums in accordance with Galtung’s definition. According to Toshifumi Murakami (2003), an anti-war museum is “a peace museum aiming to inform the fear of war and to form anti-war attitude,” while a “pro-peace museum” is “a peace museum aiming to form the attitude and skill for making a peaceful society and peaceful international relations”. Many public peace museums in Japan emphasize the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the US air raids on various cities. However, in these museums there is no training of the public in skills for conflict resolution like in “pro-peace museums” such as the Caen Memorial in France. Regardless of the title of a museum, the exhibits and their intended aims determine whether it is a war or a peace museum. The following comparison of two war exhibits in two Japanese museums demonstrates the differences.

**Yushukan Museum in Yasukuni Shrine**

The Yushukan War Memorial Museum was founded in 1882 as the first museum in Japan. It was rebuilt in 1932 and then renovated in 2002. A recent leaflet of the Yushukan museum explains: “We are especially pleased to have the opportunity to display a carrier-borne Mitsubishi Zero fighter aircraft. From the Yushukan’s collection, which encompasses over 100,000 items, we have selected those that shed a new light on modern Japanese history.” The mentioned aircraft was a main combat plane used by Japan’s navy during World War II. The display of such a fighter plane is characteristic of war museums such as the Musée de l’Armée in Paris and the National Army Museum in London. It should be noted that the Yushukan leaflet puts emphasis on “a new light on modern Japanese history”. Is the museum’s concept of history really new? The exhibits do not seem to be new at all. At Yushukan, war memory is used to glorify war and there are, for instance, no exhibits on the Chinese people’s sufferings, as the following example of a Yushukan exhibit shows.

The Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) Incident on July 7, 1937, was a flashpoint of Japan’s aggression against China. Yet an article from the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun newspaper dated
July 7, 1937, is exhibited in the Yushokan museum without any criticism of Japan’s aggression. The incident is explained in the article as follows: “On July 7th, 1937, while Japanese troops were conducting night maneuvers near the Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Beiping (modern Beijing), shots were fired at them. Shots were also fired at Japanese reinforcements who arrived the next morning. A battle was subsequently fought against the Chinese at Wanping ….” There is no indication in this article that the incident marked the start of Japan’s all-out invasion of China. The text seems to imply to the average museum visitor that from the Japanese point of view there was good reason for these Japanese troops’ attacks on the Chinese.3

Another example from the same museum was an exhibit on the Nanking Massacre of 1937/38. When I visited the Yushukan Museum, there was the following explanation: “The purpose of the Nanking Operation was to surround the capital, thus discouraging the Chinese from waging war against the Japanese. Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, ignored the Japanese warning to open the gates of the city. He ordered his troops to defend Nanking to the death and then escaped. Therefore, when the hostilities commenced, the leaderless Chinese troops either deserted or surrendered. Nanking fell on December 13.” There is no mentioning of or reflection on Japan’s aggression in this explanation. It should be also noticed that the neutral word “operation” is used although the rest of the world calls it a “massacre”. A postcard picture illustrates the night assault on Nanking in November 1937.4 It is estimated that “more than 300,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers were systematically raped, tortured, and murdered – a death toll exceeding that of the atomic blasts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined” (Chang 1998: cover). There are no exhibits on the brutal aftermath of the night assault on Nanking at the Yushukan War Memorial Museum.

What are the impressions of visitors to the Yushukan museum, considering that exhibits like those covering the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Nanking Massacre only show Japan as a successful military power and disregard the nature and consequences of Japan’s aggression?

Handwritten notes in Japanese in a guestbook at the end of the exhibition give an indication. There are two types of opinions: some tend to praise the museum and the others criticize the content of the exhibits. A 24 year-old man wrote, “I felt that I touched a spirit that modern Japanese tend to lose.” On the other hand, a 19-year-old girl wrote, “The Japanese military is glorified at this museum. It is important to do so, but it is necessary to reflect on the war.” A 15-year-old non-Japanese noted, “There was really a Nanking Massacre!! Japan is telling a lie. She should reflect on the war. Down with Japanese Imperialism!!” An anonymous person commented, “Are you Chinese? You, the Chinese, are brainwashed by the Chinese government. Wake up! The more China and Korea fuss about the past, the more the USA and Europe would be happy. Try to look at the world more openly, Chinese!” The visitors referred to above were all born after World War II and did not experience war directly. A 71-year-old man, reflecting on the war, wrote that “We should not forget that three million Japanese and twenty million foreigners were killed. Japan should not try to justify the aggressive war. I was forced to be a suicide bomber and was taught to die for the emperor. I thought Japan would fall even if the emperor was protected. Though the emperor system remained after World War II, people suffered terribly from the lack of food. War means murder and there is no just war.” This older man is

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3 There has been an argument about “shots” among historians. The historian Keiichi Eguchi believes that shots were fired by the Chinese, but he maintains that the war was a product of Japan’s aggression that had started one decade earlier (Ienaga 1996:35).

4 The picture shows “brave” Japanese soldiers but did not show the Chinese suffering.
very critical of the museum. It seems that many young people who lack personal experience of war tend to be persuaded by the Yushukan museum.

**Kyoto Museum for World Peace**

The Kyoto Museum for World Peace was founded on the campus of Ritsumeikan University in 1992. It is the only peace museum in the world that exists at a university. Its aim is written in an inscription in six languages (Japanese, Chinese, Korean, English, French and German) near the entrance (Kyoto Museum for World Peace 1999: 1):

> The Kyoto Museum for World Peace, Ritsumeikan University, was built with the hope of contributing to the realization of world peace. Through these exhibits, we hope to convey the tragic reality of war, to illustrate the efforts of those who oppose war, and to provide an understanding of the importance of establishing peace.

In contrast to the Yushukan museum, in the Kyoto Museum for World Peace Japan’s aggression and its results are exhibited in a section called “The Colonies and Occupied Areas”. For example, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident is explained in a completely different light: “Japan gained control of north-eastern China as a result of the “Manchurian Incident”5. Japan then aimed at occupying the northern part of China. She started total war against China using the military conflict at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937.” This explanation is much more accurate and honest than the one given at the Yushukan museum. The result of Japan’s aggression is also explained correctly: ten million Chinese were killed and many Chinese and Korean men were drafted into Japanese military service and often sent to the front lines while many women from occupied territories were forced into sexual slavery for the Japanese military personnel.

As for the Nanking massacre, the museum displays a photo which shows Chinese people being buried alive. The photo used is from a Chinese book. The Kyoto Museum for World Peace, together with other museums in Japan has started to exhibit Japan’s past aggression. This fact began to receive international attention. An article titled “Japan: Fresh Look at Aggression” in the August 15, 1994, edition of International Herald Tribune exemplifies the international response: “War museums recently built in Osaka, Kyoto, Kawasaki, Saitama and Okinawa all deal forthrightly with Japan’s aggressive strategy, its harsh and often murderous treatment of conquered Asian peoples and its refusal to surrender until the United States unleashed nuclear weapons.” Strangely the institutions cited were introduced as “war museums”, although they included the word “peace” in their names. Nonetheless, this report correctly highlighted Japanese peace museums’ attempts to exhibit historical truth.

Beyond its domestic relevance, the Kyoto Museum for World Peace also serves as a tool for reconciliation with citizens from other countries. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently invited many foreigners, among them former Dutch prisoners of war, to this private museum. These foreign guests were not taken to the Yushukan museum in the Yasukuni Shrine or the National Showa Memorial Museum. Representatives of the Dutch Association for Compensation visited the Kyoto Museum for World Peace four times, consecutively from 2000 to 2004. The association founded in 1990 has several thousand members who were former prisoners of war in Japan or were internees in the East Indies. Since December 1994 the members have held monthly demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy in the Netherlands to demand Japan’s official apology and compensation for damages suffered during World War II. Formal dialogue between the Dutch and the Japanese began in 1995, following a suggestion

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5 The Japanese military attacked the Chinese army in Liutiaoahu, Liaoning, on 18 September 1931.
for further interaction by the Japanese ambassador Mr. Yukio Sato. The Dutch delegation visited the Kyoto Museum for World Peace on October 23, 2002, and exchanged opinions with Japanese students at Ritsumeikan University. A Dutch representative shared his experience about the cruel behavior of the Japanese military and said, “I don’t dislike the Japanese people at present. I can forgive the Japanese for their crimes, but please don’t ask me to forget the past.” (Kokusai Heiwa Museum Dayori 2003: 20) During a conversation one year later, a Dutch man talked about inhumane behavior by Japanese guards at a concentration camp in the East Indies, adding that many lives had been saved because of the atomic bombing of Japan. A student argued that many Japanese people were killed by the atomic bombs and it had not been necessary to use them because Japan was already close to defeat. The Dutchman asked the student to accept his opinion. However, when a student asked him how the Dutch colonial policy is taught in schools in the Netherlands, he claimed that the question is not related to the principal object of the meeting. The museum’s director Ikuru Anzai, who reported on this meeting in a letter to the author, pointed out that it seems that it is not easy for both sides to face the past sincerely. The differences of opinion between the Dutch visitors and the Japanese students were made clear in the dialogue, which is very important because this could be the beginning of the mutual realization that they have different concepts of history.

Peace Education through Peace Museums

It is natural that exhibits, permanent and traveling ones, are used to promote peace education at peace museums. Equipment such as audiovisual devices and space to hold lectures and concerts and show films are helpful in carrying out this role. It is also necessary for visitors to have spaces and opportunities to think quietly and discuss their impressions and opinions so that they may be able to think and act for peace in the future. Cooperation with NGOs, especially art groups has proved desirable in order to promote peace education. A peace museum can play a key role in promoting peace education in various fields. By introducing projects undertaken at the Grassroots House in Köchi City I will clarify how we may begin to move beyond the institution of the war memorial museum.

Peace Education for Families

Families who visit peace museums receive the opportunity to learn about various issues contributing to peace, which include the environment, human rights and sustainable development. Once visitors learn about these issues, they can become active participants in solving the world’s problems. For example, the families of the Grassroots House members traveled to a forest called “Forest for the Constitution” and began to plant samlings in Otoyo-cho, Nagaoka-gun of Kochi Prefecture, in 1995. The forest has become a symbol of promoting peace and protecting the environment. Visiting children drew a huge picture remembering their experiences of planting trees at the Forest for the Constitution in an art class at the museum. This picture was then exhibited at the Köchi Art Museum and became a traveling exhibit to the International Museum of Peace and Solidarity in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. As a result, paintings by Uzbek children were sent to the Grassroots House and were exhibited there. Thus, peace education for families can also help in creating a culture of peace in the community and internationally.

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6 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces war and prohibits Japan from owning military forces. This article has been in danger of being changed by the government.
Educational Cooperation with Schools and Universities

There are various methods to teach schoolchildren and students about peace. Teachers regularly take classes of children to the Grassroots House so that they can see various items that were used during World War II, such as outdated school textbooks, conscription papers and army uniforms. Children learn about the past by viewing these exhibits and listening to witnesses of World War II. These speakers have been invited to report about their war experiences and activities for peace at various schools. As eye witnesses to the war age and become fewer, their stories are recorded on videotapes that can be used in schools. One example has been the sending to schools lecturers with a traveling exhibition concerning US air-raids on Kōchi which killed about 400 citizens. Mr. Masahiro Okamoto, the director of the Grassroots House, lost his mother and sister then in these air-raids. He made a picture-story show about the air-raids and talked about the history in Kōchi along with his wife at elementary schools. Teachers occasionally visit the museum to rent some exhibits so that they can display them at schools.

The Grassroots House is also involved in the peace education of college students. There is a course called “Peace and Disarmament” that started in 1987 at Kōchi University and I am one of its lecturers. About 150 students from departments of humanities, science, education and agriculture have participated. The theme for a course in 2001 was “Peace in Asia and Japan” and focused on Japan’s relations with China and Korea. Mr. Shigeo Nishimori, the founder and former director of the Grassroots House, gave lectures on the past, present and future of the Sino-Japanese relations. Many students were shocked to hear about Japan’s aggression against China and Korea because these historical facts were not taught to them at their schools. Mr. Kensaku Umekara, the then president of the Association of Recording US Air Raids and Damages in Kōchi, gave lectures on Japan’s dual capacity as aggressor and victim. He particularly emphasized the aggression against Korea and the deportation of Koreans who had been forced to work for Japan. The Grassroots House has introduced lecturers to schools and universities and has been playing an important role as a peace education centre for children and students as well as for young teachers who have no experience of war.

Various teaching materials have been published as Grassroots House booklets. Several booklets on Japan’s wartime aggression were written by members of the museum, who had traveled to China to investigate the damages caused by soldiers from Kōchi. A booklet on the Japanese-American history7 was published in conjunction with an exhibit called “For the Sake of the Children” which was displayed at the Grassroots House, the Kōchi Art Museum and at various locations in Tokyo. This booklet re-examined the deportation of Japanese-Americans into ten concentration camps during the war. Other booklets have been devoted to peace history, which is not taught in Japanese schools. For example, readers are informed about Kou Makimura who protested against Japan’s aggression and was tortured to death at the young age of only 26, in a prison in Kōchi. In short, the Grassroots House and other peace museums contribute to the documentation and distribution of peace-related information that has been neglected by the official Japanese curricula.

Peace Education for Community

The Grassroots House is a community based peace museum, and as such it is a place where various NGOs meet together. Groups focusing on peace, the environment, human rights, women and art conduct activities such as art exhibitions, lectures, meetings, concerts, plays and movies.

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People in the community enjoy these activities, especially the folding of paper cranes. About 100,000 citizens, from children to senior citizens, fold one million paper cranes every summer which are used to decorate downtown Kōchi, where the US air raids took place. Focused activities for peace started in Kōchi on the eve of the United States attack on Iraq in 2003 and have continued to this day. In 2003, people were asked to write their own messages on a huge role of paper. The messages were photographed and then sent to US-President George W. Bush and the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. On these occasions people had the opportunity to think about the past, present and future, which is important activity for creating a culture of peace in the community.

**Peace Education through Art**

Through The Grassroots House artists and ordinary citizens have been given the opportunity to become involved with peace concerts, art exhibitions, dramas, film festivals and peace marches that are held every summer. “Think globally and act locally” has been practiced for almost three decades in the Kōchi Prefecture. One of the activities was a peace concert performed by young Chinese, Japanese and Korean musicians. It was initiated by Ms. Keiko Tamaki, Vice Director of the Grassroots House, after the launch of military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The concerts have been held four times a year in public places throughout the city. At the concerts, a fundraising campaign was conducted to help the people of Afghanistan.

**Education and Activities for Reconciliation**

In the *UN Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*, dialogue and cooperation are regarded as vital means to create a culture of peace. The Grassroots House contributed to creating such a culture of peace both domestically and internationally. When members of the museum went on trips to China, it was not easy for them to face Japan’s aggression knowing what soldiers from their hometown of Kōchi had done during World War II. At first, some of the Chinese people they encountered expressed hatred towards the Japanese, but opportunities for reconciliation became possible for these visitors by their action of listening and learning from the Chinese people’s history and supporting their demand for Japan’s apology and compensation for damages done during the war. The Grassroots House also has supported the creation of a culture of peace between high school students from Japan and South Korea. Japanese students conducted research projects about Koreans who were forced to work in Kōchi during World War II and this action has helped them to gain friendships across borders. Japanese high school students went to the Republic of Korea to learn what happened to Korean women who were forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese military during the war. These student activities were filmed and published in a book to make the experiences available as teaching materials for further peace education. There are some other museums besides the Grassroots House that exhibit Japan’s wartime aggression honestly and support the Korean and Chinese lawsuits against the Japanese government for an apology and satisfactory compensation for the victims of Japan’s aggression.

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8 According to a Japanese proverb, the folding of 1000 paper cranes makes a person’s wish come true. Sadako Sasaki, a Japanese girl who died of leukemia due to the long-term consequences of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, folded hundreds of paper cranes before she passed away in 1955 at an age of twelve.

9 Other museums that actively participate in this project are the Women’s War and Peace Museum (Women’s Active Museum) in Tokyo and the Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum.
Conclusion

War memory is quite different from country to country, as the example of reconciliation efforts between China and Japan shows. In a war museum, war memory tends to be used to glorify war. While a peace museum helps visitors to think critically about war; and in the future to think and act for peace. War memory displayed at public peace museums in Japan has emphasized victims within Japan and has downplayed the aggression. On the other hand, Japan’s aggression is well exhibited at private peace museums, and the reconciliation between small groups of Chinese, Korean, Dutch and Japanese people has become possible.

A peace museum has shown to be a positive means to promote peace education through exhibits, art, dialogue and encouraging cooperation at home, school, in the community and worldwide. Art is universal and art can be used in a traveling exhibit that can move throughout the world. A peace museum can also play a role in conflict resolution and reconciliation among conflicting parties. The UN Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace states, “A culture of peace could be promoted through sharing of information among actors on their initiatives in this regard.” The International Network of Peace Museums, the Association of Japanese Museums for Peace (to which relatively big museums belong) and Japanese Citizens’ Network of Museums for Peace work to this end. Currently, these networks are still in the making and their influence remains limited. Keeping in touch with like-minded people who have the same concern for a more peaceful future and have the sense of solidarity is necessary to create a culture of peace. An important step towards this goal will be to further increase cooperation between the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), especially the Asia and Pacific Peace Research Association (APPRA), and the International Network of Museums for Peace in the coming years.

References


Cold War and Reunification: Germany 1989 and Korea 2009

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This paper challenges the conventional claim that the Cold War (1947-1990) between NATO and the Soviet dominated forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a time of peace. Rather, it is argued that the dramatic reduction in military activities, both nuclear and conventional, which occurred within two years of the fall of the Berlin Wall, demonstrates that in the years prior to 1989 the nations involved in the two alliances were engaged in active, siege-style warfare. By the time Germany reunified in 1990 the state of war between the two forces was close to its end. The historical Cold War is used as an analogy for contemporary conflict in Korea. Intra-Korean warfare, 1950-53, was rightly described as an Asian component of that historical Cold War. Since well before the ending of Soviet/United States conflict it has been clear that conflict on the Korean peninsula is mobilized and intense largely because of its own local dynamics. Key elements of intra-Korean conflict include nuclear and missile-based weapons deployed on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone, virtually complete separation between the peoples, economies and currencies of North and South Korea, and huge standing conventional armies. These are all indicative of an active state of war, resembling the siege conditions in the original Cold War. In Korea, assumptions on both sides that the country should be reunified intensify the conflict, by making a settlement impossible until one side or the other is declared a winner in their Cold War.

KEYWORDS: Peace; Cold War; Siege Warfare; North Korea; South Korea; Nuclear Weapons; Reunification.

In international relations, 25 years is a long time. It took less than 25 years from 1918, and the end of World War I, to get to the brink of World War II. The intervening years experienced the break up of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman empires, the Great Depression and New Deal in the US, uprisings against Japanese colonization in Korea, the Brazilian Revolution of 1930, and foreign invasions in Manchuria and Poland. Big changes in perspective and in reality can happen in 25 years. Looking back over a different 25 years, from the perspective of 2009, it can now be argued that in 1984, and during the closing years of the Cold War, strategists and citizens alike made assumptions about “reality” which have not stood the test of history. Two assumptions stand out, one local the other more global. While using 25 years of hindsight to judge earlier times may not be exactly fair, these days it is commonly understood that the conflict in Korea, in 1984 still being described as quintessential Cold War, was already being governed by its own dynamics. Today, in 2009, peninsula hostilities continue unabated, amidst nuclear tests, missile threats and naval confrontations, long after that first Cold War has ended. And the original Cold War itself, described at the time as “armed” peace, we now know to have enabled genuine peace only because it finally, and quite unexpectedly, came to a sudden end. Before exploring these two analytical claims however, a brief review of key political and strategic events 25 years ago seems worthwhile.

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In November 1984, Ronald Reagan had just been re-elected President by the most decisive voting margin ever, an unmistakable rebuttal to a NATO-centered peace movement whose anti-Cold War posture had so recently seemed on the ascendant, even in the United States. In the Soviet Union, 18 years of Breshnev’s leadership, which ended in 1982, was followed by instability: his two successors each lasted only about a year – Andropov until February 1984, and Chernenko till March 1985. In 1984, then Foreign Minister Gorbachev, now recognized as a Nobel Peace Laureate (1990), was hardly known beyond the USSR, although Margaret Thatcher commented favorably on his 1984 diplomatic trip to the UK. In China, Deng Xiaoping’s modernizations had hardly begun to show their enormous effects, so the Bund in Shanghai, now home to the most exotic of modern architecture, was still dominated by iconic buildings dating back to European attempts at colonization 100 years before. A New York Times travel writer described China’s international hospitality as classically modest and communist (Wren 1984):

Visitors to Shanghai usually have no choice as to where they stay. The China International Travel Service allocates rooms, of which there has been a chronic shortage. But several hotels are worth requesting because they are landmarks.

The Peace Hotel, known as the Cathay before the Communist takeover in 1949, offers the best location, overlooking the Bund and the Huangpu River. The rooms are old, the carpets worn, the bathrooms reminiscent of a neglected rent-controlled apartment on Manhattan’s Upper West Side. Worse, the management has sealed off the grand staircase, preventing a fast exit in case of fire. Yet its reputation as China’s finest hotel of prewar days lingers. A room for two: about $40 a night.

In South Korea – the Republic of Korea (ROK) – the 1988 Olympics and the beginnings of the modern democratic era were still several years away. And it was Japan, not the “Asian Tiger” nations and certainly not China where unstoppable economic momentum seemed to have taken hold.

Nations around the world in the mid 1980s were still steeped in Cold War threats and counter threats. Even civilian life was caught up in them. The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, leading to a US-led boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games held a year later – 62 nations stayed away. In 1984, the Soviet Union reciprocated, boycotting the Los Angeles Olympics along with 13 other nations. 25 years on, the world in 2009 continues to reap the harvest of that Soviet war; the Mujahidin and Taliban forces originally funded by the CIA to fight Russians are now funded by Saudis and others to fight Americans. While Afghan insurgents continue to take on onesuper power, the other super power that attacked in the first place has completely disappeared. So in some senses, much has changed. Across the world in Nicaragua, in 1984 the Sandinista government under leftist Daniel Ortega seemed to the US so to threaten its interests that Reagan’s staff was covertly funding a war for regime change. Ortega was indeed defeated, albeit in an election in 1990, but by 2009 he had returned to power while Reagan’s political heirs languished in the US electoral wilderness. Some things are rather similar to where they were 25 years ago. Civilian casualties and surrogate wars in what were called “Third World” countries were an important element of the Cold War. And nuclear confrontations in Europe, across the northern hemisphere and under the Arctic Ocean demonstrated that the super powers were themselves directly engaged in military maneuvers in the “cold” war; the nuclear challenges, too, were very dangerous. This is where we return to the analysis. Was the Cold War, the nuclear Cold War, peace, or was it not? And what does the answer to that question tell us about the situation in 2009?
Cold War and Reunification

1984: No Peace in the Cold War

During the Cold War years, NATO and Warsaw Pact leaders described their nuclear weapons deployments as tactical or strategic moves to keep the world “at” peace. But in fact the risk of nuclear assault became progressively more intense as the years passed. By 1984 the newest deployments left powerful and dangerous missiles closer than they had been: NATO’s Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing Missiles were installed in Western Europe and the Soviets were placing SS20 missiles nearby at 48 different launch sites in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These missiles were precision targeted. Their handlers were on round-the-clock alert. The amount of time between launch and strike was negligible. Millions of Europeans were now forced to understand that any day they might be dead without warning. And if they were under instantaneous threat then, in the event of a nuclear launch, US and Soviet populations would have less than half an hour longer. If catastrophic death is less than an hour away, all day every day, one is not living “at” peace. And the nuclear confrontations were not confined to missile deployments.

Arms control treaties, though offered as a way of “limiting” nuclear weapons development, had in fact become one of the preferred ways to structure the details of active nuclear weapons development. The negotiations behind the treaties themselves frequently turned into yet another forum for confrontation and hostility. Nuclear “deterrence” though described as the strategy to prevent a war, also provided the strategic framework by which the Soviets and Americans confronted each other head on, each of their thousands of warheads specifically targeted at pre-selected cities and military installations on the other side.1 The linguistics of the nuclear regime tried to make these horrifying weapons seem mild: “Limited” nuclear wars were “exchanges” and civilians would “evacuate” in the event of a “strike,” but the realities were genuinely hostile. Soviet citizens could travel to the west only under tightly limited conditions. Americans rarely crossed the Iron Curtain. In both economies, military budgets held an unchallenged top priority. The “hot” frontiers in Germany, in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, in submarines hunting under the Arctic – all overseen by a network of spy satellites – were not peaceful zones governed by peaceful agendas. By 1984, when nuclear weapons planning had finally become part of the public consciousness and citizen political debate, ordinary people all over the world understood they might be living only moments away from annihilation.

And all of this, the surrogate wars, the nuclear deployments, the threats of instant annihilation, the hostile relations between super powers, the arms “control” treaties and the isolation of the two economic blocs from each other, was being described as “peace.” The official assumption seemed to be that these were the conditions of future life on earth, that this was the only kind of “peace” the world could expect. And yet, 25 years later we know that this assumption was, quite simply, false. Relations between the two lead participants in the Cold War may not be tranquil yet, but the threat of massive and instant annihilation has disappeared. Death without warning is in fact in direct contradiction with the word “peace” and, with US/Russian peace secured at least for now, it is legitimate to argue that the Cold War was war and not peace. One irrefutable sign that in 1984 “peace” was yet to come lies in the profound difference between the underlying terrors of the Cold War years and the open and untrammeled trade, travel, marriage, media and arts experiences across both East and West Europe, in particular, that pervade life in 2009.

1 In the United States, opponents of the nuclear build-up reaped significant organizational and financial rewards by mobilizing citizens who were learning about where they lived in relation to likely blast zones.
A State of Siege Ends

The original Cold War was a special kind of war. I have argued elsewhere that it was a form of reciprocal nuclear siege, which gradually came to an end between 1989 and 1991. (Meyer-Knapp 1991) The ending process became possible after the selection of Gorbachev as Soviet Communist Party Secretary in 1985. Even the public began to perceive that an ending might one day be at hand after a “Summit” meeting in Reykjavik in October 1986, when Reagan and his Soviet counterpart almost managed to negotiate a 50% reduction in nuclear weapons. But the actual peace process began rather later, in Europe, exactly where those dangerous new missiles had been deployed a few years before, along the inter-German frontier, along Churchill’s Iron Curtain. Chris Gueffroy, was the last person to die in the Cold War in that particular zone. He was killed as he tried to escape, by East German frontier guards February 6, 1989. Later the same year, over the course of five months between June and November, open elections in Poland, the free migration of East Germans through Hungary to West Germany and finally the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signaled that the state of siege between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was coming to an end.

1989 did not mark the complete demobilization of either Russian made or American made nuclear weapons. Both countries still hold and target nuclear forces to this day, but the immediacy of the danger dropped away astonishingly fast. For decades, under the Cold War regime, tanks and troops on rapid response deployments faced each other in Germany, separated by just a few miles. By June of 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces were already completing an agreement to prevent “Dangerous Military Activities.” A US airplane, that had been kept aloft 24 hours a day for “command and control” of US nuclear forces, landed for good within a year. By September 1990 a deterrence-era, jointly negotiated plan to cut conventional forces levels was being described by US Secretary of State Baker as “irrelevant”, in light of the decision to reunify the two Germanys. (Federation of American Scientists 2005) On September 12 that year, the “Four Powers,” who had occupied Berlin since the end of World War II, signed a settlement in Moscow to remove their forces from the city. Astonishingly, for those of us who lived with the Iron Curtain dividing Germany into seemingly permanent, hostile camps, by October 3, 1990, less than a year after the Berlin Wall came down, the two Germanys had become one. In early December there were elections for a new government for the entire people. With the onset of peace, democracy across the whole of Germany could take hold anew.

Over the next few months, pro-Soviet governments collapsed in several Warsaw Pact countries, and more surprisingly over the next few years the Soviet Union itself broke apart into independent nations. Those extra Russian votes in international organizations and extra teams in international sports events were real after all.2 The Soviet monolith became a Commonwealth of Independent States. By 1991 Gorbachev’s government was in close cooperation with US forces for a combined assault on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait. The ending of the Soviet/American Cold War, a seemingly impossible dream in 1988, had become reality in less than two years. The Cold War was not peace. But as it ended peace came into being.

Asia’s Diverse Experiences

The visible part of the Cold War’s ending was centered to a large degree on Europe. But parts of Asia too had been engaged in the conflict and some had earlier paid a steep price for those

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2 For example, Ukraine became a member of the International Agency on Atomic Energy in 1957.
years of undeclared but active war. In Asia, the Cold War presented itself in more varied forms than under the stringent militarisms of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (as it was formally known). China, Vietnam, Japan and Korea were all included in the early Cold War narrative, but in all four, events after 1945 also had their own local momentum. By 1984, in Japan, in China and in Vietnam local issues were paramount. Korea, however, was still being described as a Cold War hot spot. Now, 25 years on, it is clear that the conflict in Korea has also long manifested an intensely local momentum, even if at least four other nations have recently been engaged in trying to temper its nuclear dynamics. A brief review, now, of the linkages between East Asia and the traditionally defined Cold War shows that by 1984 none of these four nations remained linked to the core of Cold War politics. That does not mean, however, that Asia today is free of cold war-style conflict.

If there is one nation which can report without a doubt that the original Cold War was a real war, not peace, it is Vietnam. The Vietnamese, divided by international agreement in 1954, found by 1960 that their country was becoming a frontline in the maelstrom of US/Soviet, communist/anti-communist politics and militarization. In the fighting between 1960 and 1973, Vietnamese dead and wounded alone amounted to 2-3 million, and there should also be a reckoning for material physical destruction, herbicidal, ecological destruction and social upheaval. The long term consequences for Laos and Cambodia as well as for Vietnam were enduring and significant. After America and her allied forces withdrew in 1975, slowly but surely peace returned to the entire region, but it took years. In Cambodia, in 2009, trials for the perpetrators in their horrendous, wartime “killing fields” are only now under way, more than 30 years after the event. Vietnam, like Afghanistan and Nicaragua was a hot zone in the Cold War.

In a rather more passive way the Japanese, too, were once bound up in the military dynamics of the Cold War. As the losers in World War II, it cannot have been any surprise that their islands were to be occupied by Allied troops. Americans, based nearby in the closing months of the war, arrived in large numbers soon after the official surrender in August 1945. Over 160,000 were deployed in Japan during the 1950s and, even after the official occupation administration ended, the numbers stayed high: over 80,000 during the Vietnam War years and over 40,000 in the next two decades (Kane 2006). While most Japanese were not caught up directly in the combat, the people of Okinawa experienced the oppressive sides of combat training and war for years: the roar of aircraft taking off and landing night and day, the social risks from so many single men at nearby bases, the everyday congestion of vehicle traffic. Only in the last twenty years, since the ending of the Cold War, have the numbers of troops in Japan finally begun to drop, though the Japanese continue to serve as forward deployment zone for US troops.

Two other Asian countries, China and Korea, were initially caught up in the Cold War narrative as well but both have proved to be in relationships with the USSR and the US which are in fact quite different. China’s situation was clarified first. Military planners in the United States have a reputation for merging Communist nations into a single enemy system, but the State Department and others in Washington were able fairly quickly to discern that the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s might open a strategic opportunity for constructive China/US relationships. Richard Nixon, the first US President to visit, arrived in China in February 1972, amid a fanfare of publicity. Most US Presidents have since found reasons to go there. Chinese leaders in the US are a rarer sight, but officials from the two nations have been meet-

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3 The Vietnamese name for the conflict is Chiến tranh Việt Nam.
4 Vietnam was divided as a result of a civil war inside the country between communist and non-communist Vietnamese forces.
ing regularly in other ways ever since the Nixon/Mao breakthrough. Unlike Cold War era Soviet/US “summit” meetings, US and Chinese officials often meet without much fanfare. And despite potential military tensions over Taiwanese independence, and China’s growing military resources, both nations have, since 1972 preferred to focus on their trade relations. Neither China’s challenge to Tibetan cultural survival, nor limits on freedom of speech, nor US “imperialism,” nor violations of human rights by both governments seems to derail the corporate and monetary interchange which has become the core of the relationship between the two nations. By 1997, when the British returned Hong Kong to Chinese control, it had become clear that politics and commerce could be kept at arms length, thereby avoiding military confrontation. Indeed long before 1984, perhaps even 35 years ago now, the Cold War and China were no longer discussed in the same terms.

Korea was still being included, wrongly I will argue, in the Soviet/American narrative, even as late as 1989. In 1945 the country had indeed been an active zone in the onset of the Soviet and US confrontation that ultimately became the Cold War. Soviet forces and US forces converged on Korea in August 1945, heading towards a strategic collision seemingly identical to their respective races, in May of that year, to place into their own “orbit” the largest possible amount of Germany territory. And Korea, just like Germany and Austria, was divided by post-war plans which allocated occupation “powers” to four of the conquering nations, in lands the Axis nations had lost by their defeat. Within five years, Koreans from North and South were at war with each other for control of the entire country, a war that lasted until 1953, with significant military support from the United States, the Soviet Union and China. That war rightly remains an important event in most historical narratives of the Cold War, like the Berlin Airlift of 1948, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the US intervention in Vietnam in 1960.

Korea's Dissociation from the Cold War Narrative

However, by 1990, after the Berlin Wall came down and Germany had reunified, it became clear that tensions in the Korean peninsula were in their essentials largely local not global. Kim Il Sung, the founding leader of the Democratic Republic of Korea, was no Erich Honecker; he was not a caretaker unable to hold a country together once the Soviet Union fell. Instead he was a charismatic, long lasting leader with dynastic pretensions and a highly developed ideology which might be called socialist but was also intensely Korean, Confucian and even rather mystical. The Soviets had long ago become almost marginal to North Korea’s day to day experience. The nation’s survival depended on China, which itself had been demonstrating since the mid 1970s that it played no part in the Soviet/United States Cold War. Meanwhile, though the Republic of Korea did rely on US troops to help maintain its territorial integrity, by the early 1990s it had also become clear in South Korea that what threat there was came not from the Soviet/American Cold War but from North Korea itself.

The late 1980s saw real hopes for diplomatic change in Northeast Asia. For example Gorbachev made an approach to improve relations with South Korea despite offending North Korea, and Japan made a failed attempt to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. On the Korean peninsula itself, however, unbroken lines of confrontation span the years 1984-2009 and they have not been related to the rise and fall of US/Soviet tensions, but rather to North Korea’s own nuclear weapons development, to inter-Korean trade relations, and to hypothetical prospects for reunification. The nuclear threat in Korea is indigenously Korean. And whether or not there is to be reunification at some point in time is not, as it was in Germany,
ultimately dependent on super power relations far away, but rather it is a product of the aspirations and governing styles and national identities of the two different Koreas now in existence. The original Cold War framework had completely disappeared by 1992, but the Korean nuclear weapons threat evident then has carried its own version of a “cold” war into the new millennium.

Each new American administration appears to be as ensnared in North Korea’s nuclear strategies as its predecessors were by the earlier meta-narrative of the “communist menace.” But the core momentum for conflict is to be found on the Korean peninsula itself, where a meta-narrative of “reunification,” with its implied question about which side will win and become the governing nation, interweaves with a constant stream of hostile threats on both sides - nuclear tests and missile challenges, nearly 2,000,000 soldiers on alert, regular aggressive naval confrontations, trade zones that open and close without warning, and threats about aid and faltering armistice agreements. All of these challenges ricochet back and forth, month after month, year after year.

At its own scale, the Korean peninsula in 2009 lives with a reality remarkably similar to that of the earlier Cold War. The parallels are eerie, each one beginning with the ending of a battlefield war which did not reveal the pathway towards authentic peace. Korean nuclear threats, as in the Cold War, offer continuous reminders of the possibility of catastrophic damage. Budget priorities are focused first of all on military procurement at the expense of civilian life, particularly in the North. Long years of compulsory military service occupy all the young men on both sides of the line. There is no chance for free contact between people in the two zones. Economic relationships are distorted by currencies with no real rate of exchange. Repeated negotiations for the control of nuclear arsenals create long term “agreements” which seem only to lead to more and more weapons that are increasingly capable of dangerous effects. Spies infiltrate each other’s countries. Humorless and tense frontier guards at crossing zones may make a show for tourists but they are also manifestations of real conflict. Attempts by third party nations to keep relationships from becoming explosive are marginalized. Profound isolation from each other allows for very little understanding on either side of the actual lives being lived across a ferociously dangerous frontier. Anxieties abound in other countries around the region that these two principals may one day escalate their conflict uncontrollably, sweeping neighboring nations into a war which they are in no position to prevent. So the question arises, in what sense are these cold Korean wars really war?

Siege Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

When naming the original Cold War a “war,” I characterized it as a siege war. I suggest something similar with respect to the inter-Korean relationship today particularly with respect to North Korea. Siege has a number of important features evident during the historical Cold War, and evident again in Korea today. The phrases in quotation marks are all to be found in Michael Walzer’s description of the dynamics of siege warfare (2006: 160-61):

“Siege is the oldest form of total war.” The sheer scale of the Cold War nuclear threat made the word “total” redundant. Today North Korean investment in the military challenge also seems total. Men inducted into military service are active for up to 13 years. And a country with one of the lowest GDPs anywhere has both a nuclear and a missile weapons complex. In South Korea, all young men are required to devote two years to active duty, and the ROK government pays for the deployment of US garrisons as well. While in the last two decades South
Korea has become wealthy, so the national cost is gradually decreasing as a percentage of that wealth, the country maintains one of the largest armies in the world. Together the Koreas have nearly as many men under arms (1,857,000) as China, the largest force in the world (2,255,000), though the Korean population is approximately 6% of China’s size.\(^5\) The test of total war rests also on experience. The Korean battlefield in the 1950s left no part of either territory unscathed. With hillsides scraped bare and refugees starving, the images from the TV show MASH are nothing like bleak enough. 

“Civilians (are) attacked along with soldiers in order to get at soldiers.” All over South Korea, military bases are embedded inside civilian communities. Small camps for vehicle maintenance, large camps as divisional headquarters. Military planes and helicopters overhead no matter where. Soldiers are everywhere, too. Men in army uniforms pervade the society like no other place I have ever lived. Every part of the country is a legitimate target. The same is certainly true in the North though much less data is publicly available, particularly in South Korea, where censorship blocks access to any website which might contain North Korean information presented from the North Korean perspective. The censorship in South Korea is minimal compared to North Korea’s jamming of all electronic signals from outside the country, but each side strenuously isolates itself from the other while embedding military life throughout internally.

“The inhabitants of a threatened (area) seek the most immediate form of military protection and agree to be garrisoned.” Koreans on both sides seem actively to consent to the widespread deployment of soldiers across their territories. Americans, Europeans, Russians and other Soviet citizens once used to accept the widespread deployment of nuclear missiles despite the risk of becoming targets themselves. The hoped for defense seems to reduce concerns about the increased risk of attack. In South Korea in 2002, all 1600 declared conscientious objectors were in jail, having risked sentences of 27 months, longer than mandatory service. On their release they would not regain their civil rights (Seoul Quakers). Very few people even in the more democratic South challenge their garrison life.

“Once combat begins noncombatants are more likely to be killed. The soldiers fight from protected positions.” While tank traps and heightened readiness certainly aim to keep Koreans on both sides from being invaded, it is the soldiers and not the civilians who have ways to defend themselves in the event of a final assault to end the siege. Even nowadays, when direct clashes are rare, they are more likely to ensnare civilians than soldiers. In 2009 alone, traders in the North Korean industrial zone have been held, as have fishermen and, with huge publicity, so were two US journalists. In 2008 a South Korean woman was shot and killed having wandered inadvertently across the boundary line on the eastern coast. When North Koreans test their missiles they never mention military strategic targets preferring to threaten civilians as far away as Japan and even Hawaii.

“Civilians who don’t fight at all are quickly made into ··· ‘useless’ mouths.” Famine in North Korea in the 1990s was all too clear an example of this axiom. In this respect the siege in Korea is far more intense on one side than on the other. There is little sign at the moment that South Korea’s citizens are suffering any material deprivation at all.

\(^5\) For comparison’s sake the UK and the combined Koreas juxtapose with interesting results. The population in the Koreas is slightly larger – 71,858,480 to 60,943,912 –, the land mass is somewhat smaller – 2,190,204 sq km to 300,000 sq km – and the total active military manpower in Britain, one of the armies most engaged in active duty in the world, is about ten percent of that of the combined Koreas.
“That is what siege is like. The goal is surrender; the means not defeat of the enemy army but the fearful spectacle of civilian dead.” The asymmetry in this feature of siege runs the other way – the famines of the 1990s show North Korea well able to withstand civilian deaths. There exists no recent data as to whether the South can do the same. However, visitors to any of the patriotic historic sites in South Korea are constantly reminded of the heroic martyrs, civilians all, who died in resistance to Japanese colonization a hundred years ago. Perhaps neither side is easily terrified by the prospect of civilian dead, which in turn may explain why neither side makes any significant attempts to bring the current conflict to an end.

2009: Another Cold War

If this is siege, what is the strategic goal? And how might it end? In Korea, as in the Cold War, the military situation consists of two large scale, sedentary forces, face to face on full alert, the danger intensified from time to time by specific, short term crises. Here, as in the original Cold War, the rather odd reality may be that for both sides their goal is no more than their own survival rather than conquest of the other’s land or fortress. The American government was delighted to claim the ending of the Cold War as a victory, but many in Washington watched with considerable dismay once the Soviet Union began to collapse. The unified stability it had provided even during the siege changed over the ensuing years into varied and unpredictable foreign policies, in volatile regions of the world. And the US, for all that it is accused of imperial pretensions, seems much more inclined try to guarantee space for a new McDonalds franchise than to stay to govern a conquered land over the long term.

Although both Koreas talk constantly of reunification, it is quite possible that in this new cold war, both Koreas have as their real goal their own survival alongside the continued, but peaceful survival of the other. The current government of North Korea rightly suspects that no other political power, in China say, or in South Korea, has the North’s survival as a pivotal interest. And the people of South Korea, with the German model all too vivid, may well want their own survival without necessarily taking on the enormous economic, cultural or political tasks that would loom were the two Koreas actually to merge. Since they cannot, at the moment, officially agree to coexist, their next best option is this hard, cold siege. It is expensive, there is no end in sight, and it is not peace.

Peace, should it come to the Korean peninsula without a catastrophic military assault, and whether it brings with it one nation or two, will be very different from today: it will bring a new freedom to move and to travel, to connect with people, to live without fear, and to plan a future, all of which would represent a change in life experience, even in the South. And in constructing the peace, generous political decisions will probably have to be made in favor of reconciliation over punishment, in favor of investment over reparation, in favor of life over death. If this analysis of the current warlike state of the Korean peninsula has aroused concern, perhaps the concern can be eased by remembering that 25 years ago across the nuclear battlefields of Europe and in submarines under the Arctic there was not the slightest sign that the original Cold War might come to an end. Five years later the world had changed. Although there is no peace in 2009 in either Korea, the unexpected is, as Clausewitz explained, one of the three legs on which the stool of war rests (1976: 85). Overtures to peace can begin at any time. They are more likely to be recognized for what they are if we also recognize the real intensity and significance of the military conditions that exist today.
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This research has two major goals. Firstly, it seeks to understand why the Russian civil society is in a state of decline and why collective action among civil groups fails. Secondly, it is aimed at furthering the existing theoretical framework studying the decline of civil society in Russia and building a model designed to suggest yet another explanation for the cause of that decline. The main argument of this research paper is based on an assumption that existing theoretical or structural explanations are not sufficient to provide an answer to a fundamental question: Why does Russian civil society fail these days? To further the existing scholarship on the study of this problem I suggest a deeper analysis of the social and organizational structure in which the Russian civil groups operate.

**KEYWORDS:** NGOs; Civil Sector; Russian Federation; Societal Structure Model; Collective Action.

The decline of communism in the late 1980s gave a sudden boost to civil activism in the Soviet Union. Civil organizations largely represented by NGOs and grassroots movements appeared on the political scene and played a significant role in the collapse of the USSR. And yet the fall of communism has since been followed by the decline of civil movements in Russia and in most other post-Soviet Eastern European states. Shifting from a power countervailing the state, the voluntary civil sector, both NGO and grassroots activism, turned into a myriad of organizations competing with each other for foreign funding, thereby pursuing short-term goals of securing their own financial welfare rather than promoting democracy. The vertically oriented civil sector that was pursuing benefits either from foreign donors or the state did not seek horizontal cooperation within civil society, avoiding networking and promoting individualism. The growth of state authoritarianism in Putin’s era witnessed strong state intervention in civil society, a crackdown on western sponsored civil groups and their gradual replacement with the state controlled and state sponsored civil sector. State controlled civil society in its turn inherited a vertical structure of operation and sought no cooperation with any civil elements except the state. Therefore, civil networking and collective action within civil society appeared to be effectively divided both into pro-democratic western supported and state supported civil society organizations. This thesis aims to analyze the reasons behind the weak cooperation within the civil sector in the Russian Federation.

My main argument states that the decline of civil society in the Russian Federation is due to the lack of collective action among civil society groups, which in its turn emanates from operational environment and the nature of public goods pursued by the civil society groups’ i.e. short-term goals. In other words, in the absence of coercion and incentives it is easier to obtain public goods individually rather than collectively. Thus, collective action is not affected solely...
by social or political factors or by historical legacy, but rather by an amalgamation of those factors interacting with each other and creating an environment distinct from those of other developing states but similar to those of other post-Soviet states facing similar problems. In contrast to civil groups in many developing post-colonial states, the Russian civil sector has weak community ties due to its communist heritage. Accordingly, both NGOs and grassroots movements are more individualistic rather than community serving and society oriented like in other developing states.

Civil society groups in any country depend on the societal environment, which creates and defines the operational environment for civil society. Admittedly, the Russian civil society is facing a complex operational environment influenced by an array of factors, many of which are also intrinsic to many other developing states: competition for foreign funds, lack of resources, state oppression etc. However, historically, since the dawn of its appearance in the late 1980s, the Russian civil sector has been peculiarly distinct from those of other developing states. Undoubtedly, excessive state pressure derived from the oppressive totalitarian state apparatus of the Soviet Union has played its role in the creation of the third sector since the late 1990s. However, after that period we can hardly speak about state interventionism in the civil sector at all. The implementation of the Civil Code in 1994 has been the first measure undertaken by the government to institutionalize or control the civil sector ever since the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, we can not fail to notice that the decline of the civil sector began well before the state unleashed its strength on the voluntary sector. The main features of this decline are: failure to promote democratization (which influences the state), lack of collective networking (well before and after Putin’s ascend to power) and fierce competition among each other. Namely, civil society had only a minimal role in protecting human rights and dealing with refugee crises during both Chechen wars in 1994-97 and 2000. The 1996 Presidential elections have been a venue for multiple human rights violations and electoral fraud with little to no objection from civil society. Putin’s presidency has been followed by the opening of the Civic Forum in 2001, the establishment of the Public Chamber in 2004, an anti-Western NGO campaign in 2005, the adoption of NGO Law in 2006, etc. The decline of civil participation is not only a feature characteristic of the Russian civil sector, rather it is peculiar to the whole post-Soviet region (Shleifer and Treisman 2005).

This thesis does not seek to demonstrate how to tackle the lack of collective action nor does it provide answers to how to lead the Russian civil sector out of the deadlock that it is currently facing. The major goal is to explain how the current situation came into being and why Russian civil society groups are repeatedly failing at collective action. This thesis aims to build a theoretical model upon which a further research in the field can be conducted. It seeks to provide a theoretical and analytical framework by explaining the civil sector’s decline in Russia, which distinctly differs from mainstream explanations. Thus, the main goal of this research is theory building rather than hypothesis testing. In its current stage, this project does not rely on empirical data and its goal is to suggest rather than prove and justify. The theoretical model presented in this work should be considered as a basis for further research and the collection on more empirical data.

Social Networking of Civil Society

To a great extent, we can put a degree of blame on state interventionism, starting since the year 2000, as the process of state-run institutionalization and domestication of civil society top-down
has severely crippled the latter (Green 2002). As previously mentioned in my main argument, state interventionism is a crucial reason behind the weakening of the civil sector. Due to its exceptionally pervasive character and the totalitarian approach, the state interventionism in the Russian Federation acquired a unique nature, peculiarly different from the state pressure in many other developing pro-democratic regimes. Simply, Putin’s administration took the matter of civil society’s institutionalization too closely and invested too much in it. There are a number of reasons for that: “color” revolutions in neighboring Ukraine and Georgia, civil society’s increasing reliance on foreign donors, etc.

A number of theories offer explanations for civil decline in societal factors. Such criteria as a prolonged economic crisis, widespread poverty and unemployment have been cited on many occasions to explain the unwillingness of the population to participate in civil groups (Henderson 2002). Another theory, already mentioned here as one of the Russian concepts of civil society, points to the Soviet concept of public sphere, which has influenced individual mentality, encouraging persons to seek for private sphere to be used for public social activities, since the official public sphere has been dominated by the Communist Party. Assumingly, as mentioned by Semenova (2006), such an approach has been both satisfactory for the state and the society:

For the Soviet nomenklatura this double standard life was also parochial—as long as people focused their efforts on expanding the private sphere, they would not openly challenge the regime in the public sphere.

The given theory is similar to arguments proposed in this thesis. However, I would like to avoid generalizing the societal relations to public and private spheres, considering that after the collapse of communism both concepts have been widely reversed, and even under an assumption that the Soviet legacy persisted in mentality it is difficult to assume that the Soviet public and private spheres could have survived intact and could seriously affect participation in civil society. My argument aims to narrow down the given theory to inter-personal relations, inter-personal networking, avoiding the sphere concept.

Fig. 1. Generalized public trust levels

Following this line of argument, I will suggest that the main reason accounting for the failure of collective action of the Russian civil society and, as a result, the decline of the latter lies
in the nature of inter-societal relations or networking. Described in scholarly literature as a “weak tie” society (Sik 1995; Busse 2001; Misztal 1996), the post-Soviet society is distinctly different in terms of its societal environment from societies of other developing states.

**“Weak Ties” Networking**

A theory of “weak tie” networks is an offspring of interpersonal ties theory, widely used in mathematical psychology, first introduced by Granovetter (1973), theory of weak ties in its classical form, basically states:

... that our acquaintances (weak ties) are less likely to be socially involved with one another than are our close friends (strong ties). Thus the set of people made up of any individual and his or her acquaintances comprises a low-density network (one in which many of the possible relational lines are absent) whereas the set consisting of the same individual and his or her close friends will be densely knit (many of the possible lines are present).

![Figure 2. Weak tie networking: personal level](source)

Accordingly, the above figure (See Fig. 2) shows that strong ties retained by the members of a certain group in a weak tie society are usually end up within this same group since the given group is only loosely connected with other similar type of groups.

In a Soviet society, characterized by a lack of generalized trust in both state and society (Misztal 1996), weak ties have developed into a knit network of individuals united into weak ties cliques, according to their geographical location and social, gender, occupational or emotional reasons. Largely inaccessible to strangers and wary of state influence, networks or cliques have been based on close inter-personal relations and effectively blocked any outside interference or ideological influence. In comparison to industrialized western societies capable to ensure social and personal security of their community members and, therefore, based on corporate structures (Boissevain 1974), communist societies had to develop their own societal norms (See Fig. 2). Additionally, their norms were significantly different from those of post-colonial societies since the latter have been mainly based on tribal, communal, pre-industrial or feudal systems. Therefore, distinction between public and private spheres in communist societies had to rely on weak tie networking within its private sphere, thus emulating social relations which in western societies normally exist in public spheres. Transition of public social relations into the private sphere has undeniably been a distinctive feature of the Soviet societal norms (Seme-
However, I will assert that the public/private sphere norms could not have survived the collapse of communism and establishment of a new order. Logically speaking, in an absence of totalitarian pressure and without restrictions on associational life, there could be no further reason to retain public social relations in the private sphere as before. Enormous social as well as political shifts brought over by perestroika in late 1980s have swept away the public/private sphere Soviet norm which could be seen during the earlier mentioned boom of civil society in the late 1980s: civil activism, both social and political. On the contrary, unlike the private and public sphere norms, the weak tie networking has survived and prevailed as a norm of inter-social relations. According to Busse (2001):

Despite urbanization and massive industrialization, Russian social life in even its largest cities suggests more of the village or island than it does America’s ideas of urban life as contrasted with small town life (Hummon 1990). Using place as an identifier of type, ‘post-Soviet social capital’ shares many similarities with ‘small town social capital’ or ‘island social capital,’ these isolated, closed, continuous, multiplex networks with strong norms and social control.

Those “island” communities have mainly preferred to keep their social activities and relations in the private sphere, even though there are no restrictions for them to act publicly. The main reasons for the weak tie society to exist are high levels of social insecurity, deep mistrust in authorities and the state as well as lack of trust in institutional structures both state and civil (See Fig. 3).

![Fig. 3. Weak tie vs. Strong tie communities: community level](Source: Onnela et al, PNAS, 104, 7332, 2007)

There is no doubt that weak tie networking as a societal norm is also a part of civil society. Moreover, weak tie networking is a major form of inter-personal and inter-societal relations within the post-Soviet civil society and inevitably every group of Russian civil society is made
up of weak ties, in most cases a single clique weak tie network. Creating civil society organizations should theoretically involve first of all participation of weak tie members, largely blocking outsiders and therefore civil society as a whole. Logically, a society composed of cell-like groups is most likely to produce a cell-like civil society. This hypothesis can suggest a clue on why there are so many non-profit organizations with so little if at all collective action among them. Considering that a weak tie network is not in favor of collective action with persons or groups outside the clique, any sort of communal action, including social networking and collective action, is generally blocked. Thus, even outside of civil society borders there are little to no community efforts in the modern Russian society. Accordingly, in contrast to community based tribal and feudal societies of most post-colonial developing states in the world, the post-Soviet society is not community centered; individualistic in its core it is highly weak tie oriented. Originating from the Soviet legacy, the weak tie networking seems to have successfully adopted itself to socially and politically unstable societies of post-Soviet states, occupying a niche of absent community relations which have been successfully eradicated by the decades of communism.

Similarly, thousands of civil society groups with weak tie networking mindset are in no search for collective action or networking even among like-minded groups but pursue the attainment of a set of short-term public goods, a behavior pattern which is also predetermined by the lack of collective action. In other words, realizing the impossibility to obtain long term goals solitarily, the groups vigorously pursue public support which they are most capable to get. An environment of growing state interventionism at the same time seems to encourage the pursuit of short-term goals, and vulnerable due to their solitary existence civil society groups easily fell victim to the state. The lack of collective action, created in turn by the system of weak tie networking, determines the nature of public goods pursued by civil groups and complements to the decline of the third sector in the Russian Federation. At this point we can come up with the question of how the Russian civil sector managed to boom in late 1980s, in spite of an environment dominated by the weak tie networking. Indulging into the history of civil society’s development in Russia we might be lead away from the main arguments of this thesis; however, it is necessary to throw a brief glance at the transitional moments in the history of civil sector’s appearance. There is a multitude of theories explaining the appearance of the liberal civil sector in the USSR in late 1980s (i.e. Bae 2005, Tismaneanu 1995, Green 2002) seeking answers both in outside influences and in the demise of communism. However, following the arguments suggested in this thesis I will insist that the sudden outburst of the civil sector which took place in the USSR in late 1980s in spite of an atomized societal environment has been spurred by the transition from the public/private sphere to the weak tie society. The decline of the classical Soviet public and private spheres was inevitable under the decline of communism itself, whereas weak tie networks persisted to exist even after the collapse of the above mentioned spheres. The brief transitional moment between the reduction of the sphere influence and the gradual transition to weak tie networking was the time when civil sector, liberated from the old regime’s restrictions, managed to revive. However, the initial impetus was not enough to lead the civil sector onto a democratic path. Unlike the Central and Eastern European states of the Warsaw Pact, Russia was in a much direr economic and political situation. Besides, it did not choose the same development path as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia in terms of political and economic policy making. Therefore, the sudden boom of the civil sector which simultaneously took place in almost all socialist states of the Eastern bloc became gradually bogged down in economic and political problems in most post-Soviet
states, including Russia. Accordingly, the unfinished democratization process has wiped out the communist legacy of public and private sphere societal divisions but was unable to accomplish a complete transition from a totalitarian to a democratic society, leaving the weak tie networks intact and providing them with a fertile ground for development. It has been suggested that the growth of weak ties in density will assist in spreading information and eventually bring civil society elements together (Kniazeva 2002). The hypothesis in favor of weak ties (Gibson 1998) argues that

those [individuals] embedded in social networks characterized by weak ties are most likely to adapt the emergent values of a new regime, and, in this instance, to endorse democratic institutions and processes .... Thus, “weak” social networks that are politically relevant may contribute to the development of the democratic values through processes of diffusion and through practice at democratic discussion.

The major line of argument characterizing weak tie networks as positive for the development of civil society and the democratization process in general follows the assumption that weak ties are defined by a more heterogeneous nature than family and kin based strong ties networks, and therefore are more open to the spread of information and civil activism. I will not dismiss the claim that in the long run weak networking is capable of bringing different cliques or groups of heterogeneously oriented individuals in closer connection due to the growth of the group numbers and the inevitability of them communicating with each other and therefore bridging the weak tie links. However, I will argue that in the short run a weak tie societal structure is an obstacle for collective action among civil society groups as much as it is an obstacle for civil groups to recruit and reach wider masses of population and grow in size. Weak tie networking is a potential cause of vertical bonds, due to the nature of public goods (to be discussed in a following chapter). Vertical bonds are vital for the group’s survival in a society based on harsh competition and generalized distrust in an absence of community oriented mentality, whereas horizontal bonds require community participation, reciprocal cooperation and information sharing, i.e. norms unacceptable to the weak tie network principle. In a society split into cells or cliques of weak tie networks, collective community action is almost impossible in the absence of coercion or incentives (both are tools of the state rather than civil society), eventually leading to a fractionalized and clique based civil society. Undeniably, weak ties may be positive for bringing together individuals not necessarily connected by family or kin bonds. Nevertheless, the private interest oriented nature of weak tie networks prevents them from engaging and participating in community actions like it is the case with strong tie groups.

It seems obvious that the kinship based, tribal communities of many developing post-colonial states have laid a fertile ground for grassroots organizations focusing on community development and societal networking. Although limited to a certain clan, tribe and rural or urban community, strong tie networks have, nevertheless, encompassed a larger number of individuals – members of the above mentioned clans, tribes or communities. On the other hand, weak tie networks are made up of small cliques of acquaintances and friends, which are exclusive and elitist by nature. It might be assumed that strong tie networks create a more favorable ground for non-profit organizations in terms of collective action opportunities. It has been suggested (Gibson 1998) that the weak tie networks simply have to be arranged into formal organizations in order to succeed in advocating democratic values. However, it seems obvious that those networks already compose a major share of modern Russian civil society. In spite of being organized in formal organizations, weak tie networks do not change their atomized nature and vigorously reject collective action similarly to non-organized weak tie groups.
Which types of civil formations in Russia can foster weak tie networks? Answering this question might shed a light on where exactly we can look for clear examples of weak tie networks. As a matter of fact, Russian weak tie networks’ distribution perfectly fits into an original weak ties theory (Granovetter 1983), that is networks are made up of small circles of friends and acquaintances, connected to each other on the basis of mutual interests, goals, intellectual, social, gender backgrounds etc. The Russian networks are not necessarily private clubs of intellectuals, but they do include people from diverse walks of life – from construction workers to professors and from secondary school students to politicians. The network membership is strictly limited to people from the same occupation, background, social class, etc. It should be noted that the network composition differs in accordance to geographical regions and often depends on major types of occupations and social distribution between urban or rural areas. In her study of social networks in Novosibirsk, Sarah Busse (2001: 14) identified a number of major reasons behind network formation:

… redistribution of housing and of employment in the command economy; shortages in housing and infrastructure investment; and Soviet ideological control. These factors created a society of low geographical mobility, and high social isolation, that have helped to form the stable, dense, multiplex, homogenous networks that characterize Novosibirsk today.

Although weak tie networks are only visible under a meticulous examination of social structures, their presence is ubiquitous; they literally penetrate all elements of Russian social life. A system of well-connected acquaintances as a feature of the Russian part of the Soviet society undoubtedly survived the collapse of communism and seemingly shades off into the modern day Russian society. Thus, answering a question of where we can find weak tie networks, we can boldly claim: everywhere. The next puzzle to be solved is how the weak tie social structure affects collective actions of civil society.

**Logic of Collective Action**

Theoretically, the logic behind every collective action is an achievement of a common public good, sought after by a group of individuals for their material or social needs. It is widely as-
assumed that in the pursuit of public support it is reasonable to unite efforts and collectively seek the achievement of a common good. The orthodox theory of group action is, however, challenged by the assumption that groups do not always act collectively in the pursuit of attaining collective goods. Instead, on many occasions it is more favorable and rational for them to act individually. One of the classical theories of a collective action failure has been suggested by Olson (1971: 2). His argument basically assumes the following:

If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs of the burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives. Nor will such large groups form organizations to further their common goals in the absence of the coercion or the separate incentives just mentioned.

Simply put, the logic of collective action suggested by Olson argues that in a big group, where achievement of a public good does not directly depend on the performance of each member, rational individuals would rather opt to free-ride instead of actively participating in a collective action. Let us try to apply the above theory to the Russian civil society. It can be applied both at a macro level, i.e. to civil society as a whole, and a micro level, i.e. to individual groups of civil society and their individual members as well. However, firstly we need to define what can foster and hamper civil society. Intended both for political science and sociology, Olson’s theory mentions material and non-material incentives for groups. Material incentives are more applicable to market and profit oriented groups, while non-material incentives are defined as public goods for civil society. Thus, non-material incentives can be first of all considered as social interests or long-term goals. Since social interests are almost absent in the Russian civil society – community awareness is minimal and moral values are insignificant, and the pursuit of long-term goals is more ideological rather than practical. Individual or personal incentives mentioned by Olson, however, is what we can define by short-term goals, but they clearly do not require individuals or groups of individuals within civil society to act collectively. In contrast to large financial or business corporations or even civil society entities such as labor unions, NGOs (due to the nature of their public goods as defined in the previous chapter) can achieve short-term goals independently with perhaps a better result, in terms of funding distribution.

However, Olson’s theory still holds for civil groups’ incentives. Material or economic incentives are not intrinsic to civil society; the major incentives to be applied to it are non-material, i.e. social ones (Olson 1971: 60):

Economic incentives are not, to be sure, the only incentives; people are sometimes also motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship and other social and psychological objectives.

Clearly, the factor of social incentives in achieving long-term goals for civil society groups is absent from their agenda. Ironically, social incentives do exist in small civil groups (which will be discussed in a following section), however, only for the pursuit of their individual short-term goals. In civil society as a whole, however, the concept of social incentives is too weak to induce a collective action. Lacking exactly social and not material incentives, the Russian civil society fails to act collectively. The pursuit of material, short-term incentives does not require a collective action, and therefore thrives among the small groups. In other words, there are no incentives to encourage civil groups to act collectively for the achievement of their common good – democracy, human rights, community welfare, etc. The lack of incentives, as discussed before and to be discussed later, derives from an amalgamation of factors, with the weak tie society structure and excessive state interventionism being the major ones.
A similar logic goes for coercion: naturally civil society is a voluntary sector (with the exception of uncivil society which will be covered in the next chapter) and, in comparison to the business sector, it is very difficult to apply the term coercion as a reason for civil society to participate in a collective action. Nevertheless, I would suggest that in the absence of a real coercion there exists a “situational coercion,” that is the necessity to act collectively and form networks in order to grant a better protection from the state and effectively affect its own operational environment in implementing societal changes. To put it differently, coerced by the situation, i.e. by the hostile operational environment, logically, rational civil society groups could use their chances to act collectively. At present, this does not happen. My own explanation for the failure of situational coercion to encourage collective action would not be simply piling the whole weight of blame on the weak tie societal structure, but rather suggesting that the above failure emanates from a non-collective behavior mindset of the Russian civil groups which do not accept situational coercion in the same way as the common incentives. Olson’s argument seems to explain that outcome – in the absence of coercion and incentives, large groups (civil society as a whole in this case) fail to act collectively, as their main public goods (funding, credibility and publicity) can be achieved without collective action. In defining why Russian civil groups disregard coercion and incentives, we inevitably return to societal factors. The main aim of this chapter is, however, to analyze the failure of collective action as such rather than its origins. Following Olson, however, it is difficult to claim that the groups free-ride on common efforts, since they can obtain a public good without collective action. I would rather say that they neglect collective action as such as they can obtain their public goods without it. Civil groups do not even have to pretend that they are involved in a sort of collective action, as is the case with members of labor unions which do not provide incentives or coercion and as a result its members simulate collective action but eventually receive their share of public good, i.e. protection from the labor union. In this case, civil groups avoid collective action in general, and they obtain their public goods individually as a small group.

**Big and Small Civil Groups**

The concept of big and small groups plays a vital role in Olson’s theory of collective action. Group size plays an important part in defining the success of collective action, making both incentives and coercion to appear in a different light influenced by different circumstances. Briefly speaking, Olson (1971: 34) argues that small groups generally have less trouble to initiate collective action within the group, thus, in a small group,

… where each member gets a substantial proportion of the total gain simply because there are few others in the group, a collective good can often be provided by the voluntary, self-interested action of the members of the group.

Moreover, members of a small group consciously realize that their individual actions are necessary to ensure their personal public good, even if they are unwilling to cooperate with the members of their group they have to play it collectively. On the contrary, in a large group, group members are unconsciously confident that their personal actions will unlikely increase the total amount of a collective good. Therefore, in the logic of group action (Olson 1971: 36)

The larger the group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good.

Olson argues that small groups are more successful at a collective action within the group; however, if they try to expand their number of members or unite with another group they are
likely to face lamentable consequences. A small group will be successful in a pursuit of its public or individual goods in absence of visible coercion or incentives, as long as it will stay small. The success of small groups in collective action has been historically a feature of small tribal or island communities, characterized by common social ties with high levels of awareness in mutual dependence (Polanyi 1964). To some extent, we can compare the modern Russian cell-like weak tie networking with primeval island societies, where cliques of people have had close collaboration with the members of their own tiny community (strong ties) and only a lose connection with communities from nearby islands (weak ties).

Applying Olson’s concept of small groups to our case study, it does not seem difficult to connect Olson’s “small group” to a typical Russian non-profit group – mostly small in size, seeking short-term goals, avoiding cooperation with other groups and avoiding recruiting more participants (due to financial constraints). Staying small is the group’s strategy to utilize the grant money with a higher profit for group members. Avoiding friction with the state and retaining amateur in nature also allows it to keep the image of grassroots origins. In reality, most of the small Russian NGOs are staffed by members of a single weak tie cell – friends, neighbors, acquaintances, (Henderson 2002). Mutual trust is the key working environment, and the desire to pursue a common goal is supported by social bonds as much as financial incentives. Judging by the ability of the Russian non-profit groups to attract foreign aid, it seems to be obvious that small groups are effective in attaining their goals, unfortunately those goals are purely short-term ones. There is no doubt that many groups start as genuine long-term goal seeking organizations, however, encountering financial and legal obstacles on their way, most are likely to turn into an efficient small grant seeking entity concerned with its own survival and interested in the welfare of its own members only. If taken to a grander scale, this creates a civil society of small groups with no collaboration and cooperation in practice. The lack of collective action is undoubtedly the major reason behind the decline of the civil sector in the Russian Federation.

As mentioned earlier, Olson’s theory can also be used at a macro level, i.e. by analyzing civil society as a single big group with many non-profit organizations as individual members. In this view we can see that in the absence of coercion and individual incentives for individual groups to follow the common good or long-term goals, they simply tend to free-ride the whole institution, i.e. civil society itself, expecting to (or rather in most cases not even thinking of) eventually obtain the common good by simply belonging to the institution of civil society in the same way as members of a lame labor union are expecting to receive benefits from it by simply being its members without taking any action. In a long run, as previously mentioned by Olson, collective goods become almost unattainable for a big group. It has to implement some sort of incentives or coercion or otherwise face its failure as an organization. In a similar way, civil groups are following their individual interests neglecting collective action but retaining their membership. They grow numerically (before being confronted by the state) and they succeed individually; they free-ride the image of civil society for the sake of individual goals but
the institution of civil society itself is left paralyzed as a result. Just like in the case with the small groups, it is not difficult to notice the Russian civil society institute as a big group in Olson’s theory – clumsy and fractionalized, build as an institution with a name and a goal but incapable to work. Eventually, as predicted, the big group begins to steadily decay, giving birth to an offspring of its decline – uncivil society.

“Exclusive” & “Inclusive” and By-Product Groups

The groups, as defined by Olson, can be divided into “exclusive” and “inclusive” ones, depending on the nature of public goods which they seek. Normally, groups shift their exclusive / inclusive status due to their priorities in the pursuit of public goods. However, in the case of Russian civil groups, the majority of them retain an exclusive status, i.e. they limit their size and staff due to the nature of their public good, although, normally, the definition of exclusive groups is more characteristic of such non-public elements of civil society as religious associations, women’s groups, sexual minority groups or cooperatives which need to keep their size and numbers limited in order to pursue their goals in a more efficient way. In the case of non-profit groups of popular character, such as NGOs it is more natural to follow an inclusive way in order to retain a popular spirit and attract wider masses of supporters for the implementation of community projects. Russian NGOs are in favor of the exclusive approach, limiting their size and staff and following the classical stereotype of Olson’s efficient small groups. Exclusive and inclusive characteristics are not decisive factors in the performance of collective action; however, they are leading variables in defining a group size, which in its turn affects collaborative action.

To make it clear, small groups do not always fail at collective action. If they do have a necessary set of incentives or coercions to keep their growing numbers of participants from free-riding towards the common goal and actively participating in common action, there are no obstacles on their way to succeed in common action. Therefore, to a certain degree, incentives and coercion or in other words public goods are more important in defining collective action rather than the group size. This leads to an important reality: in the presence of necessary incentives (or to a lesser degree coercion), small individualistic civil groups in Russia could succeed at collective action in building a common global civil society. One more question which still needs exploration: why does collective action succeed in some groups which also have no coercion and incentives and why does it fail in others? Olson offers examples of labor unions, farmers’ and doctors’ associations as organizations which do not apply individual incentives or coercion in order to organize and lobby to obtain a collective good and yet largely manage to succeed in collective action. All of the above mentioned groups are not small in size and they are not exclusive at all. If we take labor unions as an example (which is also a part of civil society as such) we can see that, in comparison to fund seeking NGOs, they are not pursuing direct material benefits. Admittedly, they might have a goal of protecting the wages of their members, and winning over financial advantages for them. However, a labor union does not generally receive financial benefits itself, which makes it a completely non-material inclusive big group which simultaneously does not employ the same coercive or incentive measures as business and market groups do. There is no coercion to participate in labor unions and incentives are mostly moral and social. Even if a labor union’s collective action as that of an organization wins over some increase in wage it can usually be applied only to certain group of employees, not the whole membership of a labor union. How can a labor union remain as a big
group, acting collectively without a strict set of incentives and coercion, and how can labor unions throughout the country cooperate with each other? The answer Olson (1971: 132) suggests is that these groups are also organized for some other purpose. The large and powerful economic lobbies are in fact the by-products of organizations that obtain their strength and support because they perform some function in addition to lobbying for collective goods.

In other words, labor unions, for instance, are connected to certain industries, just like farmers and doctors associations and therefore they can be considered as by-product groups. In the Russian case, most of labor unions are also retain tight connection to certain political parties or movements. None of that could be said of civil society groups. They simply do not have any supporting structure to buttress their existence, as a third sector they are expected to be a force within itself, a societal actor.

The basic conclusions to be drawn from the logic of collective action proposed in this chapter can be summarized as following: Civil society groups, just like any other group without incentives and coercion, are unlikely to act collectively for the achievement of common good. Small groups appear to be more effective in a pursuit of their own public good, though usually fail at collective action, unless provided incentives beyond the individual ones which they possess as members of a small group. The nature of a public good is more important than the group size; it is actually the one which decides the group’s size. Public good in turn depends on the environment the group operates in, which predetermines the nature of a collective good. Civil society groups are not by-product groups and therefore can not expect to receive an impetus for collective action from an outside body.

Conclusion

The major challenge for this research may arise from a question why collective action fails for the Russian non-profit groups? The arguments resulting from this thesis claim that the main clues are to be sought in the societal structure inherited from the Soviet past and enhanced by volatile socio-political and economic factors.

“Weak tie” society networks are mentioned in sociological scholarship as the main form of societal relations in post-Soviet societies. Not always negative, although generally debilitating to the democratization process, “weak tie” networking is offered by this thesis as the ground cause of failure in cooperation among civil groups in Russia. It is suggested hereby that weak tie networking directly affects civil groups’ will and motivation to display a collective group behavior. “Weak tie” networking alone could not be held accountable for the lack of collective action and the decline of the civil sector. Instead, we need to consider a whole interplay of variables, evolving around both societal and political factors, affecting directly or figuratively the performance, operational environment and structure of civil groups. Whereas, the “weak tie” society creates an environment for the weak community and disrupted communicational channels, it is the nature of public goods that defines the success or failure of collective action. The nature of the common goods pursued by groups defines their size, composition, recruitment and operational strategies. The nature of public goods itself is not only a by-product of operational environment, i.e. “weak tie” society structure, but also an independent variable defining the process of collective action. Once the groups are formed, both big and small ones, collective action does not solely depend on societal factors anymore. The group size and its operational strategies in obtaining public goods all become determined by the nature of public goods. The “weak tie” societal structure also depends on external factors; if the operational en-
environment is favorable for the collective action and if the external political and economic factors are beneficial for the cooperative networking, groups can overcome societal constraints and display coordinated and organized collective action in order to obtain a common public good. From the historical data provided in this work, it is clear that there was no favorable external environment inducing a productive collective action in Russia.

At its early stages in the late 1980s, the civil sector in Russia experienced a sudden boom which is intrinsic to the transition processes between different regime types. As soon as the first wave of commotion subsided, the civil sector reached its deadlock; at this particular stage of development it has been mainly caused by the “weak tie” structure which has played a determining role in the formation of civil sector. At the later stages of its development, in the mid and late 1990s, the civil sector had been already formed, and the patterns of group behavior have already been set in motion. Both the pursuit of short-term public goods and fierce competition and hostility among civil groups compounded the earlier influence of the “weak tie” structure. We can not blame the “weak tie” networking for the lack of collaboration; rather seeds planted much earlier began to bloom into an amalgamation of factors that can be held responsible for the problem. Among them we have to mention the nature of public goods, the equilibrium of state-society relations, and last but not the least the group behavior itself. Once the pattern of operational structure began to work, i.e. small groups realized their efficacy in the pursuit of short-term goals and rejected long-term goals, making no attempts to initiate collective action. The societal pattern had been established and concretized and only a transformation similar in scale to the regime change after the collapse of communism could have created a new pattern of behavior. The changes did arrive with the new government in 2000, and the operational environment, previously influenced largely by the “weak tie” networking structure and its by-products now received reinforcement by active and pervasive state interventionism and the birth of civil society’s “evil twin” – uncivil society. With the appearance of new actors the scene transformed drastically against civil society, although the latter managed to adjust itself and even reap profits (fewer competitors due to harsh legislation, more grants due to hostile operational environment) but only in the short-run. The state factor currently plays an important role in negatively influencing the collective action of civil groups. It has succeeded along with the “weak tie” networking in de-capacitating civil groups’ performance.

Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that neither the “weak tie” societal structure nor the state interventionism can be considered the single major reason for the decline of civil society’s performance and the lack of collective action; rather we need to think about an interplay of these two factors connected by a network of variables serving as links between them. We can not successfully single out a sole factor responsible for the problem; rather we need to focus on a diversity of variables, shifting their places over the period of time. Importantly, since the decline of the civil sector in Russia has steadily continued throughout almost the whole period of its existence, we need to focus on a whole set of reasons rather than selecting a single cause. In the long run, we might anticipate the “weak tie” communities to proliferate and expand to the point suggested by many scholars (Gibson 2001; Kniazeva 2002) and form closer circles encompassing a few or many “weak tie” cliques. However, taking into consideration an intervening variable or the state interventionism in Russia we can hardly expect that the weak tie society’s de-atomization is likely to happen in a natural way. As long as the atomized society is serving the purposes favorable to the state, the latter will unlikely allow the societal development to flow uncontrolled. Accordingly, we are not likely to expect any feasible progress in democratization or civil society consolidation processes in the Russian Federation any time soon.
References


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